Nov
18
2009
Does God Really Want All People to Be Saved?
Mark Driscoll asks R.C. Sproul, “Does God desire all people to be saved?”
About Justin Taylor
Follower of Christ. Editorial Director at Crossway.
Elder at Grace Community Bible Church.
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201 Comments
I love Sproul. His book “Chosen By God” is one of my all-time favorites.
I think what he says here is good and right, but he doesn’t directly address the question. We might be able to deduce an answer based on what he said, but it seems to me that the point of the Q&A is to get direct answers. Sadly, I’m left unsatisfied.
Can anybody tell me how to embed this?
Interesting.
The Westminster COnfession says
“The rest of mankind God was PLEASED, according to the unsearchable counsel of His own will, whereby He extends or withholds mercy, as He PLEASES, for the glory of His sovereign power over His creatures, to pass by; and to ordain them to dishonor and wrath for their sin, to the praise of His glorious justice.”
So I guess God has now three wills and two pleasures, according to Sproul.
It also seems like a short jump from “God doesn’t really LIKE sending people to hell” to C. S. Lewis’ “God just lets people go to hell who want to go to hell.”
Honestly, this sounds like typical Calvinist double speak to get around the plain meaning of the text, or rather to try and uphold the plain meaning of the text in some way and hold on to Calvinism, which runs against the plain meaning of the text. Even some of the seemingly Calvinist commenters in this thread seem to sense that Sproul dances around the question here. His point about different senses of “will” is effectively debunked and disposed of by I. Howard Marshall in his commentary on the pastoral epistles, p. 427. None of this is to take away from Sproul as a great man of God and Christian scholar.
I’m inclined to agree, Arm…I understand he was responding to someone’s prompting thru a question, but it seems to me Calvinism (or the present iteration of it) has these categories that, at times, require them to shoe-horn Scripture. I still respect Sproul, tho I have differences.
I cannot understand how one holds to a philosophical concept of deterministic decrees and then turns around and suggests God grieves at sending people to hell. It is almost a self serving masochism of sorts where the LORD does not want to do what the WCF states He takes pleasure in. Is the LORD double minded with regard to His various wills? Of course He is not and therefore this explanation offered by Mr. Sproul is specious at best.
“For God has put it into their hearts to accomplish his purpose by agreeing to give the beast their power to rule, until God’s words are fulfilled.” -Revelation 17:17
Did God will that the kings of the earth disobey His will?
God desires all men to be saved but they are not, therefore God is unable to get what He desires. Why? Because He must “honor” man’s free will in rejecting Him. So it appears there is a higher authority that God must submit to, namely man and his free will. So God ceases to be God and man in his depravity resumes that role, a role he has sought from the fall- namely, sitting on the throne of his life as king of kings and lord of lords.
Arminianism places man’s free will as the highest value in God’s economy, although scripture affirms that God values Himself and His glory above all things.
If God’s glory is the highest objective, does God get more glory from the voluntary praise of free creatures, or the involuntary praise of scripted beings? Also, I think it’s unwarranted to say that according to Arminianism, free will is the “highest authority.” I agree that the highest authority is God’s sovereign will, but IF his sovereign will is for man to make self-determined, voluntary choices, then that doesn’t necessarily make free will the highest authority. Rather, it means that free will is simply the result of the sovereign preference to provide it.
Further to that end, is there greater glory in the redemption of souls for which songs of joy are sung or in the determined eternal damnation of souls the LORD is grieved to dispatch to hell i.e. Glory in redemption, Glory in grief? I can easily understand glory in Justice but I fail to see any glory whatsoever in deterministic damnation with it’s attendant grief and displeasure.
False dichotomy.
False dichotomy? How so?
regards,
#John
Yes … how are my comments creating a false dichotomy?
Saint and Sinner,
What God willed was to accomplish His good purposes through men’s own evil actions uncoerced by Himself.
Actually, my question was directed toward ‘Arminian’ and his assertion that God having two wills is false.
Unfortunately, I find that his answer is evasive at best.
He doesn’t actually answer the question.
I have to agree with Byran, here. What RC Sproul said was true, but it does not answer the question. But, I must add, the question (or I should say questions) that Driscoll read’s from the questioner is confusing. The question starts off okay: Does God desire all men to be saved. The answer to that question is unequivocally, yes. He wished all men to be saved and that none should perish.
But then the question changes form, because the questioner asks later in his letter does the Lord “want” all men to be saved. Well, what does “want” mean. Does it mean that God wills all men to saved? He clearly and unequivocally, does NOT will all men to be saved.
There is a mystery that simply will not be answered in this lifetime and that is this: there is a difference between what God wishes and what He wills. He commands all men to repent, but He clearly does not will all men to repent. He desideratively desires all men to be saved, but He does not effectually will all men to be saved. He doesn’t have two different wills. There is one will but clearly He wishes things which He does not will.
It’s clear that you’re reserving the term “will” for God’s effectual purpose *alone*, but that’s not biblical. The term “will” is *also* used in the bible for God’s preceptive desire/wish that men obey him. Therefore, it is not wrong to say that God “wills” all men to repent and be saved in the revealed “will” of God.
God doesn’t merely passively delight in men being saved either, but he *seeks* their salvation according to the bible by sending prophets to beseech, woo, entreat and beg them [the Puritans constantly use these expressions] to comply with the gospel commands and offers. That’s bespeaks an active principle in God.
Again, read Ursinus’ use of the term “will” with “desire” in this quote:
According to Ursinus, God both wills and desires the salvation of all, even as he “invites” them, but only the elect obtain salvation because he grants them saving faith.
He answers the question to me. As a teacher he provokes thought so that we can come up with the answer as opposed to being spoon-fed and answer for us to regurgitate.
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[...] question put to him by Mark Driscoll is: Does God Really Want All People to Be Saved?. Have a [...]
“Because He must “honor” man’s free will in rejecting Him…”
Not because He must, but because He chooses to. If it is God’s purpose to have men, after being enabled by His grace, willingly come to Him, then your assertion is invalid.
Exactly right. He did *not* answer the question. Mark didn’t ask him 1) if God delights in meeting out wrath upon the lost, but 2) if God desires all men to be saved in the revealed will. His “answer” was not “great,” contrary to what Driscoll says. It was an evasion, sadly. Piper actually answers the question in his work on the “Two Wills of God,” as does R. L. Dabney [in "God's Indiscriminate Proposals of Mercy"] and countless other Calvinists.
Thomas Adams, Isaac Ambrose, William Bates, Louis Berkhof, Jeremiah Burroughs, Thomas Cartwright, John Calvin, Robert Candlish, Thomas Chalmers, Ezekiel Culverwell, WIlliam Cunningham, John L. Dagg, James Durham, John Flavel, Andrew Fuller, William Greenhill, Andrew Grey, Rudolph Gwalther, William Gurnall, Matthew Henry, Oliver Heywood, Charles Hodge, John Howe, Erroll Hulse, Andreas Hyperius, Hanserd Knollys, Cotton Mather, John Preston, Samuel Rutherford, Richard Sibbes, Charles Spurgeon, George Swinnock, Francis Turretin, Zacharias Ursinus, William Whately and George Whitefield all explicitly say that God “desires” all men to be saved in the revealed will.
Not only that, but Augustine, Robert Harris [a Westminster divine], Walter Chantry, Hugh Latimer, Ralph Erskine, Samuel Davies, Daniel Burgess, Sydrach Simpson [a Westminster divine], Isaac Ambrose, Solomon Stoddard, Charles Spurgeon, Richard Sibbes, John Flavel, Stephen Charnock, Thomas Manton, Samuel Rutherford, John Shower, William Gurnall, George Swinnock, Ralph Venning, George Whitefield, Jonathan Edwards, Andrew Gray, Charles Spurgeon, Thomas Chalmers and Erroll Hulse all explicitly speak of God “begging” men to come to him for salvation in the gospel offer.
Why aren’t modern Calvinists in mass speaking this way any more? This subject is being sorely neglected!
Jesus delights that God has hidden the gospel from the wise (Mt 11:25), then wails over the obstinance of Jerusalem (Mt 23:37), it’s a hard question for systematics to answer (except for arm-chair theologians). Go easy on Sproul. And no I’m not PCA. ;-)
The main question put to Sproul is not hard to answer. However, explaining how it is theologically coherent for God to will and nill the same thing in different respects is where the difficulty is. Sproul was mainly asked if God desires the salvation of all men. He should have said “Yes!” without hesitation, and then explained the nuances and distinctions biblically and theologically. Again, these are two distinct questions:
1) Does God desire all men to be saved in the revealed will?
2) How can God truly will all men to be saved in the revealed will when he has purposed to only save some?
#1 should be easy. #2 is what is difficult to explain, although fine Reformed theologians have done it [John Howe, R. L. Dabney, etc]. We could go easy on Sproul if he were a mere novice, but he is not. There is no instance in his long career of writings or in his lectures that I know of where he affirms that God desires the salvation of all men in the revealed will, even though I think he believes it.
Here’s the Puritan John Preston’s [1587-1628] answer to question #2, just as a sample for the blog readers:
Tony,
I think the questions put to Sproul were hard to answer because he was asked two different questions. (1)Does God desire all men to be saved and (2)Does God want alll men to be saved. These are two different questions especially if you define “wanting” as “willing.”
It was an unfair question to Sproul and Driscoll should have spotted it.
What do you mean, what “I’ve” done. That was how the question was asked! He started off by asking about desire and the questioner changed to want. I haven’t “done” anything. And it’s not a distinction without a difference. The difference between what God wills and what He desires is HUGE.
You think the difference is “huge” beccause *you* reserve the term “will” for God’s efficacious purpose *alone*, but that is neither biblical nor historically Calvinistic. Therefore it is a distinction without a difference, since God both wills and desires the salvation of all men in the revealed will, just as Ursinus says.
I’m not reserving anything, Tony. Sproul correctly said in the video that there are two different Greek words translated as will.
If we were living in the times the Bible was written we would be using two different words. To put it in today’s vernacular it would be this: what God wishes and what He wills. What we understand will to mean.
CR,
You’re proving my point. *You’re* reserving the term “will” for the latter category of God’s decretal purpose, and “wish” and “desire” for what was formerly called God’s revealed “will.” That’s historically novel, as both the bible and historic Calvinists have used the term “will” interchangeably with God’s revealed “wish” also. Ursinus alone proves my point.
Here’s a list for CR:
Thomas Adams, Isaac Ambrose, John Arrowsmith [a Westminster divine], William Bates, Louis Berkhof, Henry Bullinger, John Bunyan, Jeremiah Burroughs, Thomas Cartwright, John Calvin, Robert Candlish, Thomas Chalmers, Stephen Charnock, Thomas Crawford, Ezekiel Culverwell, William Cunningham, R. L. Dabney, J. L. Dagg, John Davenant, James Durham, Jonathan Edwards, John Flavel, Andrew Fuller, William Greenhill [a Westminster divine], Andrew Grey, Rudolf Gwalther [Bullinger's successor], William Gurnall, Matthew Henry, Oliver Heywood, Charles Hodge, Ezekiel Hopkins, John Howe, Erroll Hulse, Andreas Hyperius, Hanserd Knollys, Hugh Latimer, Edward Leigh, D. M. Lloyd-Jones, Thomas Manton, Augustine Marlorate, Cotton Mather, R. M. McCheyne, Matthias Martinius, Wolfgang Musculus, Amandus Polanus, Edward Polhill, John Preston, William Prynne, Edward Reynolds [a Westminster divine], J. C. Ryle, James Saurin, Henry Scudder [a Westminster divine], W. G. T. Shedd, George Swinnock, Francis Turretin, Zacharius Ursinus, Herman Venema, Peter Martyr Vermigli, Thomas Watson, George Whitefield and Johannes Wollebius all explicitly refer to God “willing” men to obey his preceptive “wish”/”desire.”
I can provide all the primary source quotes for everything I am referencing, if “desired.” ;-)
Isn’t the fact that God only saves some (according to his pleasure) and damns others (to display his attribute of wrath) apart of his revealed will? Isn’t that the standard Calvinist interpretation of Eph 1:4- and Romans 9:24? What do you mean by “revealed will” here other than God’s intentions being made known to us via divine revelation? If both the desire to save all and the desire to save some and damn others is part of divine revelation and describe God’s intentions towards humanity then we have a contradiction and falsification of this argument.
I think that R.C. Sproul got into trouble the moment he gave an analogy. In other words, the judge despairs over having to condemn his guilty son, but yet according to Calvinism, who scripted, fixed, determined and decreed for man to fall into sin in the first place, so that God is now despairing over what He immutably decreed?
To: Richard Coords
Rich I read your first post about how you believe that Calvinists like Sproul believe that God gets more glory by the praise of “scripted beings.” Consider Jesus his life was “scripted” his destiny was spelled out in the Old Testament. Was Jesus free? He was the freest individual who has ever lived, yet Jesus was determined and ordained before the foundation of the World to die for his people. So do you see how in the Bible that man is free and he chooses but none of those choices are outside what God ordains?
Honestly, I don’t. I cannot follow your logic in your analogy with Jesus and Calvary. Are you suggesting that Jesus choose Calvary, which He did not also Himself freely ordain? I’m sorry. I’m just not following your logic at all.
Tony,
I don’t care how many people you have in your list and you’ve really complicated the issue. If I was to talk to your normal recently regenerated Joe Lunchbucket in the street and he asked the same question(s) being asked here about does God want or desire all or some to be saved, here is how I would answer that question today and everyone in your list would agree with me: there is a difference between what God wishes and what He wills. It’s unfortunate that our English language is not as precise as the biblical Greek language (because if it was we would have two different words and not one word with different adjective modifiers) but if I wanted to confuse your normal Joe, I would use your argument. I would tell him, “yes, God wills all to be saved, but at the same time he wills only some to be saved.”
If I wanted to use big words and confuse people, I would use your argument. But if I just wanted to speak to him in plain and simple English and be true to the Bible I would say this: God wishes all men to be saved (it really is astounding that He would wish any to be saved) but He wills only some to be saved.
I’ll give you the last word.
CR,
Consider this very small sample of quotes that show how some Calvinists use the term “willing” interchangeably with God’s “desire”. They not only demonstrate how these men do not agree with you that God only “wills” the salvation of the elect, but also how they are no more “complicating the issue” than I am:
There is nothing new about this interchangeability either, as it even goes back to Augustine’s defender, Prosper of Aquitaine. Notice how he warns against saying that God only “wills” the salvation of the fixed number of the elect:
Now finally, look at George Whitefield’s manner of using the terms “desire” and “willing” interchangeably in a sermon to the lost:
One thing is for sure: Prosper, Whitefield, Fuller, Hodge, Cotton Mather, and Bunyan don’t agree with you, and you ought to care about what they have said, along with Ursinus.
Tony,
Nothing you have said changes this biblical fact: God wishes or desires all men to be saved, but He does not will it – He commands all men to repent, but He does not will it.
Every single Calvinist you cite (I didn’t see any hypercalvinists) if they asked me, “CR” what do you mean by will?” I would say, “oh, the Webster def’n that we use in the 21st century – The Lord’s determination, insistence persistence and willfulness – God does not have the determination or willfulness to save all men. Each one of the biblical calvinists you mention would say, ah yes, CR, we agree.
If they asked me what do you mean by wish or desire, CR? I would say the Webster def’n of what it means to wish or desideratively desire – to express or entertain a wish. Every single one of the men you mentioned would say, ah yes, we agree CR. The Lord definitely expresses a wish that all men be saved. He does not will it, i.e. He is not determined or insistent or persisting in saving all men, but He does wish it.
However they defined their terms then, if I defined it to them today how it’s used in today’s vernacular each and everyone of them without a doubt, would agree.
The quotes are plain enough. All the men I cite have no problem using the term “willing” in an inefficacious sense, unlike you. As I said so many times, you’re only using the term “will” in an efficacious sense when applied to God, even though John Preston and Ursinus alone are enough to show how you differ from them. Bunyan’s terminology above is also as plain as day:
That is clearly an inefficacious usage of the term “willing.” You can claim all day that these men agree with you, but it is nothing more than that, i.e. a mere claim/mere assertion without any demonstration or proof, even when the evidence is before the eyes of all the readers here.
Tony,
You fail to understand something. Just because it was okay for those men to use it then doesn’t mean it was okay for us to use it now. I’ll give you one example. And I don’t mean to be funny or anything, here. But I heard in a taped sermon D. Martin Lloyd-Jones use a word to express a suddent emotional utterance in reference to responding to the Holy Spirit and the word he used was “ejaculation.” He used it over and over and over again. Well, maybe they still use that word in the UK to describe that but we don’t. I’m not trying to be funny here, I’m being serious. And it just continues to shock me even though I knew what he meant.
Similarly, when we say will, we mean determination, persistence and insistence. To use that word in any other way in today’s vernacular. If we continue to use willing for any other thing than what it means today we give ammunition to the Arminians who talk about double-speak. I’m also concerned about the average Joe Lunchbucket who has not read the difficult Old English of John Owen. You seem to think it’s more important to use “willing” because men used it hundreds of years ago than what it means today.
To complete one of my sentences above, to use that word willing in any other way, TODAY, than what I’ve described, would be wrong, in my opinion, notwithstanding very confusing and giving Armninians the ammunition to criticize us as doing double-speak.
Ok. The bible uses the terminology of God “willing” all to obey the gospel and be saved, the Reformers used that terminology, and the Puritans did as well, but we should not. If it is confusing for us to use “willing” in different senses, then it must be for “love,” “grace” and “calling” as well. We’ll end up saying that God only “loves” the elect, is only “gracious” to the elect and only “wills” the salvation of the elect.
Tony wrote: “The bible uses the terminology of God “willing” all to obey the gospel and be saved, the Reformers used that terminology, and the Puritans did as well, but we should not.”
As RC Sproul stated, there are two different words in the Greek with two different meanings which unfortunately are translated in the English to one word – will. It’s unfortunate that the English language is not as precise as the biblical Greek. So, yes, it’s better not to confuse people and use words that have specific meanings today rather. Translations are not inspired. Only the orginal autographs are. And it’s more important to convey proper meaning than to say, what’s good enough for the goose is good enough for the gander.
CR,
Just as the terms “love,” “grace” and “calling” are used in different senses in the bible and in Calvinistic history with respect to God’s disposition towards humanity, so has the term “will.” Given the pattern of your thinking in this meta, it wouldn’t surprise me if you had problems with saying God has a “love” of benevolence for all men, or that God is generally “gracious” to all men, since that would “complicate the issue” as well, as the terms “love” and “grace” are used in different senses biblically and historically. We even have to explain the nuances of “calling” [general vs. effectual] in the bible, since there are multiple senses of that as well.
The truth is: God loves all men [love of benevolence], but especially the elect [an electing and complacent love]. God is gracious to all men [common grace], but especially to the elect [special grace]. God calls all men generally, but only the elect effectually. God wills/wishes/desires all men to be saved, but especially the elect. The terminology is no more complicated than that, and those are the distinctions we should make in explaining God’s love, grace and will to any Christian, whether newly converted or not.
Incidentally, there are some Calvinistic men who use the stronger terms “intent” and “purpose” for God’s universal saving will. John Davenant, Matthias Martinius, Edward Polhill, Henry Scudder, John Howe, George Swinnock, Nathaniel Vincent, John Flavel and George Whitefield did so. Recently, Dr. Sam Waldron has done this very thing in expounding the context of John 5:34 and the free offer teaching of the 1689 LBC. These men could say that there is a sense in which God “intends” and “purposes” the salvation of all men, but they don’t mean that in the effectual sense, obviously. If I am “complicating the issue,” how much more are they?! ;-)
Another instance of this interchangeability or use of God’s “willingness” to save all can be seen in the John Preston quote I provided above. Preston clearly says:
To Richard Coords
What I am saying is that Jesus life was written in advance and he never sinned, ever. So was his obedience to God somehow mechanical and unreal and not gloryfing to God? No. In the same way when God regenrates a man he enables him to worship him, and this worship is not mechanical or unfree. Now do you get my point?
Rich Jesus freely choose calvary, and he ordained beforehand that he would die on the cross, both are true.
God has a “will of disposition”. God doesn’t get His jollies out of condemning people.
God truly has loving-kindness toward people, and yet He will judge sinners.
RC spoke some great stuff here. he showed us God’s character is one of love for those He created in His image, and yet God is just and will judge sin.
God’s desire is not that people should go to hell. But he will send us there, because we deserve it.
I had a neighbor of mine killed last night in a convenience store by a hood. he was a lovely guy, who every one in Catonsville knew. He was in the store at the time of the robbery, and this wicked man murdered him. He’s dead.
I hope they apprehend this murderer. And I hope he is executed. For that is what he deserves. I don’t want him to be killed, but he needs to die for what he did. he forfeited his life by killing someone, who was innocent.
God will kill all who deserve to be killed. He did it with the flood. And yet it grieved God to do it.
Always love to hear RC. Thanks very much.
It sure takes a lot of talking to explain why the verse doesn’t really mean what it says. What a crock!
“..doesn’t really mean what it says.” -Dave
And what’s that?
God wants all men to be saved according to His preceptive, or revealed will. That’s what’s in view in 1Tim 2:4 and passages like Ezek 18. It’s why guys like Edwards and Charnock and the litany of others Tony has graciously provided for us would answer this question with an emphatic yes.
But the questioner obviously recognizes some apparent tension between a blanket “Yes!” and with the Biblical doctrine of God’s absolute sovereignty. According to God’s decretive will — His will of decree — He does not want all men to be saved. If He did, in this sense, all men would be saved. The fact that all men are not saved demonstrates that God does not decree that all men be saved, and so in at least some sense, He does not want that all men be saved.
For those who say that God sovereignly chooses to make man sovereign, well, they’re wrong. God is sovereign, because He’s God. The sovereign one is God. God cannot decide to not be God anymore by giving His sovereignty to something else.
For those who think it’s not fair that God is absolutely sovereign and that sinners are responsible for their sin, you have a problem. You’re the guy Paul’s arguing with in Romans 9:18-24.
Thank you mike. You have helped me see the core issue I have AGAINST Calvinism.
You have made a distinction between God’s decretive will and His revealed will.
The specifics of His decretive will are hidden, in that no one is told or knows who He chose to work upon to be saved and those who He chose not to work upon so as to be damned. Only the general idea, that God chose some to work upon and the rest to NOT work upon, IS known.
The specifics of His revealed will are open and without doubt, because the general idea is stated not only clearly but universally. This means that there is a conflict between the specifics of the revealed will and the general idea of the decretive will.
Calvinism resolves this perceived conflict by having the specifics of the decretive will override the specifics of the revealed will.
Therefore, Calvinism holds you cannot trust or believe in anything that you can logically conclude from God’s revealed will (which is knowable), since it will be overridden by the details of His decretal will, which are not revealed.
Therefore, Calvinism holds you cannot trust or believe in anything that you can logically conclude from God’s revealed will (which is knowable), since it will be overridden by the details of His decretal will, which are not revealed.
Exactly! Well said!
And beside that, the decretal will is “revealed” to us anyway.
Indeed … the secret will is at odds with the revealed will. Scripture regards such disjointed thinking as double minded.
A.M. Mallet said:
“Scripture regards such disjointed thinking as double minded.”
Me:
Well, does God will that the kings of the earth gather together and hand their authority over to the beast against His will (Rev. 17:17)?
Where is the secret will in that passage?
Almost feels like Gnosticism.
Great comment Mike, it has helped me understand this issue. God bless you, May the lord keep you humble and growing in grace!
Historically, Calvinists [particularly the Puritans] have not only spoken of God’s “willingness,” “desire” and “wish” for all to be saved, but they freely speak of God “entreating,” “beseeching,” “begging,” “longing” for, “urging,” “pleading,” “wooing,” “alluring,” “yearning” for, “striving,” “courting,” “soliciting,” “designing,” “suing,” “aiming,” having a “propension” for, “seeking,” “trying,” “concerned” for, “pleading,” “labouring,” “working to gain,” “pressing” for, “encouraging,” “aiding,” “assisting,” “pathetically calling” for, “drawing and travailing” for the salvation of all men. So why in the world are today’s Calvinists choking on the idea or hesitating at truth that God “wills,” “wishes” and “desires” the salvation of all men? It’s because they’ve been getting heavy doses of decretal teaching [from Sproul and others, and on the internet] to the neglect of teaching regarding God’s revealed will. This lopsidedness is very easy to fall into in our heavily autonomous/absolute-sovereignty-rejecting “evangelical” climate.
Maybe we should be focusing on the fact that God saves ANYONE, not just who He chooses. And for those who are attacking (and often do on this blog) a person who Justin’s posts about, would you really say the stuff you write in front of the person? Some grace would be nice folks. I’m not advocating that people shell up, if you will, just that we choose our words carefully and offer some grace to a watching world.
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I think Spurgeon has an great perspective on 1 Timothy 2:3-4. He spends a little over 4 pages in his sermon talking about Calvinists making the text say what it doesn’t say. It available online here.
An excerpt that bears to the truth that the Scripture, not our self-conceived systematics, must guide our understanding of any text:
“What then? Shall we try to put another meaning into the text than that which it fairly bears? I trow not. You must, most of you, be acquainted with the general method in which our older Calvinistic friends deal with this text. “All men,” say they,- “that is, some men”: as if the Holy Ghost could not have said “some men” if he had meant some men. “All men,” say they; “that is, some of all sorts of men”: as if the Lord could not have said
“all sorts of men” if he had meant that. The Holy Ghost by the apostle has written “all men,” and unquestionably he means all men. I know how to get rid of the force of the “alls” according to that critical method which some time ago was very current, but I do not see how it can be applied here with due regard to truth. I was reading just now the exposition of a very able doctor who explains the text so as to explain it away; he applies grammatical gunpowder to it, and explodes it by way of expounding it. I thought when I read his exposition that it would have been a very capital comment upon the text if it had read, “Who will not have all men to be saved, nor come to a knowledge of the truth.” Had such been the inspired language every remark of the learned doctor would have been exactly in keeping, but as it happens to say, “Who will have all men to be saved,” his observations are more than a little out of place. My love of consistency with my own doctrinal views is not great enough to allow me knowingly to alter a single text of Scripture. I have great respect for orthodoxy, but my reverence for inspiration is far greater. I would sooner a hundred times over appear to be inconsistent with myself than be inconsistent with the word of God. I never thought it to be any very great crime to seem to be inconsistent with myself; for who am I that I should everlastingly be consistent? But I do think it a great crime to be so inconsistent with the word of God that I should want to lop away a bough or even a twig from so much as a single tree of the forest of Scripture. God forbid that I should cut or shape, even in the least degree, any divine expression. So runs the text, and so we must read it, “God our Savior; who will have all men to be saved, and to come unto the knowledge of the truth.””
Spurgeon was as Calvinist. What he is addressing is Hyper-Calvinism, which most people wrongfully associate as Calvinism or Reformed Theology.
A distinction between preceptive and revealed will needs to be made. ‘Preceptive will’ has to do with what God commands. ‘Revealed will’ more broadly refers to special revelation and can also refer for example to what God promises or decrees. Thus, within God’s revelaed will both His preceptive will and portions of his decretive will can be known (e.g. prophecy).
Oy vey … nothing like Calvinist’s arguing about this topic 9th million time. Boring.
To make further clarifications, God’s preceptive will can be resisted. IOW, humans disobey what God commands. Not “all people everywhere” repent (Acts 17:30) as God commands, therefore they don’t do what he “wants/ desires” them to. But God’s decretive will cannot be resisted. No one can ward off His hand because He does all that He “wants/ desires/ pleases/ wills” both among the host of heaven and the inhabitants of earth (Dan. 4:35).
Brian, its been decreed that you suffer under our boring you to death and you have no freedom to not look at what has been said and subsequently complain of its boring content.
Excellent comments by Gerald Owens above. Walls and Dongell basically say the same thing in their book, Why I Am Not A Calvinist,
“Again, although the text seems to identify salvation as God’s deepest desire, the Calvinist must conclude that at a deeper level God never intended to bestow transforming grace on Jeremiah’s hearers. In other words, the true intentions of God cannot be discerned from his words.
“Somewhere along the way, the burden of reading myriad passages throughout the Bible in such a counterintuitive fashion should anxiously bring us to this sort of question: since the Calvinist view of divine sovereignty routinely requires such an awkward ‘decoding’ of biblical texts, should not we re-examine the Calvinist view of divine sovereignty itself?” (pp. 56, 57, emphasis theirs)
http://evangelicalarminians.org/node/312
To donsands
Sorry about your neighbor.
If it generated this much blog discussion, why be angry with R.C. Sproul for the limited time he had to answer the question?
I can’t speak for others, but I am not “angry” with R. C. Sproul. I suspect that we’re all just disappointed that he didn’t answer the important question put to him [i.e. "Does God desire all men to be saved, even though he has not decreed it?"], but answered another [i.e. "Does God take pleasure in punishing?"]. Every studied Calvinist should emphatically affirm God’s desire to save all men, even if they see the need to make careful biblical and theological qualifications afterward.
The blog discussion doesn’t mean that the question [Does God desire the salvation of all?] itself is difficult to answer, but that many people can’t see how it is coherent for God to both will and nill the same thing in different respects, despite the fact that God willed Christ to die by the hands of murdering men, which was against His will ["Do not murder"].
Some Calvinists are hesitating to affirm a “universal saving will” in God. Now, Rationalistic and taunting Arminians on the other side are showing up in the meta with the assumption that God EQUALLY wills the salvation of all men, and they think that Calvinistic qualifications on God’s will are unsatisfactory, absurd and biblically straining. That’s what is going on.
“rationalistic and taunting Arminians”
Bad,bad Arminians, how dare you raise questions and make claims that Calvinism appears contradictory in the meta (whatever the “meta” is, I’m ignorant of some of these labels, I assume it means “comments section” but what is it short for; Meta-what?).
It would be interesting to find the argumentations of these “rationalistic and taunting Arminians” dissected point by point rather than dismissing them with a label of them being “rationalistic” and “taunting”.
Thanks Reality. It’s a shame. This man was a good neighbor, and everyone liked him, and a wicked evil man shoots him dead for a few bucks.
You never know, that’s why today is the day of salvation.
“..boring.” -Brian
It’s never boring to me to discuss the deep truths of Christ. I am bored by the shallow doctrines which have been engraved in the American churches for the most part.
Discussing the depths of God’s love, salvation, election, wrath, etc., what could be more exciting. Unless one is dead to the deep things of the Holy Scriptures, a Christian should want to hear these things and learn, and grow in His knowledge of the Lord Jesus Christ, as we grow in the grace of our Lord as well.
I wasn’t disappointed at all. RC said God “doesn’t get His jollies in punishing the wicked”. God’s pleasure and desire is not to see the wicked punished, and so His desire is that sinners be spared would be implied of course. At the same time RC said, “God doesn’t enjoy sending people to hell, but He does it.”
God will judge the wicked, yet He would be pleased if they would repent. And so God grants repentance to sinners, and yet we don’t want His mercy and we don’t want to repent. We love the darkness, and we hate the truth, until we are regenerated, and then we come into the light, and we walk in the light as He is in the light, and we have fellowship with one another in the kingdom of God and righteousness.
I remember once I heard RC say, to preach the gospel to sinners dead in their sin would be the same as preaching in a grave yard to the dead buried people there; they are not going to hear.
It doesn’t seem difficult to me to understand that God can have two desires that compete with one another. I have that all the time. I want to lose weight and I want to eat a brownie. I want to go to bed but I want to see how the game ends. God does not desire the damnation of the wicked. But He desires justice and that which will bring Him the most glory (which only He can assess accurately). We can ask “If God is willing that all men be saved, and if it is within His power to make it so, then why doesn’t He just do it?” The answer? It’s not that He is bound by respect for human freedom. It is that there is something He desires more than the salvation of all men. It is that His divine plan for His creation will be accomplished and will bring glory to Him. And His will for His plan and His glory trumps any other will or desire He has.
In those instances when *you’re* desire to lose weight “trumps” your will to eat the brownie, I would humbly beg, plead, woo, strive for and entreat you for that brownie, since the brownie “trumps” all *for me* ;-)
“I want to lose weight and I want to eat a brownie.”
Is that how God is? Someone who finds himself in a dillemma between restraining and indulging himself? He really wants to love and save everyone but he just can’t? God does not seem to be very free in this scheme.
If God takes pleasure in his glory, and saving some and damning others gives him more glory than if he were to save everyone, then doesn’t it stand to reason that God takes pleasure in the death of the wicked? Since he values getting glory more than anything else, (which is odd since he is already glorious and doesn’t need creation to be a means to “more” glory) then he should be pleased with a result that gives him more glory than anything else–i.e. the death of the wicked.
Roger Olson is reviled for saying that he cannot always distinguish between the God of Calvinism and the devil. That may be shocking and outrageous, but when you consider that both would be happy about sinners being hell, you have to wonder if he is on to something.
The difference between me and God when it comes to brownies and weight is that *I* cannot roto-rooter fat out of my body when I eat the brownie, for certainly the God who programmed DNA at the molecular level can do divine liposuction. If the Spirit translated Philip from the desert to Azotus, he can teleport fat cells to Death Valley. Or He could flip the handed-ness of every sugar molecule in the brownie the way its done in Splenda to prevent uptake.
I was looking through a computer catalog from Cyberguys, and I found that there’s a lot of stuff I would WISH for, and stuff I WANT, but I don’t WILL to get it because I will my bank balance to remain positive more. I cannot do my WISHES because I have limits. See the financial woes of Nicolas Gage as an example.
Now if I was REALLY wealthy, then everything I WISH for would have been air-dropped to my front door. After all, the REAL test of REAL WEALTH is that I not only can buy what I WILL, but also what I WANT, and what I WISH.
Seems to me the same should apply to the Calvinist version of God’s Sovereignty.
For some interesting comments concerning the inadequacy of the Calvinist “two wills” defense, check out this new post at SEA:
Two Wills in God?
donsands wrote,
I remember once I heard RC say, to preach the gospel to sinners dead in their sin would be the same as preaching in a grave yard to the dead buried people there; they are not going to hear.
Which is entirely based on an unbiblical understanding of what it means to be “dead in sin”.
God will judge the wicked, yet He would be pleased if they would repent. And so God grants repentance to sinners, and yet we don’t want His mercy and we don’t want to repent. We love the darkness, and we hate the truth, until we are regenerated, and then we come into the light, and we walk in the light as He is in the light, and we have fellowship with one another in the kingdom of God and righteousness.
Do you not see the double talk in such statements as these considering the Calvinist doctrine of exhaustive determinism?
Regarding Sproul’s “answer” it was evasive and reminded me of how politicians answer hard questions (i.e. they do not answer the specific question addressed but instead reframe the question into something more suitable to them, in Sproul’s case switching from the specific question to the supposed will of disposition of God). If Sproul believes in the so-called “two wills” (the secret and sovereign will that predetermines all events; and the will of God expressed in the bible) he should have answered that if you mean the prescriptive or revealed will then God desires for all to be saved (or appeal to some standard Calvinist methods of changing the meaning of “all” and so reinterpreting the biblical texts). And if you mean the sovereign will then God desires only for those whom he has elected to salvation to be saved (i.e. God in his sovereign will, the will that determines all things, desires the salvation of **only** his elect). That is the straight and honest answer that was nowhere present in his words.
As Gerald pointed out there is good reason for determinists to be evasive on this issue. God **says things** in the bible that he directly and frequently **contradicts** in the sovereign will. Example – he says do not murder, that is stated in the bible and clear to see. On the other hand, every murder that occurs is part of the sovereign will (we are not told the reasons or given explanations as to why all these predetermined murders occur). Someone mentioned earlier that his neighbor had been murdered. According to the will of God in the bible that was a bad thing, it violates God’s stated command in scripture. But according to the sovereign will that determines all events, that murder was exactly what God desired to occur and predetermined to occur in his sovereign will.
Someone might suggest that we have no idea what the sovereign and secret will is, that is not quite accurate. We may not know the reasons or have explanations concerning the supposed sovereign will, but it is not hard to see at all. As the sovereign will supposedly determines and brings about all events (cf., “He ordaineth whatsoever comes to pass”), this would mean that if it existed, that every event that occurs in this world is an event that God wanted to occur for some reason and predetermined to occur (with no exceptions). Want to know the sovereign will then? Just look at what actually happens (both the past and the present). Now one of the problems that many of us have with this “two will theory” is that we end up with God **constantly** ***contradicting*** in his sovereign will, his own expressed will in scripture.
How do you trust such a person if he says one thing to you directly, but then constantly goes against what he says to you in his actual actions? It’s like being told one thing to your face and another thing is actually planned and then carried out behind your back.
The bottom line then (assuming the two will theory to be true) is not what God expresses in scripture, but what God actually predetermines to occur in line with the all encompassing sovereign will. Most professing Calvinists/determinists choose not to be forthright about the two will theory or what it amounts to. That is partly why Sproul could not answer directly but instead answered like a good politician, a good spin doctor for Calvinism.
Robert
If God wanted all men to be saved ultimately, then guess what? ALL MEN WOULD BE SAVED. Certainly he is powerful enough to do whatever He wants.
The same rationalism: If God wanted you to obey his commandments, then guess what? YOU WOULD OBEY HIS COMMANDMENTS. But, since you don’t obey God’s commandments, he doesn’t really want you to.
The same rationalism: God didn’t really want Christ’s murderers to obey his commandments since he willfully allowed them to disobey him and kill Christ.
“Do you not see the double talk in such statements as these considering the Calvinist doctrine of exhaustive determinism?”
No.
We disagree on what dead in sin means.
I think it means a sinner can not hear God’s truth, because he doesn’t like it; doesn’t want it, and won’t come out of the dark, because he loves the darkness rather than light. What’s of the flesh is flesh. What is of the Spirit is spirit. The natural man cannot hear.
John the Baptist said: ““A person cannot receive even one thing unless it is given him from heaven.”
“For the mind that is set on the flesh is hostile to God, for it does not submit to God’s law; indeed, it cannot. Those who are in the flesh cannot please God.”
I think the Scripture speaks very strongly that sinners are spiritually dead, and this deadness in the spirit needs God’s mercy in order to wake up, or be quickened, or be made alive.
God does the quickening. We don’t ask Him to make us alive, becasue we don’t know we are dead. In fact, we think we are alive.
He doesn’t have to quicken anyone really. But because of His great love and mercy He does make “dead in sin” sinners alive. He did it for me, and I am forever grateful He did. I was lost and blind, until Christ found me, and opened my eyes, so that I could see.
Also Jesus basically said to the Jews who troubled Him: “you do not believe in Me because you are not My sheep. My sheep hear Me, and I give them eternal life, and they follow Me. The Father has given them to Me, and I will die for them, and they shall never perish, but will see Me in My glory with the Father.”
Jesus also said to the religious elite of His day: “..because I tell the truth, you do not believe me. Which one of you convicts me of sin? If I tell the truth, why do you not believe me? Whoever is of God hears the words of God. The reason why you do not hear them is that you are not of God.””
I suppose we will never agree. Nevertheless, these Scriptures speak powerfully to me of my being shown mercy, even when I didn’t want it, and was hostile toward God. Amazing grace for sure!
“Most professing Calvinists/determinists choose not to be forthright about the two will theory or what it amounts to. That is partly why Sproul could not answer directly but instead answered like a good politician, a good spin doctor for Calvinism.” -Robert
You seem to know all about RC’s heart and mind.
I would beg to differ Bob.
Much of this would be resolved by a study in Paul’s use of the phrase “all men”. If anyone wants to expand this to mean “everyone without exception” they will soon find themselves having to recreate Paul and, perhaps grudgingly, universalist.
In Christ,
Chris
Sean W. at 9:31 am today cites the Calvinist Charles Spurgeon’s opinion regarding “all men”
Not to be snarky, but I prefer Paul’s opinion on Paul, thanks. He might have some depths that even Spurgeon did not plumb— in fact Chuck, as he snickers from the great cloud— would probably agree with me on that one.
My point is that there is more exegetical work to be done, and taking sides on the issue based on some vague words from Sproul (who looked like he was on insomenex and needed some sleep) is quite reactionary. Laying down the gauntlet seems premature.
Veritas en radice. Not, veritas en the puritans.
And, no, even we presbyterians are not afraid of paradox. In fact, I think we invented it.
“Everyone without exception” is quite vague and usually a straw man, as if some interpreters of 1 Tim. 2:4 must take “all men” to be “everyone who will ever exist.” Simply put, “all men” in 1 Tim. 2:4 is every particular man in Ephesus [or elsewhere] that the readers of the epistle were acquainted with who fall within the particular classes mentioned, so that “all without distinction” is functionally equivalent to “everyone without exception” in the context. Paul is not exhorting them to pray for abstract classes, but for particular men within the particular classes that they knew, i.e. their kings and all those in authority, which they may have been disinclined to pray for due to persecution.
The “all without exception” vs. “all without distinction” false dilemma is a sham to explode the text rather than to explain it, as Spurgeon rightly observes.
Tony,
I completely and 100% agree with you and Charles Spurgeon on the Timothy text. All men means just that all men. The Lord desires all men to be saved.
Well, I went and looked at 1 Timothy 2, and noted that the context of the verse is Paul’s command that prayers be made for everyone, and especially for ALL those in authority. So for which people were they NOT to pray for, and for who in authority were they NOT to pray for, tony?
Grace is like oil: quite life-giving when allowed to flow unimpeded, but messes tend to occur when the flow is constricted unnecessarily…
Tony,
Nice to meet you. There is really no false dichotomy in the way I often use the phrases. One speaks about all kinds of men, the other speaks of all men without any regard for distinctions. All kinds of men includes “every tribe, etc.”. Every man without exception includes the whole of humanity. It is a simple way of making a slight distinction. No ruse here. I got it from BB Warfield, who explains it far better than I do.
I do not think “sham” is a great word to use for people are wrestling with an issue. Not if you really want to win folks to your views. This is a perennial question, and answering it is not so easy as it first appears. Many of us want to be faithful to our confessional backgrounds, but Scripture comes first, so as I said, I am willing to embrace a seeming paradox if that it was I am called by the Holy Spirit to do. I am still of the opinion that Paul is using the phrase in a more narrow way, as he does in Romans. But, I am open to rethinking this.
Your attack-posting on Sproul is a bit reactionary, given the man’s track-record. “Give honor to whom honor is due”. He seems to fit the honorable profile.
PS- Not all of us learned our Calvinism from Sproul. So the apparent “blind-spots” in all of us should not be blamed on him. Any faults of mine are my own.
My so called “attack-posting” only made these points, and no more:
1. I do not know of a place where Sproul has taught that God desires the salvation of all men.
2. Sproul did not answer the question put to him in the video, but answered a different one.
3. Sproul’s neglect of teaching that God desires the salvation of all men is a significant cause why many Calvinists today do not know about this subject, i.e. it is a blindspot.
4. Sproul, despite the fact that I have benefited from his teaching in many other areas [notice the "honor" and/or respect here], is not helping us learn about God’s desire to save all men in the revealed will, and neither did Gerstner.
That hardly qualifies as an “attack post.” Rather, it is respectful and legitimate criticism.
I don’t know if you know this or not, but John Gerstner in his latter days even went so far as to deny the well-meant offer, and endorsed one of David Engelsma’s books as reflecting true Reformed orthodoxy. That’s a serious problem, as the Protestant Reformed Church is blatantly and staunchly hyper-Calvinistic. Engelsma not only denies that God desires the salvation of all men [i.e. the well-meant offer], but he denies that God has a love of benevolence for all men and is gracious to all men. The PRC has gone beyond the classic forms of hyper-Calvinism in this respect. Gerstner was unwise for siding with this theology and organization, as they do not reflect historic Reformed teaching, despite their claims. I doubt you will ever hear Sproul even respectfully mention Gerstner’s problems in this regard. That’s not good.
Tony,
Every PCA pastor I know preaches the gospel, and makes no distinction in their preaching as to whom the offer is made. They say “believe in Christ and you shall be saved”.
So, I am not sure where you are getting your empirical stats from regarding the “blind spot”. I really do not know too many hyper-Calvinists, as the preachers I know practice otherwise. Maybe a few, very few, small groups have moved in this direction, but the better part of presbyterianism has not.
Besides, we are talking about historical theology here, not the Scriptures, per se. Gerstner is now with the Lord, so I am sure any problems you have with him have all been sorted out. And all this appeal to Calvinism is sort of shortsighted on your part, being a baptist and all. Good grief man, one could certainly turn the sword back on you and ask why you are against baptizing babies, if you are such a “studied Calvinist”.
We are all heretics of one kind or another.
PS- Are you suggesting a revival of Amyraldianism?
“All without distinction,” for many Calvinists, is really code language for “SOME of all without distinction,” i.e. the elect from among all kinds/classes.
“All men” in 1 Tim. 2:4 isn’t referencing either all of the elect or abstract classes without the particulars of those classes. “All men” in the context is every person of whatever class in authority that they [Timothy and those in Ephesus] could think of. So, by implication or application for each generation of the church, including today, it means every particular person in authority in the world that we can think of.
Paul is not saying that we should ignorantly pray for all men because God will secretly have the elect within these classes [i.e. "some of all without distinction"] saved. Rather, he’s saying we should knowledgeably pray for every man in these classes because we know that God desires for them all to believe and to be saved [as this accords with his revealed will], even if they are in authority and persecuting us.
Trying to make “all men” in this context mean “some of all” is a sham and/or blatant eisegesis. Spurgeon knew it, and most Christians know it, as it is obviously counter-intuitive. Only a hermeneutical magician can transform “all men” in to “some of all men,” and this slight of hand is accomplished by presenting a false either/or dilemma. The magician says that either “all men” is “some of all kinds” [the elect] or “all men” is “everyone who has ever existed and will exist, even those now present in hell,” etc. Since we know it can’t mean “everyone that ever will or has existed,” it must mean all the elect within these classes.
Tony,
Every kind of man will be saved — without regard for status, race or nationality. We do not know who they will be, so we make the offer, as Christ said: “many are called, few are chosen”. The external call goes out to everyone, the internal call of the Holy Spirit goes out to the elect only.
Frankly, this is a good assurance to me, that any evangelism I do is always fruitful, always producing what God wants it to produce.
Frankly, it is a tough passage, and I am not happy with my conclusions, not altogether. But I find that yours is just as unsatisfactory. The difficulty is compounded by the act of trying to twist too much out the single passage. Paul’s use of the term “all men” elsewhere in his writings is used in a way that suggests limitations. To imply that this phrase is a universal desire on God’s part, in the sense of mankind in total, would put a strain on Paul’s terminology as used in Romans. I am uncomfortable with doing that, without really good reason too that transcends the historical arguments you have suggested.
Any way, I am checking out of this conversation. Take care.
Tony I understand what you are saying but my point is that ultimately God has not decreed to save all man, or else the Bible would teach universalism.
James,
You are also correct. The Lord has not decreed all men to be saved (frankly, I’m amazed that He would decree any after the Fall). He does not will all men to be saved.
“Does God Really Want All People to Be Saved?”
How about asking a different, but related question:
Will All People Be Saved?
To my question “Will All People Be Saved?” let’s rejoice in that both Calvinists and Arminians agree fully with each other that not all people will be saved. Let us then celebrate this unity and agreement between Calvinists and Arminians.
As to the question of who’s responsible for not having everyone saved, well perhaps Calvinists and Arminians will agree with each other once again: Hell-bound people are responsible for rejecting God.
All agreed?
This is not simply a question of Calvinists, but also for Arminians. According to Arminians, human beings have freedom to do or choose otherwise. The outcome could go either way.
If that is so, then there is a possible world for each alternative outcome. A possible world in which a free agent chooses one way, along with another possible world in which he chooses otherwise.
Therefore, on Arminian principles, there ought to be at least one possible world in which all free agents freely choose Jesus.
So, if God loves everyone and wants to save everyone, then why didn’t he create that possible world–rather than a world in which some human beings are heavenbound while other human beings are hellbound?
I’m a Calvinist and I honestly don’t lose any sleep over this question.
Not everyone is going to be saved and God is Good and God is Loving and God is Holy and God is Merciful and God is Perfect in all His attributes. Works for me.
I trust God. I don’t know why Arminians sweat this question.
We cannot fully understand God. We are sinners deserving of damnation. It’s a hereditary thing. and a choice thing. He is merciful and wants our best nonetheless. We fight him. He chases us. We fight. He ends up saving many of us. According to his grace. That’s what Scripture tells us. We are happy and grateful. But we still have questions and some things don’t make sense. Boo who. Big deal! If we could explain it all, there would be no mystery. If the nut has not been cracked in 2000 years, good luck now. I think Sproul both avoided the question and was honest. How annoying.
Would it not be easier and better just to admit the Calvinist position makes far less sense than the Arminian? God’s sovereignty is not sacrificed by the Arminian. His sovereignty just means he has the final say. If a man says “No” to the gospel, God can overrule him, and, according to the Calvinist position, He does. Similarly, if a man says “Yes,” God can overrule him. God is still sovereign, as the Calvinist contends (and, by the way, as the Arminian agrees), but he is much more loving, as the Arminian contends (and, by the way, as the Bible teaches).
Michael you dont make any sense.
John,
It appears by your response you may have misunderstood my intentions. Did you believe I was answering YOU personally, and making a remark about YOUR personal convictions? If so, PLEASE forgive me, and accept my most sincere apologies. A personal attack was NEVER my intentions. I was merely pointing out that it is in MY (quasi-Arminian) opinion, based on scripture, that God wants all men saved. And, as to your comment that I didn’t make sense, that is entirely possible. At the time I made the comment, I could not sleep, for whatever reason, it was about 1:00AM, and I had been up since 6:00AM. Again, if I offended you in any way, I am truly sorry.
Yours in Christ.
And, again, my lack of techno-savvy has made me look a fool (not that it takes much). My post was to have included some other names, not just yours, John.
Please accept my apologies, all.
Thank you.
I don’t think he answered the question completely, a yes or no would work and then provide the why however maybe this question can’t be answered.
I believe God is completely sovereign over salvation thus if someone is not saved by God this would then question God’s will to save all. So if God is not willing to save all universally then maybe we need to look theologically at all the aspect of his will and purposes to understand why not.
REPLY
[Michael] “Would it not be easier and better just to admit the Calvinist position makes far less sense than the Arminian?”
That would be easier to admit if you backed it up with an actual argument.
“…but he is much more loving, as the Arminian contends (and, by the way, as the Bible teaches).”
How is God much more loving under Arminianism?
“How is God much more loving under Arminianism?”
I would suggest that the “love” relationship between God and the human is more “genuine” in that it was not imposed upon the human by irresistibleness of the grace. The Arminian understanding suggests that all grace is enabling for genuine response to God’s initiating grace (whether common or special). The genuine response of the human is genuinely rebellious in direct response to the offered grace (common or special) and not merely hardwired instinctive original sin but real individual rebellion or it is a grace-enabled ability to plead mercy. God’s initiating enabling grace makes either response more “genuine” in my opinion.
Ps 115:3 – But our God is in the heavens; He does whatever He pleases.
Ps 135:6 – Whatever the LORD pleases, He does, In heaven and in earth, in the seas and in all deeps.
Ps 33:10-11 – The LORD nullifies the counsel of the nations; He frustrates the plans of the peoples. The counsel of the LORD stands forever, The plans of His heart from generation to generation.
Job 42:2 – I know that You can do all things, And that no purpose of Yours can be thwarted.
Dan 4:35 – All the inhabitants of the earth are accounted as nothing, But He does according to His will in the host of heaven And among the inhabitants of earth; And no one can ward off His hand Or say to Him, ‘What have You done?’
Is 46:9-10 – For I am God, and there is no other; I am God, and there is no one like Me, Declaring the end from the beginning, And from ancient times things which have not been done, Saying, ‘My purpose will be established, And I will accomplish all My good pleasure.’
Brothers, all these verses unequivocally teach that what God wants to happen happens. He does all that He pleases. His counsel stands. No purpose can be thwarted. He regards earthlings as nothing but does according to His will. He will accomplish all His good pleasure.
It is impossible, then, to consider that He wants, in every sense of the word, all men to be saved. Because God does what He wants, and all men are not saved. If He wanted all men to saved, in every sense of the word, and some are not saved, then His purpose would be thwarted.
Guys, for the love of 100+ comments, we’ve gotta stop with the analogies and the illustrations and the quotations and consider the Biblical teaching of God’s absolute sovereignty. An absolutely sovereign God does what He pleases. That’s what it means to be sovereign. It’s what it means to be God. To say that God’s desire for all men to be saved is trumped by man’s desire to remain in his sin is to make man sovereign, and thus make man God.
Tony brought up the examples of keeping God’s commandments and the crucifixion. We would all say that God wants us to keep His commandments. Otherwise why give them, right? But the reality that not all keep His commandments, considered together with the Biblical teaching of His absolute sovereignty (as above) forces us to consider how to reconcile these ideas, for they appear contradictory. The way they are happily reconciled is by recognizing that God will ordain that which is contrary to His preceptive will. Here is where the mystery lay: That God could ordain something contrary to what He commands.
It’s the same with the crucifixion. Did God will (like He wills us to obey His commands) that Jesus die by the hand of the Jews/Romans? Of course not! According to His preceptive will, He would have had all men to believe in His Son. But Scripture tells us that He Himself predetermined (Ac 2:23) and predestined (Ac 4:27-28) that the most heinous sin in history take place. He did not will that Jesus be rejected and murdered. But then, He did will that Jesus be rejected and murdered. This forces us to recognize that God’s will of decree — that which He ordained before the foundation of the world — is distinct from His will of precept.
Exactly, Mike. You’re echoing Augusting:
God’s will is only violated because God wills it. God’s command to not murder [Christ for instance] was violated because God willfully permitted some men to disobey. So, even when God’s will does not come to pass, his will always comes to pass. Contrary to what some mockers say, we’re not saying that “God has decreed his own eternal disappointment!,” or “that God has freely and inalterably decreed that which completely bums Him out. God has issues. He’s conflicted.” On the contrary, God’s will [in one sense] always come to pass even when his will [in another sense] does not come to pass. It is this mystery that the rationalists cannot abide, therefore they stumble at the scriptures and devise theological systems to explain away one truth for the sake of another.
Let the readers ponder the point in the writings of John Arrowsmith [a Westminster divine]:
REPLY
revrogers” “I would suggest that the ‘love’ relationship between God and the human is more ‘genuine’ in that it was not imposed upon the human by irresistibleness of the grace. The Arminian understanding suggests that all grace is enabling for genuine response to God’s initiating grace (whether common or special). The genuine response of the human is genuinely rebellious in direct response to the offered grace (common or special) and not merely hardwired instinctive original sin but real individual rebellion or it is a grace-enabled ability to plead mercy. God’s initiating enabling grace makes either response more ‘genuine’ in my opinion.”
Which misses the point of my earlier comment. Even on Arminian/libertarian grounds, you are posing a false dilemma. Even if we grant your tendentious characterization of what “genuine” love requires, that doesn’t imply an actual world with hellbound sinners. For if, a la libertarianism, it is possible for human beings to either accept the gospel or reject the gospel, if it is possible for them to either love God or withhold their love, then there’s a possible world which represents each possible alternative. In that case, God could save every free agent by simply creating the possible world in which they freely love him. That doesn’t require the “imposition” of irresistible grace. Rather, that follows from libertarian action theory.
So, explain once again, consistent with your Arminian/libertarian commitments, how Arminian theism is more loving than Reformed theism?
If God is desirous that all be saved, and He has the power to bring that to pass and decrees all that shall come to pass, then He can save all.
But then why are not all saved?
What then does God lack? the desire or the power?
If He is desirous that all be saved, and they are not, then He lacks the power and is impotent.
If He is powerful enough to save people and has decreed what shall come to pass, and does not save all people, then He lacks the desire and is wicked.
So, since all are not saved, God is either impotent or wicked.
regards,
#John
Thanks for the response.
My “tendentious characterization of what “genuine” love requires”
What makes it “tendentious”?
How would you characterize and define something being a “love” relationship?
David
Hello David,
David someone asked Hays about how he defines love in a brief discussion on his blog:
“UNSOPHISTICATED SAID:
What is your working definition of love?
10/29/2009 3:04 PM
STEVE SAID:
Acting in the best interests of another.
10/29/2009 3:14 PM”
I share this because if love is “acting in the best interests of another”, then under Hays’ exhaustive determinism, calvinistic compatibilism, in what way does God love the “reprobates” (i.e. in Hays’ system those chosen in eternity to be hell bound before they were born and before they had done anything)?? Short and unevasive answer: he does not love the reprobates.
Now the non-calvinist on the other hand, since we believe that Jesus died for the world (and that world includes both folks who will eventually become believers as well as folks who will never become believers) we do in fact believe that God has the best interests in mind for all people of the world. This is true because the best possible thing that can happen to you is to get saved and be in a personal and saving relationship with Jesus Christ. God’s plan of salvation involved a desire for all of the world to experience this, God provided Jesus as a provision of atonement for the world and God will apply the atonement to those who trust him for salvation. So if God desires a saving relationship with all, then in fact in non-calvinism he does have the best interests of all in mind and he does love all. But in Hays’ truncated and false view, God only loves those who are preselected for salvation. As to the rest he definitely does not love them, definitely does not act in their best interests. And if you believe some calvinists, the major purpose God creates them is to demonstrate his wrath upon them. So if you see how the love of God is shown to all versus only being shown to some, makes it pretty easy to see under which view God is in fact more loving.
Robert
Robert,
Do you think God loves the fallen angels? And if so, why do they have no atoning provision?
Don’t get me wrong. I affirm that God benevolently loves all of humanity, that He desires the salvation of all humanity in the revealed will, and has provided a sacrifice in Christ that is suitable and adequate for the forgiveness of the sins of the whole world, as Christ satisfied all of the requirements of God’s law as the last Adam who shares our nature.
What I am wondering about is your seeming assumption that because God loves all his creatures, he must therefore love them all equally, so as to desire their salvation equally, and therefore must of necessity provide an atoning sacrifice for the sins of all his fallen creatures. God has not done that for fallen angels, so do you deny that God loves them? The distinction in the way God deals with fallen humanity as over against fallen angels argues for a sovereign discriminating love in God whereby he can love some differently than others, and that loving all does not necessarily that he must provide an opportunity for all to be saved. He has done this for humanity, but not for angels.
If God can discriminate between men and angels, then why not between men, and thus do more to secure the salvation of some fallen men that he does not do for others? This kind of situation does not argue unfairness or unkindness in God, since fallen creatures deserve no provision at all in the first place. He graces whom he will, and the rest are left without excuse.
correction: “and that loving all does not necessarily *mean* that he must provide an opportunity for all to be saved.”
p.s. There is a significant difference between the way I handle these issues and the way Steve Hays does, but we’re both Calvinists nonetheless, in my estimation. I am just saying that he is much higher in his Calvinism than I am. If you choose to respond to my question above, just keep that in view.
R. B. Kuiper (1886-1966) did not believe that God loved all equally. In his “Scriptural Particularism” he wrote:
“But what Scripture does not teach is that God loves all men equally. On the contrary, it tells us that His love for the elect differs qualitatively from His love for others. Now it is to “that peculiar, mysterious, sovereign, immeasurable love which passes knowledge, of which his own people, the Church of the first-born whose names are written in heaven, are the objects”77. Ibid., II, 549. that the gift of Christ as Redeemer is time and again referred.”
regards,
#John
‘Hear and pay attention, do not be arrogant, for the Lord has spoken. Give glory to the Lord your God before he brings the darkness…But if you do not listen, I will weep in secret because of your pride, my eyes will weep bitterly, overflowing with tears, because the LORD’s flock will be taken captive. (Jer. 13:15-17)’
Luke 19:41 “Now when Jesus approached and saw the city, he wept over it,”
Is God just faking us out? Why would he weep over the unsaved if he decreed that they be born of sinful Adam, born into sin, unable to avoid sinning, and has the power to save all, but then only decreed to elect a few? And if He has decreed only to save a few, why cry over it? If He wants to stop crying, why not just save them all?
God must then be lying when He claims to weep over the lost, which would not be surprising given that He would be capricious and evil to only save a few when He could save all.
I suppose then, if am to be indwelt by God and share in His divine nature, I should not pull both my children out of the lake the next time he falls in off the dock, but just grab one and stand there and watch the other drown. And then tell my saved child that he should rejoice in being saved and not sweat it that the other drowned, afterall, it was his own fault that he fell in. Then I’ll be just like God the father.
regards,
#John
John,
In essence, you’re asking this:
How can the incarnate God sincerely weep over those people that he has immutably purposes to leave without effectual calling? Dabney’s addressing the very issue you bring up. Please consider reading it prayerfully.
Jesus said, “Love your enemies, bless them that curse you, do good to them that hate you, and pray for them which despitefully use you and persecute you; that ye may be the children of your Father which is in heaven . . . . Be ye therefore perfect, even as your Father which is in heaven is perfect” (Matt. 5:44, 45, 48)
God, who loves His enemies more perfectly than we do, has set the example for us by casting into burning hellfire all those whom He did not elect, who were His enemies because of the sin of Adam their forefather.
regards,
#John
When you’re through emoting, please consider prayerfully reading R. L. Dabney’s God’s Indiscriminate Proposals of Mercy by means of the link provided above.
Mike,
But what does God want to happen?
If God wanted to have a relationship with some level of contingency, could he have that?
Does the genre of the Scriptures cited have any bearing on the interpretation?
Psalm 115:17 The dead do not praise the LORD, Nor do any who go down into silence;
This unequivocally states that the dead “DO NOT PRAISE” the LORD, is that absolutely true? Does progressive revelation have any play here? Also, the psalms are doxological and metaphorical, do they have some level of hyperbole for their intended evoking of praise? Does every Scripture always give absolute comprehensive philosophical data in their phrasings for all situations?
Let’s have hermeneutical principles that are consistently applied.
Does the fact that Nebuchadnezzar uttered Dan. 4:35 have any impact on interpretation and usage of the data it proposes? In fact, people literally have said “What have You done?” to God all throughout history. Does the meaning of this statement mean something other than that people can’t say the phrase even though the statement says that “no one can . . . say to Him”?
Also, Job 42:2 says “I know that You can do all things,” but there is at least one thing that God cannot do. He cannot lie. So is Job wrong? No, he is hyperbolic here. Could God have any purpose that He intends to be contingent and be thwartable because that is the purpose He intends, thus the contingency is unthwartable?
I’m asking questions. Call me stupid, ignorant, or whatever. I would be more convinced of Calvinism if some of these questions were answered (but then again, I will remain non-Calvinist until God wants me to “convert”; He is pleased with my non-Calvinism for it is foreordained; if He desires to punish me for my non-Calvinism then I am helpless to avoid it. All of my responses are foreordained. Why get upset with me? God has ordained all things absolutely, both conformity and rebellion. That is, if Calvinism is correct. Where am I wrong?)
But what does God want to happen?
He wants to happen exactly what does happen. Otherwise He’s not God. And the cause of whatever actually happens is God.
If God wanted to have a relationship with some level of contingency, could he have that?
I’m not sure what you mean here. Can God have relationships that depend on other things? Sure. A relationship with the Father is contingent upon faith in Christ. But that doesn’t mean that God leaves it entirely to the determination of men to exercise that faith. That faith is given as a gift as a result of the miracle of the new birth that God Himself bestows freely on His elect. So conditions are met by all parties, but God Himself is the ultimate cause of the meeting of those conditions.
Does the genre of the Scriptures cited have any bearing on the interpretation?
Sure, but not to the degree that you can do what you’re doing to them. Plus, the genres represented in the extremely small above are poetry, prophecy, and historical narrative.
Psalm 115:17 The dead do not praise the LORD, Nor do any who go down into silence; This unequivocally states that the dead “DO NOT PRAISE” the LORD, is that absolutely true?
Pressing this to ask if it’s absolutely true is done (1) with an agenda, and (2) with no regard for the context of that passage.
This passage is not saying that God is robbed finally and absolutely of His glory when the wicked perish. It’s teaching that the wicked who perish do not open their mouth in praise and adoration of God. But as for the psalmist, he and his people will bless Yahweh (v. 18).
Does every Scripture always give absolute comprehensive philosophical data in their phrasings for all situations?
Let’s have hermeneutical principles that are consistently applied.
This is a red herring. In your responses to Daniel 4 and Job 42, you’re requiring something of these texts that nobody requires of anybody in normal communication. You’re ignoring context, authorial intent, and intentionally absolutizing statements that aren’t meant to be absolutized. If you take these statements at face value, they teach unequivocally that God is absolutely sovereign.
I’m asking questions. Call me stupid, ignorant, or whatever.
I won’t call you those. I say that you’re intentionally blurring the plain meaning of texts to suit your preference of an Arminian god.
(but then again, I will remain non-Calvinist until God wants me to “convert”; He is pleased with my non-Calvinism for it is foreordained; if He desires to punish me for my non-Calvinism then I am helpless to avoid it.
Again, this is an obfuscation and not meaningful interaction. You erroneously equate God’s absolute sovereignty with fatalism. That’s your assumption; no one here implied that’s a proper application of God’s sovereignty.
All of my responses are foreordained. Why get upset with me? God has ordained all things absolutely, both conformity and rebellion.
(1) I’m not upset with you. (2) You sound just like Paul’s opponent in Romans 9:19. That’s a dangerous place to be, but it’s where your theology requires you to be.
That is, if Calvinism is correct. Where am I wrong?
To review: (1) You’re wresting Scriptures from their contexts and falsely appealing to genre to make it look like they don’t always have to mean what they actually say. (2) You thereby require of God’s communication something you don’t require of normal communication with mere men — something you would be very upset with if people required of you. (3) You equate God’s absolute sovereignty with fatalism. (4) You make the argument Paul opposes and answers in Romans 9.
Has anything happened that God has not decreed? Will anything ever happen that God does not decree? If not, then how is that not fatalism? Under Calvinism God determines all that happens; He determines the fate of everything. Calvinism is deterministic and thus fatalistic, but Calvinism proposes that determinism is compatible with moral responsibility.
John Calvin believed that God determined everything and that there was no escaping the fate predetermined by God before creation:
(Institutes, 3:22:11) “. . . the reprobate are expressly raised up, in order that the glory of God may thereby be displayed. At last, he concludes that God has mercy on whom he will have mercy, and whom he will he hardeneth (Rom. 9:18). You see how he refers both to the mere pleasure of God. Therefore, if we cannot assign any reason for his bestowing mercy on his people, but just that it so pleases him, neither can we have any reason for his reprobating others but his will. When God is said to visit in mercy or harden whom he will, men are reminded that they are not to seek for any cause beyond his will.”
regards,
#John
John,
Despite your overwhelming display of having no interest of interacting meaningfully, I wanted to answer one of your questions because others might be wondering the same.
God ordains whatever comes to pass. The way that is not fatalism is that God sovereignly achieves His ends by means and second causes. Nothing will happen outside of His will (which is what those passages I quoted above teach). He is the ultimate cause of all things. But He is not the efficient cause of all that happens.
So for example, was Jesus murdered according to God’s will? Yes, say Acts 2:23 and 4:27-28. But is He morally culpable for the murder? No. The Jews/Romans under Pilate (as well as all humanity, in the spiritual sense) are morally culpable. He is the ultimate cause, but we are the efficient cause.
Fatalism would be God ordaining everything and using absolutely no means, but effectively causing each action. God can ordain and determine that things happen while still using means and thus not efficiently causing that they happen.
au contraire, my interactions are quite meaningful. What I have written is quite true from the Calvinist perspective.
However, you are incorrect in your attempted distinction between what you believe God does and fatalism. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (online) defines fatalism as follows:
“Fatalism
Fatalism is the view that we are powerless to do anything other than what we actually do. It may be argued for in various ways: by appeal to logical laws and metaphysical necessities; by appeal to the existence and nature of God; by appeal to causal determinism. When argued for in the first way, it is commonly called “Logical fatalism” (or, in some cases, “Metaphysical fatalism”); when argued for in the second way, it is commonly called “Theological fatalism”.
Per Calvinism we are powerless to do other than what we do. Prior to regeneration we are in the grip of sin as a result of our descent from Adam and we cannot fail to otherwise than sin and reject God. After God regenerates us and gives us faith, we then follow Him. We have no control over our fate.
The use of means and second causes may make God’s direct control less proximate, but it does not mean that it is any less controlled. God decrees and determines all, and whether his control is by way of efficient or other causes is irrelevant to whether it is deterministic and fatalistic.
regards,
#John
Your “meaningful” interactions are poor parodies. This will be my last reply to you.
What I mean when I say that Calvinism isn’t fatalistic is: though it’s true that all things happen according to the decree of God, that does not give us permission to be apathetic or passive, because it is through our actions that God achieves His foreordained ends.
So RevRoger’s comment that he’ll be an Arminian until God decides to change him is true, but implies that since that’s true he can just sit back and wait to be “acted upon.” That’s false. And I suppose it’s that idea that I’m equating with the term “fatalism.” If the philosophical dictionaries are to be the authority, and they say my definitions are amiss, I retract my use of the word fatalism, and substitute the system of thought that I just described.
I fail to see that my posts are parodies, since I quote Calvin directly and say what is said by other Calvinists. I just happen to think that being direct about it exposes Calvinism for what it is. If people are going to be Calvinists, then they may as well face up to the implications; Calvin himself did.
As for your point about fatalism, I see that we are on the same page as regards the concept of fatalism. That helps us get to the point of difference between us. I see now that you believed that fatalism meant giving up in the face of what one cannot change. I can see that as a possible understanding of fatalism, but I do agree that if we stick with commonaly accepted definitions discussion will be easier.
It’s interesting that you would move from RevRoger’s comment that he’ll be an Arminian until God decides to change him to the proposition that RevRoger is just sitting back until he is acted on. That connection does not follow.
Strictly speaking, I agree that RevRoger is wrong. If RevRoger will become a Calvinist before he dies, that is not something that God will decide between now and RevRoger’s death. It is something that God decided before creation and that decision will unfold in time.
If God has decided that RevRoger will change from Arminian to Calvinist, then God has also decided how that process will come about and by what means.
So, RevRoger is correct in that if God has decided it before creation, it will then come to pass as God has decided it and there is nothing that RevRoger can do about it. In fact, if Calvinism is true, then there is nothing that RevRoger would ever want to do to change it. When the time comes for his switch in theological beliefs it will appear to RevRoger as something that he wants to do, and so he will do it.
But, and this is the distinguishing point, RevRoger has no libertarian freewill to either choose or reject the switch to Calvinist beliefs.
As a collateral point, if RevRoger does just sit back and do nothing, that too was predetermined and decreed by God.
regards,
#John
Mike,
Thanks for the interaction.
God is the ultimate cause for the efficient cause. The efficient cause would not be efficient if not for the ultimate cause. The efficient cause functions because of a complex web of motivations within the individuals who implement the efficient causation. Your claim to absolute sovereignty (in my understanding of your argumentation) does not interrupt the chain which flows from God’s ultimate causation. I do not see how God is exempted from responsibility for the efficient cause of all murders since he is the ultimate cause for all things including the impulses to murder, that is, unless you are exempting those impulses to murder from the absolute sovereignty and foreordaining of God. But that would make your claim about absolute sovereignty meaningless. This is where I am confused.
I do appreciate the point by point replies. I don’t agree with them and I actually do have responses to all of them; I just don’t know whether I will be able to respond here in the comments board to all of them. But I will give due consideration to your replies and attempt for myself at least some kind of reply whether I post here or not. I’m sure I will encounter similar replies from other Calvinists in my pursuit of biblical truth.
One brief reply. The Psalm 115:17 passage does not specify the dead as being the “wicked” dead.
I honestly do not believe that I am falsely appealing to genre but instead giving due consideration to genre for proper range of hermeneutical inquiry. Genre and literary devices are significant for understanding the rhetoric of any and all literature and speech. Rhetorical sensitivity is exactly why we extend grace in not taking everything “literally” when we communicate with one another.
Communication means what it means, not always what it says. Idioms do not mean what they say; they mean what they mean in the context of the genre and social context. When I say “let’s hit the road”, I may say “hit” and “road” but I do not mean “hit” as in “strike” or not even “road” as “road”. I can say the phrase and mean let’s travel across a field now. The phrase means what it means as a whole idiom not what it says in its mere sequence of words. When Job says “You can do all things”; it is hyperbolic and not an absolute comprehensive statement of doctrine about God as I stated above about God and lying (Titus 1:2). I was not absolutizing this passage I was noting that it does not contradict Titus 1:2 by not absolutizing it.
One more thing and I’ll cease my bloviation.
Romans 9:22-24
“22 What if God, although willing to demonstrate His wrath and to make His power known, endured with much patience vessels of wrath prepared for destruction? 23 And He did so to make known the riches of His glory upon vessels of mercy, which He prepared beforehand for glory, 24 even us, whom He also called, not from among Jews only, but also from among Gentiles.”
These statements about vessels of wrath prepared for destruction (hardened unbelieving Israel) must be read in rhetorical context with where he takes the argumentation in Romans 11:32
“For God has shut up all in disobedience [hardened unbelieving Israel -- shown in Romans 9-11 --- and unbelieving Gentiles -- shown in Romans 1-4; and all of us for that matter] so that He may show mercy to all [all of those persons who are shut up in disobedience i.e. all of us humans].”
God condemns all so that He MAY show mercy to all. This seems to imply both his desire to show mercy and his intention to do so.
Blessings,
David
Calvin himself doesn’t have much trouble giving God credit for all those screaming in pain in the hellfire, even though their being there was inevitable and beyond their control:
“Again they object: were they not previously predestined by God’s
ordinance to that corruption which is now claimed as the cause of
condemnation? When, therefore, they perish in their corruption, they but pay the penalties of that misery in which Adam fell by the
predestination of God, and dragged his posterity headlong after him. Is he not, then, unjust who so cruelly deludes his creatures? Of course, I admit that in this miserable condition wherein men are now bound, all of Adam’s children have fallen by God’s will. And this is what I said to begin with, that we must always at last return to the sole decision of God’s will, the cause of which is hidden in him.
(Calvin’s Institutes of the Christian Religion, 3:23.4)
Scripture proclaims that all mortals were bound over to eternal death in the person of one man [Adam] (cf. Rom. 5:12 ff.). Since this cannot be ascribed to nature, it is perfectly clear that it has come forth from the wonderful plan of God…. Again I ask: whence does it happen that Adam’s fall irremediably involved so many peoples, together with their infant offspring, in eternal death unless because it so pleased God?… The decree is horrible indeed, I confess. Yet no one can deny that God foreknew what end man was to have before he created him, and consequently foreknew because he so ordained by his decree…. And it ought not to seem absurd for me to say that God not only foresaw the fall of the first man, and in him the ruin of his descendants, but also meted it out in accordance with his own decision. For it pertains to his wisdom to foreknow everything that is to happen, so it pertains to his might to rule and control everything by his hand.
(Institutes 3:23.7)
Yippee! As Calvin states, “this miserable condition wherein men are now bound [in sin, on the way to hell], all of Adam’s children have fallen by God’s will” is just God’s “wonderful plan” that He makes come to pass because it is “His might to rule and control everything by His hand”.
It’s just like John Piper said, he (Piper) doesn’t know God’s secret will or secret election and it could well be that God has not elected the kids that he (Piper) tucks into bed. And he’s just fine with that.
Wow, gotta love that guy (God, not Calvin or Piper). Just makes you wanna snuggle right up into His loving hands and peek over the edge of His palm at your unelect kids burning in the hellfire and gnashing their teeth. I dunno about you, but it helps me sleep at night after I tuck my own kids into bed.
Ah, the mysterious and gnostic love of God for the people screaming in hell for billions and billions of years as part of His wonderful plan. Makes me all kinda sentimental and gooey inside. If only Armnians would switch over to preaching this stuff, they would find their churches filled to overflowing.
regards,
#John
What God sez:
Ezekiel 18:32 “For I take no pleasure in the death of anyone, declares the Sovereign LORD. Repent and live! ”
Ezekiel 33:11 “Say to them, ‘As surely as I live, declares the Sovereign LORD, I take no pleasure in the death of the wicked, but rather that they turn from their ways and live. Turn! Turn from your evil ways! Why will you die, O house of Israel?’ ”
What Calvin sez (Institutes, 3:22:11) “. . . the reprobate are expressly raised up, in order that the glory of God may thereby be displayed. At last, he concludes that God has mercy on whom he will have mercy, and whom he will he hardeneth (Rom. 9:18). You see how he refers both to the mere pleasure of God. Therefore, if we cannot assign any reason for his bestowing mercy on his people, but just that it so pleases him, neither can we have any reason for his reprobating others but his will. When God is said to visit in mercy or harden whom he will, men are reminded that they are not to seek for any cause beyond his will.”
Also:
(Institutes, 3:21:5) “By predestination we mean the eternal decree of God, by which he determined with himself whatever he wished to happen with regard to every man. All are not created on equal terms, but some are preordained to eternal life, others to eternal damnation; and, accordingly, as each has been created for one or other of these ends, we say that he has been predestinated to life or to death.”
I like how ol’ Calvin had such a lock on the heart of God and the interpretation of His word. It’s why I go back and read Calvin whenever I get concerned over the lost and it troubles my soul. It gives me one of those “aha” moments: “God is taking pleasure in the fact that their damnation to hellfire and gnashing of teeth glorifies Him and displays His glorious wrath”. I look forward to one of my children fulfilling this glorious role. Or perhaps my wife, as she may have only been given effervescent faith, such that God brings her into the church for a while only to later express His refusal to elect her, at which time she will leave the church and end up gnashing her teeth in hell.
regards,
#John
revrogers: “What makes it ‘tendentious’?”
You define love in libertarian terms, which begs the very question at issue.
“How would you characterize and define something being a ‘love’ relationship?”
The unregenerate are like mental patients who can’t help themselves. God isn’t “imposing” on them. Rather, regeneration restores their fallen mind and will to proper working order. A properly functioning mind and will naturally loves the good and hates evil.
steve hays wrote, “The unregenerate are like mental patients who can’t help themselves.”
Isn’t that kind of the point?
We don’t hold mental patients to be morally responsible for their actions, so we don’t execute them for their crimes. However, God does. Seems to be a bit of a disconnect there: God executes the mental patients who can’t help themselves.
regards,
#John
#John1453 said:
“Seems to be a bit of a disconnect there: God executes the mental patients who can’t help themselves.”
Me:
Not all analogies are ment to be analogous at all points.
Perhaps a better analogy would be one of someone addicted to a drug that caused mental instability leading to murder.
Delivering someone from that addiction against their will is VERY loving.
Thanks for “a” reply to the request to define a “love relationship”, but I do not detect your actual definition.
You state “A properly functioning mind and will naturally loves the good and hates evil.”
Adam’s properly functioning (“good”) mind and will apparently did not naturally love the good and hate the evil.
Good point, RevRogers.
Also, most people would define love in libertarian terms. God does. In His revealed Word He asks people to choose to love Him or not. Seems pretty straightforward to me.
For example:
Deuteronomy 30:15 See, I have set before thee this day life and good, and death and evil; 16 In that I command thee this day to love the LORD thy God, to walk in his ways, and to keep his commandments and his statutes and his judgments, that thou mayest live and multiply: and the LORD thy God shall bless thee in the land whither thou goest to possess it. 17 But if thine heart turn away, so that thou wilt not hear, but shalt be drawn away, and worship other gods, and serve them; 18 I denounce unto you this day, that ye shall surely perish, and that ye shall not prolong your days upon the land, whither thou passest over Jordan to go to possess it. 19 I call heaven and earth to record this day against you, that I have set before you life and death, blessing and cursing: therefore choose life, that both thou and thy seed may live: 20 That thou mayest love the LORD thy God, and that thou mayest obey his voice, and that thou mayest cleave unto him: for he is thy life, and the length of thy days: that thou mayest dwell in the land which the LORD sware unto thy fathers, to Abraham, to Isaac, and to Jacob, to give them.
Joshua 24:14 Now therefore fear the LORD, and serve him in sincerity and in truth: and put away the gods which your fathers served on the other side of the flood, and in Egypt; and serve ye the LORD. 15 And if it seem evil unto you to serve the LORD, choose you this day whom ye will serve; whether the gods which your fathers served that were on the other side of the flood, or the gods of the Amorites, in whose land ye dwell: but as for me and my house, we will serve the LORD.
1 Kings 18:21 And Elijah came unto all the people, and said, How long halt ye between two opinions? if the LORD be God, follow him: but if Baal, then follow him. And the people answered him not a word.
regards,
#John
Rev. Rogers,
Pardon me, this is an aside, but are you an Arminian-Egalitarian who’s also posted comments on egalitarianism over at Denny Burk’s blog?
Yes, I do comment there occasionally. However, I consider myself more of a marital complementarian than a gender complementarian.
Marital complementarian: the roles of a husband and a wife to one another are complementary and the issues of submission and headship are relative to their marriage to one another
Gender complementarian: the roles of any male and any female are complementary in some respects and the Bible teaches that a female’s role is restricted in certain areas in relation to any and all males
Rev. Rogers,
Two final questions and then no more.
(1) Do you believe women should be ordained to the office of pastor or elder in a church?
(2) Do you affirm the Danvers Statement? If not, which parts do you disagree with?
Thanks.
From what I believe can be derived from clear Scripture, I believe a woman’s service to the body as pastor or elder must be qualified with regard to manifesting to the assembly that she is in no way in conflict with her husband or that she would be seen as disrespecting him. Her teaching should be in cooperation with her husband and in concert with his responsibility to nourish and cherish her and her responsibility to the duties of the family. I think there may be some indication of husband-wife leadership in the assemblies in the New Testament.
The present concept of “ordination” has acquired elements that are post-biblical. I have no problem with a woman being “ordained” as a hospital chaplain, and I believe that some SBC positions against woman’s ordination are sheer foolishness and quasi-Catholic.
I have some hesitancy to an absolute affirmation to rally for absolutely open women’s pastoring based on factors that admittedly are not absolutely clearly “biblical” qualifications but more based in the practicality of real life.
I am more concerned about what I believe is the unbiblical automatic restriction of allowing a woman to teach what the Lord has given her by the Spirit’s revelation and/or study of the Scripture. Women both taught and led men in the Scriptures but in full respect to their respective husbands.
I believe some gender complementarians are inconsistent in their application. Gender complementarians should not allow women to teach men ANYTHING. . . AT ANY TIME. . . IN ANY PLACE, if this position is truly based in a so-called creation gender ordinance (this includes wives of seminary presidents at ETS meetings and former vice-president candidates).
I’ve slept since I’ve read the Danvers statement so I don’t remember specifics but I probably would have some things to pick at in it.
Just curious, I haven’t noticed you at Denny’s lately. Is that because of his request at revealing one’s identity?
Blessings,
David (not Adrian’s son) Rogers
REPLY
Robert
“Now the non-calvinist on the other hand, since we believe that Jesus died for the world (and that world includes both folks who will eventually become believers as well as folks who will never become believers) we do in fact believe that God has the best interests in mind for all people of the world.”
If, according to freewill theism, it is possible for every human being to either accept or reject the gospel, then there’s at least one possible world in which each human being accepts the gospel. Therefore, God could act with everyone’s best interests in mind by instantiating a possible world in which everyone freely accepts the gospel. Libertarian freedom or the freedom to do otherwise (i.e. principle of alternate possibilities) implies that there is at least one such world.
Not true. Libertarian freedom does not imply that there is at least one world in which everyone chooses God. Indeed, that very point is at the core of Molinism. Under Molinism God knows what every person will do in every possible circumstance that could arise. So, if under a particular set of circumstances in a possible world I have the opportunity to play ball, or watch TV or read a book, God knows what I will do (e.g., I will read a book). Should that circumstance come to pass then I will read the book and there is no possible world in which that circumstance would come to pass and I don’t read a book. Hence, God cannot actualize a world in which I choose differently because the choice is up to me. That is, God cannot actualize both a world in which I do X, and also the exact same world (with the same history) in which I do not do X.
However, under Molinism there is still an infinite number of possible worlds which differ according to God’s actions, and so God can choose to instantiate which ever world pleases Him best.
Given that God is perfect, He will cause to come into being the best of all possible worlds, that is, one which has the best set of our foreknown choices. Given that there is sin and unbelief in this world, it was obviously not possible for God to create a world in which everyone freely believed. Or, I suppose, there was but He had reasons for not doing so. But that latter proposition is inconsistent with what we know about God.
regards,
#John
#John1453 “If He is powerful enough to save people and has decreed what shall come to pass, and does not save all people, then He lacks the desire and is wicked.”
Your conclusion has everything going for it except anything resembling an actual argument.
I’m just using an argument from logic that has been around since the early Greeks. It’s a pretty standard argument from evil that can be found in any of the latest books by atheists. I just modified it so that it would refer to Calvinist tenets.
In its usual form it’s presented thusly:
1) If God were willing to prevent evil but unable to do so, God would be impotent.
2) If God were able to prevent evil but unwilling to do so, God would be malevolent.
3) God is neither unwilling nor unable to prevent evil.
4) There is evil.
5) God does not exist.
regards,
#John
#John1453: “God, who loves His enemies more perfectly than we do, has set the example for us by casting into burning hellfire all those whom He did not elect, who were His enemies because of the sin of Adam their forefather.”
What exactly do you object to? Reprobation? Original sin? Or everlasting punishment?
It seems at least a bit strange to me that God tells us to love our enemies but He throws His enemies into the pit and watches them burn in agony for billions and billions of years (for a start, many more years to go). I’m nonplussed by the fact that the enemies he casts into the fire are enemies that never ever had the capacity to not be enemies. They were enemies of God from the get go, from conception. In fact, they were enemies before they existed. They were born in sin, unable not to sin, unable to love God. No matter what circumstance God would put them in, they would choose evil over life.
And yet God says that He is perfect and we aren’t.
Seems a wee bit inconsistent to me.
regards,
#John
#John1453 “Wow, gotta love that guy (God, not Calvin or Piper). Just makes you wanna snuggle right up into His loving hands and peek over the edge of His palm at your unelect kids burning in the hellfire and gnashing their teeth. I dunno about you, but it helps me sleep at night after I tuck my own kids into bed.”
Calvinism has no official position on the fate of all who die young. Some Reformed theologians (e.g. Warfield) believe in universal infant salvation.
And why do you think Methodism traditionally practices infant baptism? To wash away original sin. So why do you single out Calvinism? Are you simply ignorant of historical theology in general?
“Ah, the mysterious and gnostic love of God for the people screaming in hell for billions and billions of years as part of His wonderful plan. Makes me all kinda sentimental and gooey inside. If only Armnians would switch over to preaching this stuff, they would find their churches filled to overflowing.”
Since Arminianism traditionally subscribes to hell, why do you single out Calvinism at this juncture?
steve hays assumed that I was referring to infants. Nope. I am referring to children who have passed the age of accountability. Say a 10 or 12 year old. They may not be elect, and there is nought anyone can do about that.
As for the hellfire, the difference between Calvinism and Arminianism is that under the former it is God who is responsible for their presence in hell. He created people who are born into sin and unable to choose God and destined for hell unless He does something about it. And God does nothing about it (He only bothers about the elect). I used the phrase “wonderful plan” to refer back to my above quote from Calvin.
regards,
#John
If “John” is referring to those who have passed the age of discretion, then why would he object to the idea that those beyond the age of discretion are liable to everlasting punishment?
In Arminianism, God could save everyone. If you think that everyone has the freedom to either believe in Christ or disbelieve in Christ, then there’s a possible world in which everyone freely believes in Christ. That possibility follows from the Arminian commitment to libertarian freedom. So, if “John” were consistent, he’d admit that God could save them from their hellish fate (in this world) by instantiating a different possible world in which they did otherwise.
Given that God is all powerful, God could of course save everyone. However, the question is why He won’t. Under Calvinism, there is no explanation; God is simply capricious. Under Arminianism, God will not because otherwise He could not receive freely given love, nor have his love freely accepted (in the libertarian sense of free).
regards,
#John
REPLY
#John1453 November 20, 2009 at 6:40 pm
I’m just using an argument from logic that has been around since the early Greeks. It’s a pretty standard argument from evil that can be found in any of the latest books by atheists. I just modified it so that it would refer to Calvinist tenets.
In its usual form it’s presented thusly:
1) If God were willing to prevent evil but unable to do so, God would be impotent.
2) If God were able to prevent evil but unwilling to do so, God would be malevolent.
3) God is neither unwilling nor unable to prevent evil.
4) There is evil.
5) God does not exist.
***********************
Of course, that argument could also be modified to refer to Arminian tenets. Since according to Arminianism, God has libertarian freedom, nothing necessitated God in creating a world where evil exists. God could prevent that outcome by not making our world (or any world whatsoever) in the first place.
So, by your own logic, applied to Arminian tenets, God is malevolent and evil.
Nope. Arminianism is considered the explicit response to the issue of evil and provides a theodicy for it. Yes, God could have decided not to create anything at all. However, if He did want a world in which His creatures could freely love him (in a libertarian sense) and could be morally responsible, and could undergo soul formation, then He would have to create a world in which evil could occur.
Under Arminianism (or Molinism, or open theism, etc.) God is neither malevolent nor evil because could prevent evil but does not do so in order that we might exist with libertarian free wills. It is thus we who are the source of our moral evils because the causes for our actions have an ultimate end in our own undetermined wills. Wills are not something with causes, but something we exercise. Hence the explanations for our choices are teleological (directed to an end), but not determinative (a result of prior necessary and sufficient causes).
So, it is not the case that the logic can be applied to Arminian tenets.
regards,
#John
#John1453 “Not true. Libertarian freedom does not imply that there is at least one world in which everyone chooses God.”
Of course it does. That’s a logical implication of libertarian freedom. If libertarian freedom is the freedom to do otherwise in the same situation (which is a standard definition), then the outcome could go either way. If you deny that it’s possible for an agent to either choose A or refrain from choosing A, then you deny that he would have chosen otherwise. You thereby deny the principle of alternative possibilities.
But, in that case, how can you still object to determinism or compatibilism?
If, on the other hand, you admit, a la libertarianism, that it’s possible for an agent to do otherwise, then that commits you to a possible world in which he does otherwise. That possibility can’t adhere in the actual world, for the actual world only exemplifies one future, one timeline, one possible alternative.
Therefore, the alternate possibility must refer to, and be grounded in, another possible world.
As for Molinism, all you’ve done is to expose the incoherence of Molinism.
However, since you bring it up, here is how Thomas Flint, a leading Molinist, defines libertarian freedom: “Necessarily, for any human agent S, action A and time t, if S performs A freely at t, then the history of the world prior to t, the
laws of nature, and the actions of any other agent (including God)
prior to and at t are jointly compatible with S’s refraining from
performing A freely.” Cf. Divine Foreknowledge: Four Views, 161n1.
This, of course, is just a formal way of expressing the freedom to do otherwise (or principle of alternate possibilities).
So my argument follows even from a Molinist definition of libertarian freedom.
You’re a bit mixed up. What Flint says is true, and it is then the choice of the person, not God, that determines the outcome. And God, being omniscient as to all outcomes, knows which of the free choices that person will make.
However, it is not true that there are two worlds, both with libertarian free will, which have identical composition and identical histories but in one world the person chooses freely to perform action A, and in the other world the person freely chooses not-A. A person can only freely choose one, not both, and God knows what is chosen.
You may disagree, but that is what Molinists believe. If free will is truly libertarian, then God will not (not “cannot”, but “will not” because the creation of and overriding of free will is always within his power) control the outcomes of the choices.
regards,
#John
#John1453
“So, it is not the case that the logic can be applied to Arminian tenets.”
It follows directly from the second premise of your own syllogism: “If God were able to prevent evil but unwilling to do so, God would be malevolent.”
Yet you admit that God was able, but unwilling to prevent evil: “Yes, God could have decided not to create anything at all. However…”
Therefore, if we hold you to your own words, then God is malevolent and evil by Arminian standards.
If you’re going to backpeddle from a conclusion which is entailed by your own syllogism, then you need to withdraw your syllogism. But, in that event, you can no longer deploy that syllogism against Calvinism without implicating your own position in the same breath.
Hey, I was reporting on the standard atheist argument from evil. I’m not the one that invented the argument; blame the Greeks.
Anyway, your conclusion would only be true if there were no other grounds exculpating God from malevolency on account of His unwillingness. The point of theodicies is to get God off the hook in respect of His unwillingness (since all theodicies except Process Theism assume the omnipotence of God, there is no way off that horn of the dilemma).
Under the Arminian (or any libertarian free will system), God is not malevolent because He is unwilling for reasons that are justifiable. One such reason is human libertarian love. Another reason is human moral responsibility.
regards,
#John
Re steve hays and infant election.
Though Calvin himself believed in infant baptism, not all current Calvinists do (hmmm, if Calvin was wrong on the infant baptism thing, maybe he was wrong on the predestination and election thing, too). However, for those that do believe in both election and universal infant salvation, it seems a bit odd and ad hoc that God would “off” a whole bunch of the elect while they were babies. And, if true, then it means that there already are saved from every nation on earth (all those from every nation who died while infants).
regards,
#John
#John1453 “Given that God is all powerful, God could of course save everyone. However, the question is why He won’t. Under Calvinism, there is no explanation; God is simply capricious. Under Arminianism, God will not because otherwise He could not receive freely given love, nor have his love freely accepted (in the libertarian sense of free).”
That’s a completely ineffective rebuttal since my argument is predicated on libertarian freedom as the operating premise. Try again.
?
Sorry, I don’t follow your argument.
regards,
#John
#John1453 “Anyway, your conclusion would only be true if there were no other grounds exculpating God from malevolency on account of His unwillingness.”
Wrong. My conclusion follows by strict implication from your own syllogism. You’re now having to salvage your argument by conceding that your syllogism was invalidated by suppressed premises. So you now need to reformulate your syllogism to explicate your suppressed premises.
Note again that I indicated that the syllogism is one that atheists use to argue against the existence of the Christian God, who is defined as maximally compossible (i.e., maximally good, perfect, powerful, etc.). I never said that I agreed with it, but rather indicated that I did not believe it was true for reasons that an Arminian would agree with (or Plantinga, etc.).
To return to my original point, the Calvinist has no way to escape the horns of the dilemma: either the God he describes is malevolent, or he is impotent.
regards,
#John
#John1453 “ You’re a bit mixed up.”
We’ll see who’s mixed up.
“What Flint says is true, and it is then the choice of the person, not God, that determines the outcome.”
Determines *which* outcome? Determines the outcome in *which* possible world?
If libertarianism is true, then there is more than one possible outcome. That’s the point. The principle of alternate possibilities.
Hence, there is more than one possible outcome. Hence, there is more than one possible world which corresponds to that alternate outcome.
“And God, being omniscient as to all outcomes, knows which of the free choices that person will make.”
And if the agent is free in the libertarian sense, then the agent not only has more than one choice, but he makes more than one choice–in different possible worlds (or world-segments).
That is what it means to say he could do otherwise. If it could go either way, then there must be a possible world for either hypothetical outcome.
“However, it is not true that there are two worlds, both with libertarian free will, which have identical composition and identical histories but in one world the person chooses freely to perform action A, and in the other world the person freely chooses not-A.”
Is that what I said? No. Different possible worlds represent alternate futures. They may have the same history up to a point, but they fork off at the point where the free agent opts for one alternate timeline or another.
As to identical composition, to remind you, once more, a defining feature of libertarian freedom is the ability to do otherwise given the very same preconditions.
“A person can only freely choose one, not both, and God knows what is chosen.”
Can only make one choice per possible world. That’s because each possible world (0r segment thereof) represents an alternate possibility. This doesn’t mean a libertarian agent only makes one choice. Rather, he only makes one of those choices in a given world. Not that there is only one given world in which he can choose.
“You may disagree, but that is what Molinists believe.”
You’re the one who introduced Molinism, not me. I was discussing the implications of libertarian freedom. It’s not as if Molinism has a monopoly on possible worlds.
Steve Hays writes, “If libertarianism is true, then there is more than one possible outcome. That’s the point. The principle of alternate possibilities. Hence, there is more than one possible outcome. Hence, there is more than one possible world which corresponds to that alternate outcome.”
Your “hence” is a non sequitur, and I know of no one who argues for libertarian free will that would agree with you.
It does not follow that there must be a possible world for either hypothetical outcome, at least not if one holds to the principle of bivalence (which most people do hold to, including most philosophers and most who believe in libertarian free will). For example, tomorrow there either will or will not be a sea battle depending on the choice of the admiral. A free will libertarian would argue that both are possible, and that whether one does occur depends entirely on the uncaused choice of the admiral. That is, there is nothing in the natural world that causes him to choose one way (including the inclinations, etc. of the admiral herself), and God does not determine the choice. However, there will only be one outcome, not two. The sea battle will occur, or it won’t. Both those who believe in simple foreknowledge and Molinists agree that God knows what the outcome will be because he knows the actual future. What will occur is the actual future (e.g., the sea battle occurs), and God knows that.
There are different types of open theists. Some do not believe that bivalence is essential (e.g. Sanders, who believes that “will / will not” is neither true nor false but simply unknowable and therefore does not constitute knowledge). Others do believe in bivalence (e.g. Boyd, Rhoda). For the latter will / will not are contraries, not contradictories. The contradictory of will / will not is might/might not.
Anyway, if one believes in bivalence (as I do) then there cannot be two true outcomes of a future choice.
*In logic, the semantic principle of bivalence states that every proposition is either true or false. The principle of bivalence can be stated more formally as: For any proposition P, either P is true or P is false. This principle is related to the principle of contradiction and the principle of the excluded middle.
regards,
#John
.
#John1453
“Your ‘hence’ is a non sequitur.”
That’s an assertion, not an argument.
“And I know of no one who argues for libertarian free will that would agree with you.”
That’s an anecdote, not an argument.
“It does not follow that there must be a possible world for either hypothetical outcome, at least not if one holds to the principle of bivalence (which most people do hold to, including most philosophers and most who believe in libertarian free will). For example, tomorrow there either will or will not be a sea battle depending on the choice of the admiral. A free will libertarian would argue that both are possible.”
“Both possible” in relation to *what*? The actual world? The actual future? They can’t both be possible in relation to the same outcome since contrary outcomes would be incompossible. Both could only be possible in relation two different possible worlds. Your position also has no way of grounding unexemplified possibilities.
“Both those who believe in simple foreknowledge and Molinists agree that God knows what the outcome will be because he knows the actual future. What will occur is the actual future (e.g., the sea battle occurs), and God knows that.”
That assumes the very thing you need to prove. If the future is open-ended, then there is no one outcome to be known prior to the event.
“Anyway, if one believes in bivalence (as I do) then there cannot be two true outcomes of a future choice.”
Which, once again, misses the point. They cannot both be true in reference to the same world. But different possible worlds represent alternate futures. That supplies the truthmaker for counterfactual statements–without which counterfactual statements lack truth-value. Yet libertarianism is knee-deep in counterfactuals.
“In logic, the semantic principle of bivalence states that every proposition is either true or false. The principle of bivalence can be stated more formally as: For any proposition P, either P is true or P is false. This principle is related to the principle of contradiction and the principle of the excluded middle.”
True or false for *what*? For each possible world, every proposition is either true or false. But that restriction obtains *within* possible worlds, not *between* possible worlds. There is no contradiction in saying that what is true in one possible world may be false in another. Try again.
steve hays wrote: (1) ““Your ‘hence’ is a non sequitur.” That’s an assertion, not an argument.” and (2) ““And I know of no one who argues for libertarian free will that would agree with you.” That’s an anecdote, not an argument.”
In regard to no. 1, steve’s reply does not help his position, in that after I assert that what he says does not follow, I then go on to explain why. Steve’s reply fails to show how his conclusion follows.
In regard to no. 2, the fact that no one else argues as steve does is good evidence for the conclusion that steve, being the odd one out, is wrong. This places a greater burden on him to show how is conclusion is supported (which he does not do).
Neither Molinists nor simple foreknowledge-ists believe that the future is open ended. They believe that the choices of humans are contingent facts, but they both believe that the future is, and has been, fully determined by God (because of the content and nature of His knowledge). Even open theists would agree that the ultimate end is determined, and that many of the events along the way to that end are determined. They would just hold that many of the intermediate events are not yet determined.
steve hays seems to use “open ended” to mean “contingent”, but they are not the same concepts. Further, as I have indicated, neither Molinists (e.g., W.L. Craig) nor those who hold to simple forknowledge (e.g., D. Hunt-the one with the PhD) believe that the future is open ended in the sense that steve hays sets out, i.e., unknown outcome. Both believe that the outcome is known because they believe that God can foreknow the outcome of a contingent choice. The situation with respect to open theists is more complex, but they would not describe the future in the way that steve hays does.
steve hays does not appear to understand the principle of bivalence nor how possible world theory works, but this is not the place for a mini lesson in those concepts (unless it is desired by readers). In short, however, if a person makes a choice at a certain time, e.g. biting an apple, and that choice represents the true history of the world, then there is no possible world with the exact same history up to that point in which the person does not bite the apple. Some nonChristians have speculated that the universe is continually forking off and every logically possible world thus exists (either always and at the same time, or as progressive branching), but such arguments are not relevant for discussions of future knowledge involving the Christian God (i.e., one who possesses maximal compossible attributes). [note that I said "logically possible", not "alethically possible"]
It appears to me that steve hays is unfamiliar with the concepts and literature necessary to engage usefully on this issue and out of his depth. So, unless anyone is interested in this line of argument, I won’t further engage on these points.
regards,
#John
“steve hays does not appear to understand the principle of bivalence nor how possible world theory works, but this is not the place for a mini lesson in those concepts (unless it is desired by readers).”
It appears to me that steve hays is unfamiliar with the concepts and literature necessary to engage usefully on this issue and out of his depth. So, unless anyone is interested in this line of argument, I won’t further engage on these points.”
John, this reader would like to see you engage and elaborate more on these points. By the way, Steve Hays is slightly more formidable than you might think.
Lastly, are you the same John who lives up in Canada and is a lawyer? If my weak memory serves, are you the same John who argued emphatically and continuously (some might say derisively) for the Old-Earth Creationist point of view over at C. Michael Patton’s blog, Parchment and Pen? On an over 700 comment thread?
Mais oui, c’est mois.
The old age thing was my first extensive foray into blogging, which I only really started this year. Some of my posts are somewhat embarrassing. I’ve tried to tone down a bit since then so that reason tops emotion.
salut,
#John
revrogers
“Adam’s properly functioning (‘good’) mind and will apparently did not naturally love the good and hate the evil.”
You’re confusing what is natural with what is necessary.
Truth unites and divides wrote:
“John, this reader would like to see you engage and elaborate more on these points. By the way, Steve Hays is slightly more formidable than you might think.”
Steve Hays is one of he worst examples of calvinists blogging on the internet that I have ever encountered. He is constantly and sinfully attacking other believers with completely inappropriate comments. He posted here earlier addressing me and I have ignored him not responding because I usually avoid interacting with him.
Just today on another blog Steve Hays wrote this about me:
“Under the pious veneer, Robert is an atheist at heart. He doesn’t trust God to write the story of his life. Robert wants to write his own story. Like a famous fallen angel, Robert suffers from delusions of godhood. The idea that God is in control of his life is unbearable to Robert. Deep down, Robert has no faith in God. God can’t be trusted to write the story of his life. Ultimately, Robert has too much faith in himself to have room left over for faith in God. Robert is a self-idolater.
November 21, 2009 6:41 AM”
So **according to Steve Hays** I am “an atheist at heart”, I don’t trust God, “suffer fro delusions of godhood”, “deep down I have no faith in God,” and I worship myself. Contrary to Steve Hays’ false allegations I am responsible for a large prison ministry involving about 7,000 inmates. Have been a pastor in various places and have been an elder and in church leadership for many years. I have a strong marriage and family. I am extremely blessed in all areas of my life and praise the Lord for all that he has done and continues to do in my life. Because I have challenged Steve Hays’ calvinism, Hays responds with these public and false claims. My response is to contrast my life and ministry with his (he is fifty years old, lives with his mother, is unmarried and childless, is not in church leadership, instead he spends hours a day posting on the web and considers that to be his “ministry”). I will contrast my reality with his anytime. Unfortunately, he has no accountability so he is allowed to publically attack people with these kinds of comments. Actually he is accountable, to God, he professes to be a Christian, perhaps his sinful antics partly explains his life circumstances.
Robert
Robert,
Perhaps it is better to let the Triablokes go their own way. It is one of the most disgusting, carnal focused apologist sites I have ever encountered. One of my church groups recently explored some of the apologist sites to demonstrate the character of the internet and what to avoid. Hays site was deeply embedded in the disgusting category. Justin Taylor’s site was received quite favorably along with C. Michael Patton’s Parchment & Pen.
“Just today on another blog Steve Hays wrote this about me”
Robert,
Can you provide a link to this blog thread so that I read the entire comment discussion?
Thanks.
Also, fwiw, I’ll be addressing some of your commentary about Steve Hays in a later comment when I have more time.
May God continue to bless your prison ministry.
I’ve see Hays post elsewhere. I’m not always successful in writing dispassionately, but I’ve found it useful to write in the third person. We’ll see how this one goes.
cheers,
#John
I haven’t spoken a harsh word about Robert or other non-Calvinists on Justin Taylor’s thread. I’ve confined myself entirely to the issues at hand. It’s Robert and Mallett who are interjecting their invective into this thread, not me. And keep in mind that Robert is on record comparing Calvinists to Nazis, Klansmen, and cult-members. Both Robert and Mallett are very selective in their disapproval.
I am not on record as making any such comparisons and of course I am selective in my disapprovals. It would be irrational to be otherwise.
#John1453: “In regard to no. 1, steve’s reply does not help his position, in that after I assert that what he says does not follow, I then go on to explain why. Steve’s reply fails to show how his conclusion follows.”
i) To the contrary, I specifically countered “John’s” explanation.
ii) Likewise, I’ve explained in some detail how the conclusion follows. “John’s” bare denial hardly amounts to a disproof.
“In regard to no. 2, the fact that no one else argues as steve does is good evidence for the conclusion that steve, being the odd one out, is wrong.”
i) A headcount is not an argument. Indeed, it’s a tacit admission that someone can’t defend his position by reasoned argument.
ii) Also keep in mind that this is just another assertion. “John” has offered no statistical evidence to back up his statistical claim.
“Neither Molinists nor simple foreknowledge-ists believe that the future is open ended. They believe that the choices of humans are contingent facts, but they both believe that the future is, and has been, fully determined by God (because of the content and nature of His knowledge).”
i) Arminians emphatically deny that divine foreknowledge implies divine determinism of the future.
ii) ”John” continues to equivocate over the future. He still doesn’t grasp the issue. The question at issue is not whether the actual future is open-ended. Rather, in libertarianism, there are alternate possible outcomes. The actual world actualizes one possible outcome. But this is by no means to obviate the open-ended character of the future at the level of possible worlds. And that is how the freedom to do otherwise cashes out. Does “John” even understand the principle of alternate possibilities?
iii) Apropos (ii), this, in turn, raises the question of whether God can know in advance which possible future is the actual future.
iv) Even if “John’s description of Molinism were accurate, that’s beside the point since the question at issue is not merely the descriptive question of what Molinism claims to be the case, but the evaluative question of whether Molinism is coherent. Can Molinism consistently make good on its claims?
Remember that Molinism is a compromise position which tries to finesse libertarian freedom and divine sovereignty. Whether it’s successful in that endeavor is a standing bone of contention.
“Even open theists would agree that the ultimate end is determined, and that many of the events along the way to that end are determined.”
That’s vague and equivocal. The point at issue is not whether natural events like earthquakes are determined, but whether God predetermines human actions. This is something open theism denies. Indeed, it goes further and denies that God even knows what human agents will do.
“Steve hays seems to use ‘open ended’ to mean ‘contingent’, but they are not the same concepts.”
That’s not how I’ve defined my terms.
“Further, as I have indicated, neither Molinists (e.g., W.L. Craig) nor those who hold to simple forknowledge (e.g., D. Hunt-the one with the PhD) believe that the future is open ended in the sense that steve hays sets out, i.e., unknown outcome.”
i) Once again, “John” fails to distinguish between the description of a claim and the evaluation of the claim.
ii) He is also trying to shift the focus of the discussion. The question of whether or not God can foreknow the counterfactuals of freedom is ancillary to my original argument. The question at issue is whether there is at least one possible world in which libertarian agents freely believe in Christ. And, therefore, whether the Arminian God is more loving than the Calvinist God when the Arminian God could save everyone without infringing on their libertarian freedom, but chooses, instead, to making a world containing hellbound sinners.
“Steve hays does not appear to understand the principle of bivalence nor how possible world theory works, but this is not the place for a mini lesson in those concepts (unless it is desired by readers).”
Because “John” doesn’t have a real argument, he resorts to promissory arguments. The check is in the mail.
“In short, however, if a person makes a choice at a certain time, e.g. biting an apple, and that choice represents the true history of the world, then there is no possible world with the exact same history up to that point in which the person does not bite the apple.”
To the contrary, that’s exactly how libertarianism asserts. Remember Flint’s definition, which I quoted above. According to Flint, libertarian freedom is definable by the fact that the preconditions don’t determine the outcome. Under the very same preconditions, you could have a different outcome.
Consider another standard definition of libertarian freedom by a leading libertarian philosopher (William Hasker):
“By ‘libertarian freedom’ is meant freedom such that the agent who makes a choice is really able, under exactly the same circumstances, to choose something different from the thing that is in fact chosen…libertarian freedom is inherently indeterministic. This means that there is nothing whatever that predetermines which choice will be made, until the creature is actually placed in the situation and makes the decision,” Contemporary Debates in Philosophy, 219.
It follows from Flint’s definition and Hasker’s alike that the history of the world could be identical up to the point at which the free agent makes his next choice, yet different futures remain in play. Although the actual world instantiates just one possibility to the exclusion of the others, the future could go either way at the level of possible outcomes, which inhere in different possible worlds (or world-segments). And that is how libertarian philosophers unpack the freedom to do otherwise.
“Some nonChristians have speculated that the universe is continually forking off and every logically possible world thus exists (either always and at the same time, or as progressive branching), but such arguments are not relevant for discussions of future knowledge involving the Christian God (i.e., one who possesses maximal compossible attributes). [note that I said ‘logically possible’, not ‘alethically possible’].”
That objection is muddled in two respects:
i) A Christian can subscribe to the multiverse. Don Page is a Christian physicist who has written in support of the multiverse.
ii) More to the point, the question at issue is not the physical existence of forking paths, but forking paths as possible worlds (i.e. abstract objects). As (Christian) libertarian philosopher Robert Kane explicates the concept:
“Open alternatives lie before us…This means we could have chosen or acted otherwise…If Jane believes her choice is a free choice (made ‘of her own free will’), she must believe both options are ‘open’ to her while she is deliberating. She could have chosen either one…But that means she believe there is more than one possible path into the future available to her and it is ‘up to her’ which of these paths will be taken. Such a picture of an open future with forking paths–a garden of working paths, we might call it–is essential to our understanding of free will,” Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics, 285-86.
Kane’s explanation directly contradicts “John’s” contrary assertion about the relation between past and future in libertarian action theory.
“John” seems to lack even a nodding acquaintance with the standard libertarian literature–although that’s the position he claims to be both representing and defending. Either that or he doesn’t grasp what the writers are saying.
“It appears to me that steve hays is unfamiliar with the concepts and literature necessary to engage usefully on this issue and out of his depth.”
Notice that I’m the one who’s actually documenting my claims from the relevant literature. “John” is simply pounding his fist.
Why do I post on Calvinism? Aside from the fact that I believe it is wrong? Because it presents such a negative picture of God that people become atheists or reject the message of Jesus. It’s an obstacle and barrier to evangelism. Which is a real issue for me because I don’t believe that God has predetermined the number of the elect (unlike Calvinism, of course).
First correction: Hays quotes Kane, ““Open alternatives lie before us…This means we could have chosen or acted otherwise…If Jane believes her choice is a free choice (made ‘of her own free will’), she must believe both options are ‘open’ to her while she is deliberating. She could have chosen either one…But that means she believe there is more than one possible path into the future available to her and it is ‘up to her’ which of these paths will be taken.”
Note that Kane is writing from Jane’s perspective; to her all of the paths are open to her while she is deliberating. That is not God’s perspective under either simple foreknowledge or Molinism. Under those two theories, God knows which path Jane will take. However, God does not determine her choice (and neither does the natural universe); the choice is entirely hers. But she can only choose in one way, and there is no other universe in which she chooses the other way. Molinism has been attacked for not properly grounding God’s knowledge (though W.L. Craig does not think the attack successful). [I repeat myself again] Under simple foreknowledge and Molinism there is no other universe with the exact same prior history and constitution in which Jane makes the choice differently. So Kane does not contradict me, at least not in that passage.
It is, of course, possible to imagine other theories in which the above description is not the case, but those theories would not be simple foreknowledge or Molinism (which is what Hays began his attack on). Hays gives the example of the multiverse, which is fine, but that is not what was underdiscussion and the failings of the multiverse are not the failings of Molinism or simple foreknowledge.
regards,
#John
#John1453: “Note that Kane is writing from Jane’s perspective; to her all of the paths are open to her while she is deliberating.”
Wrong! Kane is using Jane to articulate the concept of libertarian freedom. This represents Kane’s position, as a libertarian action theorist.
“That is not God’s perspective under either simple foreknowledge or Molinism.”
For some reason, “John” keeps trying to recast the issue. The starting point is not middle knowledge or simple foreknowledge. The starting point is libertarian freedom. If you take libertarian freedom as your operating premise, then the next question is what does that imply?
Remember the question headlining Justin’s thread? Does God really want to save everyone?
Arminian commenters immediately began to pounce on Calvinism. I, however, pointed out that if you subscribe to libertarian freedom, then there’s at least one possible world in which everyone freely believes in Jesus. Yet God doesn’t make that world. Instead, he makes another possible world containing a large number of hellbound sinners. In that event, is the Arminian God more loving than the Calvinist God. That’s the question.
You can pose the same question for any form of freewill theism. The same question is applicable to Molinism. Indeed, William Lane Craig admits the existence of possible worlds in which everyone is saved. He justifies the creation of a world in which everyone is not saved on the grounds that more people are saved overall, even if that comes at the expense of the damned.
“Under those two theories, God knows which path Jane will take.”
Once again, “John” is unable to distinguish the descriptive question from the evaluative question. The question at issue is not merely what those two theories stipulate to be the case, but whether one or both are internally coherent with all their operating assumptions.
“But she can only choose in one way, and there is no other universe in which she chooses the other way.”
Which is a point blank denial of libertarian freedom. If “John” wants to deny libertarian freedom, that’s fine with me. However, he’s been attacking Calvinism right and left. Yet it’s very difficult for him to attack Reformed combatibilism if he’s going to repudiate libertarian incompatibilism as well. At that point, what is his standard of comparison?
“Under simple foreknowledge and Molinism there is no other universe with the exact same prior history and constitution in which Jane makes the choice differently.”
That statement directly contradicts Flint’s definition of libertarian freewill, and Flint is a leading Molinist. It also contradicts Hasker’s definition.
“So Kane does not contradict me, at least not in that passage.”
Kane isn’t stating the position of either middle knowledge or simple foreknowledge. That’s not his starting point. His starting point is libertarian freewill. The next question is what libertarian freewill allows or disallows.
I’ve now cited three libertarian action theorists (Flint, Hasker, Kane) whose definition of libertarian freedom directly contradicts the position of “John.” Yet “John” is attacking Reformed compatibilism. If, however, “John” rejects libertarianism and compatibilism alike, then what is his fallback position?
“It is, of course, possible to imagine other theories in which the above description is not the case, but those theories would not be simple foreknowledge or Molinism (which is what Hays began his attack on).”
“John” is rewriting the history of the thread. I didn’t begin by attacking middle knowledge or simple foreknowledge. Go back to where I entered the discussion. I began by discussing the universalistic potential of freewill theism:
http://thegospelcoalition.org/blogs/justintaylor/2009/11/18/does-god-really-want-all-people-to-be-saved/#comment-53998
“Hays gives the example of the multiverse, which is fine, but that is not what was underdiscussion and the failings of the multiverse are not the failings of Molinism or simple foreknowledge.”
i) Once again, “John” is rewriting the history of the thread. I’m not the one who brought up the multiverse. He did. I was responding to his introduction of that issue into the exchange.
ii) Moreover, he did that by confusing the concept of forking paths with the concept of the multiverse. While the multiverse is one way to underwrite the garden of forking paths, the two concepts are hardly synonymous. Kane is using the garden of forking paths to illustrate libertarian action theory, not physics.
iii) Furthermore, the “failings” of Molinism or the multiverse were not the point at issue. The issue was the way in which libertarian freedom implicates the possibility of a world in which everyone freely believes the gospel.
iv) Finally, “John” said the multiverse was inconsistent with Christian theism. I simply pointed out that you have professing Christians like Don Page who think otherwise.
So let’s recap the real issue: according to freewill theism, does God want everyone to be saved? If libertarian freewill creates the possibility of a world in which everyone freely accepts the Gospel, yet God chooses not to make such a world, but instead, makes a world in which many sinners will spend eternity in hell, then in what sense does God want to save them? It lay within his power to do so without stepping on their libertarian toes. And, in that case, how is freewill theism more loving than Reformed theism?
The following proposition appears fundmental to Hays arguement against libertarian freedom: “if you subscribe to libertarian freedom, then there’s at least one possible world in which everyone freely believes in Jesus.” (from, e.g., his post November 22, 2009 at 8:15 am).
None of the three philosophers cited by Hays (Flint, Hasker, Kane)states that proposition, which Hays does not appreciate.
Libertarian free will is not defined by the number of possible futures, but by the manner in which a human makes a choice. In particular by the constraints on that choice or lack thereof.
“By “libertarian freedom” is meant freedom such that the agent who makes a choice is really able, under exactly the same circumstances, to choose something different than the thing that is in fact choses. The choices in question, then, are not causally determined to occur as they do; libertarian freedom is inherently indeterministic. This means that there is nothing whatever that predetermines which choice will be made, until the creature actually is placed in the situation and makes the decision.” (W. Hasker, “Providence, Evil, and the Openness of God”, pp. 125-6).
However, in the true history of the universe the person in question will only choose one thing. There are not two (or more) true / actual histories of the world. There are many logically possible histories, but only one actual one. In both simple foreknowledge and Molinism, God is limited in what worlds he can create by the actual choices of the people that inhabit those worlds. God cannot create every world that is logically possible, but only those that are actually possible. Actually possible worlds are feasible worlds.
W.L. Craig writes that “What Molinism holds is that God knows logically prior to His decree to create a world what any person would freely do in any fully specified, freedom-permitting set of circumstances in which God might place him.” (from his website) What a person will freely do is a definite fact for God.
On the difference between merely possible worlds and feasible worlds W.L. Craig writes, “The distinction between possible worlds and feasible worlds is one that lies at the heart of the doctrine of middle knowledge and may have very important theological implications, such as the one that you note. The terminological distinction was first drawn by the philosopher Thomas Flint, but the conceptual distinction is inherent in Luis Molina’s theory of middle knowledge formulated in the sixteenth century. . . . According to Molina, logically prior to the divine decree to create a world, God possesses not only knowledge of everything that could happen (His natural knowledge) but also everything that would happen contingently in any appropriately specified set of circumstances (His middle knowledge). God’s natural knowledge is His knowledge of all necessary truths. By means of it God knows what is the full range of possible worlds, or as you put it, worlds that are intrinsically possible. He knows, for example, that in some possible world Peter freely denies Christ three times and that in another possible world Peter freely affirms Christ under identical circumstances, for both are possible.”
This brings us to Hays point that there exists a possible world in which everyone comes to saving faith. It is therefore important to pay attention to what Craig writes next. “God’s middle knowledge is His knowledge of all contingently true conditional propositions in the subjunctive mood, including propositions about creaturely free actions. For example, logically prior to His creative decree, God knew that if Peter were in circumstances C, he would freely deny Christ three times. Such subjunctive conditionals are often called counterfactuals. These counterfactuals serve to delimit the range of possible worlds to worlds which are feasible for God to actualize. For example, there is an intrinsically possible world in which Peter freely affirms Christ in precisely the same circumstances in which he in fact denied him; but given the counterfactual truth that if Peter were in precisely those circumstances he would freely deny Christ, then the possible world in which Peter freely affirms Christ in those circumstances is not feasible for God. God could force Peter to affirm Christ in those circumstances, but then his confession would not be free. By means of His middle knowledge, God knows what is the proper subset of possible worlds which are feasible for Him, given the counterfactuals that are true.”
The important point is that God cannot create a world in which a person chooses to do other than what God knows she will do in those exact same circumstances. Though it is logically possible for someone to do A or B or C, etc. in those circumstances God knows that the person will do A.
So, it may be that there is a world in which everyone freely comes to Christ, but the only such world is one in which God must lie, or the world must end in 3 A.D., or some other factual circustance that God, in His wisdom, does not want to actualize. We cannot know God’s reasons for choosing to create a world in which everyone does not come to saving faith, but we do have confidence that God has good reasons for doing so or that such a world was not possible. Neither way is libertarian free will defeated.
The disagreement between Hays and me appears to lie in what types of worlds we were referring to. When I wrote that libertarian freedom does not imply that there is at least one world in which everyone chooses God, I was referring to feasible worlds. When Hays was referring to the fact that there exists a world in which someone eats an apple (for example), and an exact same world in which someone does not eat an apple, he was referring to logically possible worlds. In that sense he is true and I agree with him.
Furthermore, the Calvinist is no better off than the Libertarian; indeed her position is worse. The Calvinist position is worse because God determines the future by decree, and so could simply decree that every person be saved. Moreover, under Calvinism saving faith is irrestible since God first regenerates the heart of the person that is saved. Under Calvinism God is not limited by the true conditionals of freedom (i.e., by what a person will do under specified circumstances).
At this point we return to why Sproul did not adequate answer the question: it is not possible to answer it in any morally sensible manner.
Back to John Calvin, (Institutes, 3:21:5) “By predestination we mean the eternal decree of God, by which he determined with himself whatever he wished to happen with regard to every man. All are not created on equal terms, but some are preordained to eternal life, others to eternal damnation; and, accordingly, as each has been created for one or other of these ends, we say that he has been predestinated to life or to death.”
Scripture proclaims that all mortals were bound over to eternal death in the person of one man [Adam] (cf. Rom. 5:12 ff.). Since this cannot be ascribed to nature, it is perfectly clear that it has come forth from the wonderful plan of God…. Again I ask: whence does it happen that Adam’s fall irremediably involved so many peoples, together with their infant offspring, in eternal death unless because it so pleased God?… The decree is horrible indeed, I confess. Yet no one can deny that God foreknew what end man was to have before he created him, and consequently foreknew because he so ordained by his decree…. And it ought not to seem absurd for me to say that God not only foresaw the fall of the first man, and in him the ruin of his descendants, but also meted it out in accordance with his own decision. For it pertains to his wisdom to foreknow everything that is to happen, so it pertains to his might to rule and control everything by his hand.
(Institutes 3:23.7)
Yippee! As Calvin states, “this miserable condition wherein men are now bound [in sin, on the way to hell], all of Adam’s children have fallen by God’s will” is just God’s “wonderful plan” that He makes come to pass because it is “His might to rule and control everything by His hand”.
So, in heaven we will be delighted with God that He has used some of our loved ones (children, parents, grandparents, best friends, etc.) as a means of displaying His wrath forever and ever. We’ll be pleased that God didn’t save them even though He could have.
Oh how wonderful to be used by God to show the glory of His wrath and to burn in hellfire forever so that His glorious wrath can be displayed for billions of years without end.
regards,
#John
I should also point out that a world in which everyone has libertarian freedom and is also saved may not be feasible because of the contigent nature of such worlds. The circumstances in which a person finds themself in one of the possible worlds is constrained by the contingently free choices of persons prior in time to the one making the choice. Recall that God knows the outcome of every free choice prior to creation. Because not every logical world is not a feasible world, there are no grounds for believeing that a world in which everyone freely is saved is a feasible one.
Under Calvinism, however, a world in which everyone is saved is feasible, but for the fact that God wants some people to burn hell so that he can display His wrath.
Even if there is a feasible world in which everyone has libertarian free will and comes to saving faith, the fact that we do not have such a world means either that it is not feasibly possible or that this world, one in which everyone has freee will but not everyone is saved, is better for some reason that God only knows.
regards,
#John
#John1453: “None of the three philosophers cited by Hays (Flint, Hasker, Kane)states that proposition, which Hays does not appreciate.”
A red herring. The question is whether, given a standard definition of libertarianism, such as they supply, an Arminian can demonstrate that there is no possible world in which free agents freely choose Jesus. For if there is even one possible world in which everyone is saved, yet God chooses to instantiate a different world in which some individuals are damned, then in what sense is Arminianism more loving than Calvinism?
This is a question of logical implications, given a libertarian premise. What does that premise logically allow or disallow?
Given his commitment to libertarian freedom, can the Arminian (or Molinist) rule out a possible world in which everyone is saved?
“Libertarian free will is not defined by the number of possible futures, but by the manner in which a human makes a choice. In particular by the constraints on that choice or lack thereof.”
That’s a false dichotomy. Libertarian freewill is defined by the agent having at least two viable alternatives at his disposal: in the same situatio, he can either choose A or refrain from choosing A.
If his choice is constrained in the sense that only one path is open to him, then he lacks libertarian freedom.
“However, in the true history of the universe the person in question will only choose one thing. There are not two (or more) true / actual histories of the world. There are many logically possible histories, but only one actual one.”
“John” is apparently saying that in the actual world, an agent only has one path open to him. I agree with that. But, then, I’m a Calvinist. When “John” makes statements like that, he is repudiating libertarianism. In that event, what is his objection to Calvinism?
“In both simple foreknowledge and Molinism, God is limited in what worlds he can create by the actual choices of the people that inhabit those worlds.”
People don’t make actual choices in possible worlds. For merely possible worlds have not been actualized.
It would be more accurate to say that so-and-so does one thing in one possible world, and another thing in another possible world.
And the fact that, according to Molinism or Arminianism, God’s choice of what world to create is constrained by what human agents will do or would do does nothing to show that there can be no possible world in which free agents freely choose Christ.
If there are no possible worlds in which Judas either betrays Christ or remains faithful to Christ, then it’s not possible for Judas to do otherwise. In that event, you deny libertarian freedom. And, since I’m a Calvinist, that’s fine with me. However, that denial does nothing to help “John” make his case against Calvinism.
“For example, there is an intrinsically possible world in which Peter freely affirms Christ in precisely the same circumstances in which he in fact denied him; but given the counterfactual truth that if Peter were in precisely those circumstances he would freely deny Christ, then the possible world in which Peter freely affirms Christ in those circumstances is not feasible for God. God could force Peter to affirm Christ in those circumstances, but then his confession would not be free.”
Both possible worlds are feasible since, in both possible worlds, Peter acts freely. He acts just as freely in the possible world where he’s faithful to Christ as in the possible world where he’s faithless to Christ.
Therefore, God would not be “forcing” Peter to affirm Christ by instantiating a possible world in which Peter freely affirms Christ. Peter could freely opt for either alternative under precisely the same circumstances.
So, whichever outcome God instantiates is consistent with Peter’s libertarian freedom.
“The important point is that God cannot create a world in which a person chooses to do other than what God knows she will do in those exact same circumstances. Though it is logically possible for someone to do A or B or C, etc. in those circumstances God knows that the person will do A.”
There is no one thing a libertarian agent will do in different possible worlds. Even Craig, in the every passage which “John” cited, is explicit on that point: “He knows, for example, that in some possible world Peter freely denies Christ three times and that in another possible world Peter freely affirms Christ under identical circumstances, for both are possible.”
According to Craig, it could go either way. Indeed, there are possible worlds which encapsulate each of these alternate outcome.
“So, it may be that there is a world in which everyone freely comes to Christ, but the only such world is one in which God must lie, or the world must end in 3 A.D., or some other factual circustance that God, in His wisdom, does not want to actualize. We cannot know God’s reasons for choosing to create a world in which everyone does not come to saving faith, but we do have confidence that God has good reasons for doing so or that such a world was not possible. Neither way is libertarian free will defeated.”
Notice that “John” is now backpedaling from his previous denials. He now admits the possibility of a world in which everyone is saved. Yet God didn’t create such a world. Instead, he made a world in which everyone is not saved. So how is Arminianism (or Molinism) more loving than Calvinism?
“Furthermore, the Calvinist is no better off than the Libertarian; indeed her position is worse. The Calvinist position is worse because God determines the future by decree, and so could simply decree that every person be saved. Moreover, under Calvinism saving faith is irrestible since God first regenerates the heart of the person that is saved. Under Calvinism God is not limited by the true conditionals of freedom (i.e., by what a person will do under specified circumstances).”
i) “Not better off” is a far cry from “John’s” original allegations. “John” is retreating from his prior position.
ii) Moreover, “John” hasn’t shown that Calvinism is worse off. He says that under Calvinism, God could “simply decree that every person be saved.”
Yet he’s also quoted Craig saying there’s a possible world in which free agents like Peter can do otherwise under identical circumstances. So, for “John” to show that Calvinism is worse off than libertarianism, he must show that there is no possible world in which the damned in the actual world freely chose Christ in a possible world.
“So, in heaven we will be delighted with God that He has used some of our loved ones (children, parents, grandparents, best friends, etc.) as a means of displaying His wrath forever and ever. We’ll be pleased that God didn’t save them even though He could have.”
“Even though he could have saved them.” But, to draw an invidious contrast between Calvinism and libertarianism on that score, “John” needs to demonstrate that it was impossible for God to do so on libertarian grounds.
“Even if there is a feasible world in which everyone has libertarian free will and comes to saving faith, the fact that we do not have such a world means either that it is not feasibly possible or that this world, one in which everyone has freee will but not everyone is saved, is better for some reason that God only knows.”
False dichotomy. It means that “John” should go back and question his a priori commitment to libertarian action theory.
Hays has already forgotten a previous post of mine on this thread in which I indicated that normally people engage in a productive discussion by actually reading the posts carefully and interpreting them charitably, by which it is meant that one looks for an interpretation that makes sense and for the strongest interpretation. Doing so would help Hays overcome his penchant for shooting from the lip.
In his post of November 23, 2009 at 9:06 am Hays calls my reference to the three philosophers he cited a “A red herring.” If that is so, then it equally applies to his use of them, which is what prompted my reply. More importantly, however, I pointed out that the three philosophers he cited do not support his contention; Hays has not replied differently. I don’t expect a reply on that point because Hays is incorrect.
Hays keeps returning to his point that “if there is even one possible world in which everyone is saved, yet God chooses to instantiate a different world in which some individuals are damned, then in what sense is Arminianism more loving than Calvinism”. I’ve tried to educate him with the following two facts: (1) libertarian free will does not necessitate that conclusion, and (2) none of the three major Christian approaches to libertarian free will (simple foreknowledge, Molinism, open theism) necessitate such an approach and all the varieties of open theism explicitly reject that proposition.
I’ve provided quotes from philosophers in support, but to no avail. I will try once again, again using W.L. Craig (a proponent of Molinism / middle knowledge): “So there are worlds which are intrinsically possible but which God, given the counterfactuals that happen to be true, is not capable of actualizing and which are therefore, in Flint’s terminology, infeasible for God. Notice that because counterfactuals of creaturely freedom are contingently true, which worlds are feasible for God and which are infeasible is also a contingent matter. It all depends on how creatures would freely behave in various circumstances, which is beyond God’s control.
Alvin Plantinga was the first contemporary philosopher to apply this scheme to the problem of evil. In response to J. L. Mackie’s claim that since a world in which everyone always chooses to do the morally right thing is intrinsically possible, an omnipotent God should be able to create it, Plantinga pointed out that for all we know such a world may not be feasible for God. Indeed, for all we know, all the worlds which are feasible for God and which involve as much good as the actual world also involve as much evil. Hence, although a world with as much good as the actual world but with less or no evil in it may be intrinsically possible, it may not be within God’s power to create such a world. Hence, God cannot be indicted for not having created such a world.”
Given that Hays chief argument fails, his submissions have no traction.
Hays writes, “Both possible worlds are feasible” in reference to Peter either denying or affirming Jesus. No, they are not both feasible because in those exact circumstances Peter will make his choice to do one or the other. In those exact circumstances Peter will always make that choice because that is the choice he makes. His choice is not determined by God, but it is known by God. A world in which Peter affirms Christ in those exact circumstances is not feasible for God, because it never will occur. Or, if one is an open theist, God can only know Peter’s decision as a might/ might not, but since all free human decisions are of that type God cannot guarantee a world in which all persons freely choose him.
Hays writes, “People don’t make actual choices in possible worlds.” ?? Under simple foreknowledge or Molinism God knows what people will choose (or “would” choose if one prefers to state it as a conditional). So God knows which possible worlds could be actual and feasible for him to create. God knows that if he creates a world with the exact circumstances Peter faced, then Peter would (and did) choose to deny Christ. Thus God could not create that world and expect Peter to affirm Christ, because affirmation of Christ is something God knows Peter will not do.
[It's becoming tiresome repeating all this. If this is the level of skill and knowledge at Triablogue, then I have no interest in going to that site]
Hays writes, “Notice that “John” is now backpedaling from his previous denials. He now admits the possibility of a world in which everyone is saved.” If Hays were to actually read what I wrote, rather than what he thinks or imagines that I wrote, and if he were also to read it charitably, then he would realize that I have not backpedalled. From start to finish I have maintained that there are some worlds that are not feasible for God to make and that a world in which everyone freely follows Jesus appears to be one of those (that are not feasible). What occurred is that I finally figured out that Hays was confusing logically or intrinsically possible worlds with feasible worlds. Once I picked up on that I spoke to logically possible worlds and agreed that Hays and I were in agreement on that point (but still not on the former).
Hays simply states, “False dichotomy”. If anyone can spot it, I’d appreciate it. Right now I’m left with the impression that English is not Hays native tongue.
Hays concludes with the assertion that I have an “priori commitment to libertarian action theory.” How could he possibly know that? As a matter of fact, I began my beliefs with the simple and unreflective belief that God knew exactly what would happen. I didn’t know about foreknowledge determined by decree (Calvinism), or Molinism, etc. My arrival at my current belief that God has given humans libertarian freewill is a result of reading Bible passages such as:
Deuteronomy 30:15 See, I have set before thee this day life and good, and death and evil; 16 In that I command thee this day to love the LORD thy God, to walk in his ways, and to keep his commandments and his statutes and his judgments, that thou mayest live and multiply: and the LORD thy God shall bless thee in the land whither thou goest to possess it. 17 But if thine heart turn away, so that thou wilt not hear, but shalt be drawn away, and worship other gods, and serve them; 18 I denounce unto you this day, that ye shall surely perish, and that ye shall not prolong your days upon the land, whither thou passest over Jordan to go to possess it. 19 I call heaven and earth to record this day against you, that I have set before you life and death, blessing and cursing: therefore choose life, that both thou and thy seed may live: 20 That thou mayest love the LORD thy God, and that thou mayest obey his voice, and that thou mayest cleave unto him: for he is thy life, and the length of thy days: that thou mayest dwell in the land which the LORD sware unto thy fathers, to Abraham, to Isaac, and to Jacob, to give them.
Jeremiah 21:8, 9 “8 Furthermore, tell the people, ‘This is what the Lord says: See, I am setting before you the way of life and the way of death. 9 Whoever stays in this city will die by the sword, famine or plague. But whoever goes out and surrenders to the Babylonians who are besieging you will live; he will escape with his life.
regards,
#John
#John1453 “Hays has already forgotten a previous post of mine on this thread in which I indicated that normally people engage in a productive discussion by actually reading the posts carefully and interpreting them charitably, by which it is meant that one looks for an interpretation that makes sense and for the strongest interpretation. Doing so would help Hays overcome his penchant for shooting from the lip.”
“John” has already forgotten all his uncharitable remarks about Calvinism.
“In his post of November 23, 2009 at 9:06 am Hays calls my reference to the three philosophers he cited a ‘A red herring.’ If that is so, then it equally applies to his use of them, which is what prompted my reply.”
Not at all, since I cited them to establish a premise, not a conclusion. Try again.
“More importantly, however, I pointed out that the three philosophers he cited do not support his contention; Hays has not replied differently. I don’t expect a reply on that point because Hays is incorrect.”
i) “John” hasn’t shown that I’m incorrect, since I never cited them to establish my conclusion. Rather, I cited them to define libertarianism. “John” is simply burning a straw man.
ii) Moreover, John is the one who’s incorrect, since he defends libertarianism, but does so in a way that contradicts the standard definition.
“I’ve tried to educate him with the following two facts:”
Just to set the record straight, I’m the one who’s been tutoring “John” on his own side of the argument. I’m the one who had to quote libertarian philosophers to correct his misdefinition of libertarian freedom. “John” has been playing catch-up.
“(1) libertarian free will does not necessitate that conclusion.”
i) It doesn’t need to “necessitate” that conclusion. Rather, it’s sufficient that unless “John” can disprove that conclusion, then he can’t claim that Arminianism is more loving than Calvinism. “John” is illogically attempting to shirk his burden of proof.
ii) Moreover, “John” cites Craig, yet Craig grants the possibility of a world in which everyone is saved.
“And (2) none of the three major Christian approaches to libertarian free will (simple foreknowledge, Molinism, open theism) necessitate such an approach.”
“John” is chronically unable to distinguish claims from implications or descriptions from evaluations.
“And all the varieties of open theism explicitly reject that proposition.”
i) I never said open theism implicates that proposition. But unless “John” is an open theist, that’s a diversionary tactic.
ii) Moreover, John would have to argue that open theism is more loving than Calvinism. If so, where’s the supporting argument?
“I’ve provided quotes from philosophers in support, but to no avail.”
Quoting someone’s opinion is not, itself, an argument. Moreover, the opinion is subject to rational scrutiny.
“I will try once again, again using W.L. Craig.”
I already responded to “John’s” prior citation of Craig. Craig ends up corroborating my position, not “John’s.”
Notice that “John” doesn’t attempt at any point to offer an actual counterargument to anything I’ve said. Instead, he resorts to tendentious characterizations of the exchange. This is a backdoor admission that he has no counterargument.
“It all depends on how creatures would freely behave in various circumstances, which is beyond God’s control.”
Which is irrelevant to the point at issue. God doesn’t have to control their behavior. As long as their behavior involves alternate courses of action (in different possible worlds), God can instantiate one or another of their freely-chosen actions.
“…Plantinga pointed out that for all we know such a world may not be feasible for God. Indeed, for all we know, all the worlds which are feasible for God and which involve as much good as the actual world also involve as much evil.”
i) If “John” is reduced to saying “for all we know,” then that cuts both ways. For all we know, there is such a world, and for all we know, there is no such world. If, therefore, “John’s” last-ditch appeal is an appeal to ignorance, then, by his own admission, he’s in no position to say whether or not Arminianism (or Molinism) is more loving than Calvinism.
ii) At the same time, transworld depravity fatally compromises the principle of libertarian freedom. If there’s no possible world in which free agents freely do right, then agents lack the freedom to do otherwise. In that event, how can “John” attack Reformed compatibilism or determinism?
“No, they are not both feasible because in those exact circumstances Peter will make his choice to do one or the other. In those exact circumstances Peter will always make that choice because that is the choice he makes.”
i) That’s not what Craig said. Just the opposite: “He knows, for example, that in some possible world Peter freely denies Christ three times and that in another possible world Peter freely affirms Christ under identical circumstances, for both are possible.”
So it’s not the case that Peter always makes the same choice. Rather, he makes both choices–in different possible worlds.
ii) And if, pace Craig, “John” says there is no possible world in which Peter ever chooses differently, then it isn’t possible for Peter to choose differently–which which case “John” denies libertarian freewill.
“Or, if one is an open theist…”
i) Unless “John” is an open theist who is attacking Calvinism from that particular standpoint, this is a stalling tactic on his part.
ii) And to say that God can’t know the counterfactuals of freedom hardly shows how open theism is more loving than Calvinism.
“Under simple foreknowledge or Molinism God knows what people will choose (or ‘would’ choose if one prefers to state it as a conditional).”
Which doesn’t mean they make “actual choices” in “possible worlds.” Rather, it means that if God actualizes a possible choice (of theirs), then they make an actual choice in the actual world.
“Thus God could not create that world and expect Peter to affirm Christ, because affirmation of Christ is something God knows Peter will not do.”
“Will not do” in which world? If Peter enjoys libertarian freedom, then there’s a possible world in which he affirms Christ, and another possible world in which he denies Christ. Craig even stated that, in the passage which “John” quoted. John is unable to follow the explicit claims of the very sources he cited.
“Given that Hays chief argument fails, his submissions have no traction.”
As usual, “John” substitutes a tendentious characterization for a counterargument. Unable to defend his position, all he can do is editorialize.
“From start to finish I have maintained that there are some worlds that are not feasible for God to make and that a world in which everyone freely follows Jesus appears to be one of those (that are not feasible).”
i) “Appears to be?” Yet another example of “John’s” backpedaling.
ii) If he’s going to contend that freewill theism is more loving than Calvinism, then he needs to actually demonstrate that a world in which free agents freely choose Christ is impossible. I await the argument.
iii) Moreover, if such an argument were successful, it could only succeed by denying the libertarian freedom of the agents in question. So “John” has backed himself into a lose/lose dilemma.
“Hays simply states, ‘False dichotomy’. If anyone can spot it, I’d appreciate it. Right now I’m left with the impression that English is not Hays native tongue.”
Simple: this is how “John” set up the dichotomy:
““Even if there is a feasible world in which everyone has libertarian free will and comes to saving faith, the fact that we do not have such a world means either that it is not feasibly possible or that this world, one in which everyone has freee will but not everyone is saved, is better for some reason that God only knows.”
Notice how this takes the libertarian premise for granted. But that needs to be consistent with the additional stipulation that freewill theism is more loving than Calvinism. If, however, God creates a world in which some agents are damned even though there was a feasible world in which everyone is saved, then that’s not the most loving arrangement for the damned. So “John” needs to decide which horn of the dilemma to tackle. Is God able, but unwilling, to make a world in which every one is saved–in which case God is unloving towards the damned? Or is God willing, but unable to do so because such agents lack the libertarian freedom to do otherwise?
“My arrival at my current belief that God has given humans libertarian freewill is a result of reading Bible passages such as: Deuteronomy 30:15… Jeremiah 21:8, 9.”
But if “John” subscribes to simple foreknowledge, then God created a world with foreseen outcomes, in which case the outcome cannot be otherwise in the actual world. If he foresaw what we were going to do in this world, and he created this world, then the outcome can’t turn out any differently.
Likewise, if “John” subscribes to Molinism, then if God instantiates possible world A, we can’t do in actual world A what we did in possible world B. To instantiate one possibility thereby precludes another possibility.
Good grief.
Hays wrote, “Rather, I cited them [the three philosophers] to define libertarianism. “John” is simply burning a straw man.”
Yes, and my point was that not only did you define libertarianism incorrectly, you also cited those three philosophers incorrectly as support. They do not support or agree with you definition.
***
Hays writes in respect of libertarianism, “he defends libertarianism, but does so in a way that contradicts the standard definition.”
??
I quoted Hasker’s definition and am willing to work with it. Hasker’s definition is: “By “libertarian freedom” is meant freedom such that the agent who makes a choice is really able, under exactly the same circumstances, to choose something different than the thing that is in fact choses. The choices in question, then, are not causally determined to occur as they do; libertarian freedom is inherently indeterministic. This means that there is nothing whatever that predetermines which choice will be made, until the creature actually is placed in the situation and makes the decision.” (W. Hasker, “Providence, Evil, and the Openness of God”, pp. 125-6).
If Hays is agreeable, then we can use that definition. An agreed definition might make progress possible.
***
Hays writes, “Craig ends up corroborating my position, not “John’s.”” What are the points of correspondence? I don’t see them; does anyone else? Craig makes a clear distinction between intrinsically possible worlds and feasible worlds, which Hays conflates. Craig also states that some worlds are not feasible for God to create, which Hays denies. Those seem like differences to me, not corroboration.
***
Hays writes, “doesn’t attempt at any point to offer an actual counterargument to anything I’ve said.”
?Am I off my rocker? Is there any one who agrees with that statement?
In addition to arguing against Hays, I’m also trying to establish some common ground so that our argument can proceed. Hays idiosyncratic use concepts and terms unlike the manner used by philosophers is making things difficult.
***
Hays writes, “God doesn’t have to control their behavior. As long as their behavior involves alternate courses of action (in different possible worlds), God can instantiate one or another of their freely-chosen actions.” No, it is not possible for God to do so. There is no single professional philosopher that would agree with Hays on this point, though if there is I would be happy to learn who it is and what they say. Hays somehow cannot get this point–is everyone else having this same problem? Should I try a different explanation?
God cannot instantiate one or the other of the freely chosen actions, because in any given circumstance a person will only make one choice, though that choice is causally free and not determined by God. Because the choice is causally free and sourced only in the person herself, we speak of her being able to make one or the other choice. But as time progresses she will only choose one of the options and after the moment of her choice has happened she and everyone else (not just God) will see what she did choose. The choice is now in the past and cannot be changed. God’s foreknowledge is as if he were seeing her choice as a past choice, as something it had become.
regards,
#John
Hays quoted part of my response:“My arrival at my current belief that God has given humans libertarian freewill is a result of reading Bible passages such as: Deuteronomy 30:15… Jeremiah 21:8, 9.” Now my response was intended to show that I did not have a priori beliefs that I held before studying the Bible, but that they had arisen from the study of the Bible. I would assume that Hayes’ beliefs are also not a priori.
A simple response from Hays like “Sorry, I jumped to conclusions in asserting that your beliefs were a priori.” would have been appropriate.
regards,
#John
Here’s a tip for all would be writers: tendentious means having a tendency; Written or spoken with a partisan, biased or prejudiced purpose; implicitly or explicitly slanted. Hays uses as an example of an allegedly tendentious argument my statement, “Given that Hays chief argument fails, his submissions have no traction.” Hunh? All I’ve stated is that if the main argument fails then the argments that depend on it also fail.
Here’s a tip for all would be logicians. A false dichotomy is one that ignores possibilities other than the two presented. The wikipedia definition is pretty standard: “The logical fallacy of false dilemma (also called false dichotomy, the either-or fallacy) involves a situation in which only two alternatives are considered, when in fact there are other options.” Hays uses as an example a proposition of my in which I suggested possible reasons without stating that they were the only two options. Not only does Hays not take that into account, but he does not identify any other option and, ironically, states that he has put me on the horns of a dilemma.
***
In order for this discussion to be fruitful, we also need to agree on what possible and feasible worlds are. If Hays would supply a definition that he is prepared to use, I will respond to it.
regards,
#John
#John1453 “Yes, and my point was that not only did you define libertarianism incorrectly, you also cited those three philosophers incorrectly as support. They do not support or agree with you definition.”
That’s just self-serving rhetoric in lieu of any counterargument.
“Craig makes a clear distinction between intrinsically possible worlds and feasible worlds, which Hays conflates.”
Far from conflating them, I specifically interacted with that dichotomy.
“Craig also states that some worlds are not feasible for God to create, which Hays denies.”
i) That’s something I didn’t affirm or deny. And that doesn’t get “John” anywhere. Since an “infeasible” world is definable as a world which God cannot instantiate, the appeal is viciously circular. So invoking infeasible worlds does nothing to advance the argument. It’s just a way of paraphrasing a question-begging claim.
ii) Moreover, even if this dichotomy were abstractly tenable, the application of that dichotomy to any specific case requires a specific argument to show that the case in question is, indeed, infeasible. Merely asserting something to be infeasible is not an argument. “John” needs to argue for his postulate.
“Hays idiosyncratic use concepts and terms unlike the manner used by philosophers is making things difficult.”
More self-serving rhetoric in lieu of any counterargument. “John” is bluffing his way through the debate.
“God cannot instantiate one or the other of the freely chosen actions, because in any given circumstance a person will only make one choice, though that choice is causally free and not determined by God.”
i) Yes, God can instantiate one or the other. What God cannot do is instantiate both in the same world at the same time. The simultaneous instantiation of alternate possibilities is incompossible. But that’s irrelevant to the discussion at hand.
ii) Both possibilities are *alternately* feasible. That’s what makes them alternate possibilities.
iii) To say that in any given circumstances a person will only make one choice misses the point–as usual.
Alternate possibilities pair off with possible worlds (or segments thereof). Will only make one such choice per possible world. And the agent will only make one such choice in the actual world.
However, that restriction takes the choice of the actual world for granted. Given the actual world, only one alternative will eventuate.
That, however, doesn’t impose a prior constraint on which possible world God chooses to instantiate in the first place.
“But as time progresses she will only choose one of the options and after the moment of her choice has happened she and everyone else (not just God) will see what she did choose.”
“As time progresses” is a statement about the actual world, not one or more possible worlds–from which the selection of the actual world is made. “John” still doesn’t get it.
“The choice is now in the past and cannot be changed.”
i) The phenomenon of accidental necessity is irrelevant to whether or not the future is open or closed. That’s a separate issue.
ii) Moreover, to the extent that “John” keeps chipping away at the freedom to do otherwise, he undercuts his own objection to Reformed compatibilism or determinism.
“God’s foreknowledge is as if he were seeing her choice as a past choice, as something it had become.”
i) If “John” is now inferring that foreknowledge entails the certainty of the outcome, then that undermines libertarianism (unless he goes the open theist route).
ii) He’s also sidestepping the issue of God’s counterfactual knowledge, which is not about what someone will do in the real world, but what is done in different possible worlds.
Lord knows I wish you two would take this pollution somewhere else.
Gee, Mr. Mallett, lighten up a touch. If there is something on this topic you’d like to discuss, I’d enjoy reading it.
Anyway, I’m outta here. Hays doesn’t understand basic issues, concepts or definitions, so it’s become more like helping my kids with their homework. Done it before and not to keen on doing it again. If he claims victory, well, c’est la vie, I won’t get my knickers in a knot.
He’s spouting off the same stuff on his triablogue, as I have discovered, so perhaps I’ll kick the tires over there for a while.
regards,
#John
John, it just gets to be a big peeing contest after awhile and the LORD knows I have been in enough of those.
As for being banned from the Triablokes, they started deleting my comments some time ago … didn’t like probing questions … in any event, I and several others just decided to keep our cloths cleaner and leave them to their own devices.
Blessings.
Mallett
I’ve reviewed the posts and see what you mean. Good advice. Thanks.
regards,
#John
Well, I posted a few comments over at Triablogue earlier today, and what happens when I schlep over there tonight?
“#John1453 said:
[Comment removed. This user has been banned from posting comments.]”
Sheesh, they use up other peoples’ blogs, but can’t handle a debate on their own site.
I guess that’s all folks.
I’ll be back to read Justin’s blog, though. He’s got quite a lot of interesting stuff, and his blog posts are great.
regards,
#John
From John Calvin, “A Treatise on Predestination”, to all the supposedly “studied Calvinists”:
“… when Pighius holds that God’s election of grace has no reference to, or connection with, His hatred of the reprobate, I maintain that reference and connection to be a truth. Inasmuch as the just severity of God answers, in equal and common cause, to that free love with which He embraces His elect” (p. 75).
“… let Pighius boast, if he can, that God willeth all men to be saved! The above arguments, founded on the Scriptures, prove that even the external preaching of the doctrine of salvation, which is very far inferior to the illumination of the Spirit, was not made of God common to all men” (p. 104).
“‘But Paul teaches us (continues Georgius) that God `would have all men to be saved.`’ It follows, therefore, according to his understanding of that passage, either that God is disappointed in His wishes, or that all men without exception must be saved … why, if such be the case, God did not command the Gospel to be preached to all men indiscriminately from the beginning of the world? why [did] He [suffer] so many generations of men to wander for so many ages in all the darkness of death?” (p. 166).
“Pighius, like a wild beast escaped from his cage, rushes forth, bounding all fences in his way, uttering such sentiments as these:
‘The mercy of God is extended to everyone, for God wishes all men to be saved; and for that end He stands and knocks at the door of our heart, desiring to enter. Therefore, those were elected from before the foundation of the world, by whom He foreknew He should be received. But God hardens no one, excepting by His forebearance, in the same manner as too fond parents ruin their children by excessive indulgence.’
Just as if anyone, by such puerile dreams as these, could escape the force of all those things which the apostle plainly declares in direct contradiction to such sentiments!”