“… when Pighius holds that God’s election of grace has no reference to, or connection with, His hatred of the reprobate, I maintain that reference and connection to be a truth. Inasmuch as the just severity of God answers, in equal and common cause, to that free love with which He embraces His elect” (p. 75).

“… let Pighius boast, if he can, that God willeth all men to be saved! The above arguments, founded on the Scriptures, prove that even the external preaching of the doctrine of salvation, which is very far inferior to the illumination of the Spirit, was not made of God common to all men” (p. 104).

“‘But Paul teaches us (continues Georgius) that God `would have all men to be saved.`’ It follows, therefore, according to his understanding of that passage, either that God is disappointed in His wishes, or that all men without exception must be saved … why, if such be the case, God did not command the Gospel to be preached to all men indiscriminately from the beginning of the world? why [did] He [suffer] so many generations of men to wander for so many ages in all the darkness of death?” (p. 166).

“Pighius, like a wild beast escaped from his cage, rushes forth, bounding all fences in his way, uttering such sentiments as these:

‘The mercy of God is extended to everyone, for God wishes all men to be saved; and for that end He stands and knocks at the door of our heart, desiring to enter. Therefore, those were elected from before the foundation of the world, by whom He foreknew He should be received. But God hardens no one, excepting by His forebearance, in the same manner as too fond parents ruin their children by excessive indulgence.’

Just as if anyone, by such puerile dreams as these, could escape the force of all those things which the apostle plainly declares in direct contradiction to such sentiments!”

Blessings.

“#John1453 said:

[Comment removed. This user has been banned from posting comments.]”

Sheesh, they use up other peoples’ blogs, but can’t handle a debate on their own site.

I guess that’s all folks.

I’ll be back to read Justin’s blog, though. He’s got quite a lot of interesting stuff, and his blog posts are great.

regards,
#John

Anyway, I’m outta here. Hays doesn’t understand basic issues, concepts or definitions, so it’s become more like helping my kids with their homework. Done it before and not to keen on doing it again. If he claims victory, well, c’est la vie, I won’t get my knickers in a knot.

He’s spouting off the same stuff on his triablogue, as I have discovered, so perhaps I’ll kick the tires over there for a while.

regards,
#John

That’s just self-serving rhetoric in lieu of any counterargument.

“Craig makes a clear distinction between intrinsically possible worlds and feasible worlds, which Hays conflates.”

Far from conflating them, I specifically interacted with that dichotomy.

“Craig also states that some worlds are not feasible for God to create, which Hays denies.”

i) That’s something I didn’t affirm or deny. And that doesn’t get “John” anywhere. Since an “infeasible” world is definable as a world which God cannot instantiate, the appeal is viciously circular. So invoking infeasible worlds does nothing to advance the argument. It’s just a way of paraphrasing a question-begging claim.

ii) Moreover, even if this dichotomy were abstractly tenable, the application of that dichotomy to any specific case requires a specific argument to show that the case in question is, indeed, infeasible. Merely asserting something to be infeasible is not an argument. “John” needs to argue for his postulate.

“Hays idiosyncratic use concepts and terms unlike the manner used by philosophers is making things difficult.”

More self-serving rhetoric in lieu of any counterargument. “John” is bluffing his way through the debate.

“God cannot instantiate one or the other of the freely chosen actions, because in any given circumstance a person will only make one choice, though that choice is causally free and not determined by God.”

i) Yes, God can instantiate one or the other. What God cannot do is instantiate both in the same world at the same time. The simultaneous instantiation of alternate possibilities is incompossible. But that’s irrelevant to the discussion at hand.

ii) Both possibilities are *alternately* feasible. That’s what makes them alternate possibilities.

iii) To say that in any given circumstances a person will only make one choice misses the point–as usual.

Alternate possibilities pair off with possible worlds (or segments thereof). Will only make one such choice per possible world. And the agent will only make one such choice in the actual world.

However, that restriction takes the choice of the actual world for granted. Given the actual world, only one alternative will eventuate.

That, however, doesn’t impose a prior constraint on which possible world God chooses to instantiate in the first place.

“But as time progresses she will only choose one of the options and after the moment of her choice has happened she and everyone else (not just God) will see what she did choose.”

“As time progresses” is a statement about the actual world, not one or more possible worlds–from which the selection of the actual world is made. “John” still doesn’t get it.

“The choice is now in the past and cannot be changed.”

i) The phenomenon of accidental necessity is irrelevant to whether or not the future is open or closed. That’s a separate issue.

ii) Moreover, to the extent that “John” keeps chipping away at the freedom to do otherwise, he undercuts his own objection to Reformed compatibilism or determinism.

“God’s foreknowledge is as if he were seeing her choice as a past choice, as something it had become.”

i) If “John” is now inferring that foreknowledge entails the certainty of the outcome, then that undermines libertarianism (unless he goes the open theist route).

ii) He’s also sidestepping the issue of God’s counterfactual knowledge, which is not about what someone will do in the real world, but what is done in different possible worlds.

A simple response from Hays like “Sorry, I jumped to conclusions in asserting that your beliefs were a priori.” would have been appropriate.

regards,
#John

Here’s a tip for all would be logicians. A false dichotomy is one that ignores possibilities other than the two presented. The wikipedia definition is pretty standard: “The logical fallacy of false dilemma (also called false dichotomy, the either-or fallacy) involves a situation in which only two alternatives are considered, when in fact there are other options.” Hays uses as an example a proposition of my in which I suggested possible reasons without stating that they were the only two options. Not only does Hays not take that into account, but he does not identify any other option and, ironically, states that he has put me on the horns of a dilemma.

***

In order for this discussion to be fruitful, we also need to agree on what possible and feasible worlds are. If Hays would supply a definition that he is prepared to use, I will respond to it.

regards,
#John

Hays wrote, “Rather, I cited them [the three philosophers] to define libertarianism. “John” is simply burning a straw man.”

Yes, and my point was that not only did you define libertarianism incorrectly, you also cited those three philosophers incorrectly as support. They do not support or agree with you definition.

***

Hays writes in respect of libertarianism, “he defends libertarianism, but does so in a way that contradicts the standard definition.”

??

I quoted Hasker’s definition and am willing to work with it. Hasker’s definition is: “By “libertarian freedom” is meant freedom such that the agent who makes a choice is really able, under exactly the same circumstances, to choose something different than the thing that is in fact choses. The choices in question, then, are not causally determined to occur as they do; libertarian freedom is inherently indeterministic. This means that there is nothing whatever that predetermines which choice will be made, until the creature actually is placed in the situation and makes the decision.” (W. Hasker, “Providence, Evil, and the Openness of God”, pp. 125-6).

If Hays is agreeable, then we can use that definition. An agreed definition might make progress possible.

***

Hays writes, “Craig ends up corroborating my position, not “John’s.”” What are the points of correspondence? I don’t see them; does anyone else? Craig makes a clear distinction between intrinsically possible worlds and feasible worlds, which Hays conflates. Craig also states that some worlds are not feasible for God to create, which Hays denies. Those seem like differences to me, not corroboration.

***

Hays writes, “doesn’t attempt at any point to offer an actual counterargument to anything I’ve said.”

?Am I off my rocker? Is there any one who agrees with that statement?

In addition to arguing against Hays, I’m also trying to establish some common ground so that our argument can proceed. Hays idiosyncratic use concepts and terms unlike the manner used by philosophers is making things difficult.

***

Hays writes, “God doesn’t have to control their behavior. As long as their behavior involves alternate courses of action (in different possible worlds), God can instantiate one or another of their freely-chosen actions.” No, it is not possible for God to do so. There is no single professional philosopher that would agree with Hays on this point, though if there is I would be happy to learn who it is and what they say. Hays somehow cannot get this point–is everyone else having this same problem? Should I try a different explanation?

God cannot instantiate one or the other of the freely chosen actions, because in any given circumstance a person will only make one choice, though that choice is causally free and not determined by God. Because the choice is causally free and sourced only in the person herself, we speak of her being able to make one or the other choice. But as time progresses she will only choose one of the options and after the moment of her choice has happened she and everyone else (not just God) will see what she did choose. The choice is now in the past and cannot be changed. God’s foreknowledge is as if he were seeing her choice as a past choice, as something it had become.

regards,
#John

“John” has already forgotten all his uncharitable remarks about Calvinism.

“In his post of November 23, 2009 at 9:06 am Hays calls my reference to the three philosophers he cited a ‘A red herring.’ If that is so, then it equally applies to his use of them, which is what prompted my reply.”

Not at all, since I cited them to establish a premise, not a conclusion. Try again.

“More importantly, however, I pointed out that the three philosophers he cited do not support his contention; Hays has not replied differently. I don’t expect a reply on that point because Hays is incorrect.”

i) “John” hasn’t shown that I’m incorrect, since I never cited them to establish my conclusion. Rather, I cited them to define libertarianism. “John” is simply burning a straw man.

ii) Moreover, John is the one who’s incorrect, since he defends libertarianism, but does so in a way that contradicts the standard definition.

“I’ve tried to educate him with the following two facts:”

Just to set the record straight, I’m the one who’s been tutoring “John” on his own side of the argument. I’m the one who had to quote libertarian philosophers to correct his misdefinition of libertarian freedom. “John” has been playing catch-up.

“(1) libertarian free will does not necessitate that conclusion.”

i) It doesn’t need to “necessitate” that conclusion. Rather, it’s sufficient that unless “John” can disprove that conclusion, then he can’t claim that Arminianism is more loving than Calvinism. “John” is illogically attempting to shirk his burden of proof.

ii) Moreover, “John” cites Craig, yet Craig grants the possibility of a world in which everyone is saved.

“And (2) none of the three major Christian approaches to libertarian free will (simple foreknowledge, Molinism, open theism) necessitate such an approach.”

“John” is chronically unable to distinguish claims from implications or descriptions from evaluations.

“And all the varieties of open theism explicitly reject that proposition.”

i) I never said open theism implicates that proposition. But unless “John” is an open theist, that’s a diversionary tactic.

ii) Moreover, John would have to argue that open theism is more loving than Calvinism. If so, where’s the supporting argument?

“I’ve provided quotes from philosophers in support, but to no avail.”

Quoting someone’s opinion is not, itself, an argument. Moreover, the opinion is subject to rational scrutiny.

“I will try once again, again using W.L. Craig.”

I already responded to “John’s” prior citation of Craig. Craig ends up corroborating my position, not “John’s.”

Notice that “John” doesn’t attempt at any point to offer an actual counterargument to anything I’ve said. Instead, he resorts to tendentious characterizations of the exchange. This is a backdoor admission that he has no counterargument.

“It all depends on how creatures would freely behave in various circumstances, which is beyond God’s control.”

Which is irrelevant to the point at issue. God doesn’t have to control their behavior. As long as their behavior involves alternate courses of action (in different possible worlds), God can instantiate one or another of their freely-chosen actions.

“…Plantinga pointed out that for all we know such a world may not be feasible for God. Indeed, for all we know, all the worlds which are feasible for God and which involve as much good as the actual world also involve as much evil.”

i) If “John” is reduced to saying “for all we know,” then that cuts both ways. For all we know, there is such a world, and for all we know, there is no such world. If, therefore, “John’s” last-ditch appeal is an appeal to ignorance, then, by his own admission, he’s in no position to say whether or not Arminianism (or Molinism) is more loving than Calvinism.

ii) At the same time, transworld depravity fatally compromises the principle of libertarian freedom. If there’s no possible world in which free agents freely do right, then agents lack the freedom to do otherwise. In that event, how can “John” attack Reformed compatibilism or determinism?

“No, they are not both feasible because in those exact circumstances Peter will make his choice to do one or the other. In those exact circumstances Peter will always make that choice because that is the choice he makes.”

i) That’s not what Craig said. Just the opposite: “He knows, for example, that in some possible world Peter freely denies Christ three times and that in another possible world Peter freely affirms Christ under identical circumstances, for both are possible.”

So it’s not the case that Peter always makes the same choice. Rather, he makes both choices–in different possible worlds.

ii) And if, pace Craig, “John” says there is no possible world in which Peter ever chooses differently, then it isn’t possible for Peter to choose differently–which which case “John” denies libertarian freewill.

“Or, if one is an open theist…”

i) Unless “John” is an open theist who is attacking Calvinism from that particular standpoint, this is a stalling tactic on his part.

ii) And to say that God can’t know the counterfactuals of freedom hardly shows how open theism is more loving than Calvinism.

“Under simple foreknowledge or Molinism God knows what people will choose (or ‘would’ choose if one prefers to state it as a conditional).”

Which doesn’t mean they make “actual choices” in “possible worlds.” Rather, it means that if God actualizes a possible choice (of theirs), then they make an actual choice in the actual world.

“Thus God could not create that world and expect Peter to affirm Christ, because affirmation of Christ is something God knows Peter will not do.”

“Will not do” in which world? If Peter enjoys libertarian freedom, then there’s a possible world in which he affirms Christ, and another possible world in which he denies Christ. Craig even stated that, in the passage which “John” quoted. John is unable to follow the explicit claims of the very sources he cited.

“Given that Hays chief argument fails, his submissions have no traction.”

As usual, “John” substitutes a tendentious characterization for a counterargument. Unable to defend his position, all he can do is editorialize.

“From start to finish I have maintained that there are some worlds that are not feasible for God to make and that a world in which everyone freely follows Jesus appears to be one of those (that are not feasible).”

i) “Appears to be?” Yet another example of “John’s” backpedaling.

ii) If he’s going to contend that freewill theism is more loving than Calvinism, then he needs to actually demonstrate that a world in which free agents freely choose Christ is impossible. I await the argument.

iii) Moreover, if such an argument were successful, it could only succeed by denying the libertarian freedom of the agents in question. So “John” has backed himself into a lose/lose dilemma.

“Hays simply states, ‘False dichotomy’. If anyone can spot it, I’d appreciate it. Right now I’m left with the impression that English is not Hays native tongue.”

Simple: this is how “John” set up the dichotomy:

““Even if there is a feasible world in which everyone has libertarian free will and comes to saving faith, the fact that we do not have such a world means either that it is not feasibly possible or that this world, one in which everyone has freee will but not everyone is saved, is better for some reason that God only knows.”

Notice how this takes the libertarian premise for granted. But that needs to be consistent with the additional stipulation that freewill theism is more loving than Calvinism. If, however, God creates a world in which some agents are damned even though there was a feasible world in which everyone is saved, then that’s not the most loving arrangement for the damned. So “John” needs to decide which horn of the dilemma to tackle. Is God able, but unwilling, to make a world in which every one is saved–in which case God is unloving towards the damned? Or is God willing, but unable to do so because such agents lack the libertarian freedom to do otherwise?

“My arrival at my current belief that God has given humans libertarian freewill is a result of reading Bible passages such as: Deuteronomy 30:15… Jeremiah 21:8, 9.”

But if “John” subscribes to simple foreknowledge, then God created a world with foreseen outcomes, in which case the outcome cannot be otherwise in the actual world. If he foresaw what we were going to do in this world, and he created this world, then the outcome can’t turn out any differently.

Likewise, if “John” subscribes to Molinism, then if God instantiates possible world A, we can’t do in actual world A what we did in possible world B. To instantiate one possibility thereby precludes another possibility.

In his post of November 23, 2009 at 9:06 am Hays calls my reference to the three philosophers he cited a “A red herring.” If that is so, then it equally applies to his use of them, which is what prompted my reply. More importantly, however, I pointed out that the three philosophers he cited do not support his contention; Hays has not replied differently. I don’t expect a reply on that point because Hays is incorrect.

Hays keeps returning to his point that “if there is even one possible world in which everyone is saved, yet God chooses to instantiate a different world in which some individuals are damned, then in what sense is Arminianism more loving than Calvinism”. I’ve tried to educate him with the following two facts: (1) libertarian free will does not necessitate that conclusion, and (2) none of the three major Christian approaches to libertarian free will (simple foreknowledge, Molinism, open theism) necessitate such an approach and all the varieties of open theism explicitly reject that proposition.

I’ve provided quotes from philosophers in support, but to no avail. I will try once again, again using W.L. Craig (a proponent of Molinism / middle knowledge): “So there are worlds which are intrinsically possible but which God, given the counterfactuals that happen to be true, is not capable of actualizing and which are therefore, in Flint’s terminology, infeasible for God. Notice that because counterfactuals of creaturely freedom are contingently true, which worlds are feasible for God and which are infeasible is also a contingent matter. It all depends on how creatures would freely behave in various circumstances, which is beyond God’s control.

Alvin Plantinga was the first contemporary philosopher to apply this scheme to the problem of evil. In response to J. L. Mackie’s claim that since a world in which everyone always chooses to do the morally right thing is intrinsically possible, an omnipotent God should be able to create it, Plantinga pointed out that for all we know such a world may not be feasible for God. Indeed, for all we know, all the worlds which are feasible for God and which involve as much good as the actual world also involve as much evil. Hence, although a world with as much good as the actual world but with less or no evil in it may be intrinsically possible, it may not be within God’s power to create such a world. Hence, God cannot be indicted for not having created such a world.”

Given that Hays chief argument fails, his submissions have no traction.

Hays writes, “Both possible worlds are feasible” in reference to Peter either denying or affirming Jesus. No, they are not both feasible because in those exact circumstances Peter will make his choice to do one or the other. In those exact circumstances Peter will always make that choice because that is the choice he makes. His choice is not determined by God, but it is known by God. A world in which Peter affirms Christ in those exact circumstances is not feasible for God, because it never will occur. Or, if one is an open theist, God can only know Peter’s decision as a might/ might not, but since all free human decisions are of that type God cannot guarantee a world in which all persons freely choose him.

Hays writes, “People don’t make actual choices in possible worlds.” ?? Under simple foreknowledge or Molinism God knows what people will choose (or “would” choose if one prefers to state it as a conditional). So God knows which possible worlds could be actual and feasible for him to create. God knows that if he creates a world with the exact circumstances Peter faced, then Peter would (and did) choose to deny Christ. Thus God could not create that world and expect Peter to affirm Christ, because affirmation of Christ is something God knows Peter will not do.

[It's becoming tiresome repeating all this. If this is the level of skill and knowledge at Triablogue, then I have no interest in going to that site]

Hays writes, “Notice that “John” is now backpedaling from his previous denials. He now admits the possibility of a world in which everyone is saved.” If Hays were to actually read what I wrote, rather than what he thinks or imagines that I wrote, and if he were also to read it charitably, then he would realize that I have not backpedalled. From start to finish I have maintained that there are some worlds that are not feasible for God to make and that a world in which everyone freely follows Jesus appears to be one of those (that are not feasible). What occurred is that I finally figured out that Hays was confusing logically or intrinsically possible worlds with feasible worlds. Once I picked up on that I spoke to logically possible worlds and agreed that Hays and I were in agreement on that point (but still not on the former).

Hays simply states, “False dichotomy”. If anyone can spot it, I’d appreciate it. Right now I’m left with the impression that English is not Hays native tongue.

Hays concludes with the assertion that I have an “priori commitment to libertarian action theory.” How could he possibly know that? As a matter of fact, I began my beliefs with the simple and unreflective belief that God knew exactly what would happen. I didn’t know about foreknowledge determined by decree (Calvinism), or Molinism, etc. My arrival at my current belief that God has given humans libertarian freewill is a result of reading Bible passages such as:

Deuteronomy 30:15 See, I have set before thee this day life and good, and death and evil; 16 In that I command thee this day to love the LORD thy God, to walk in his ways, and to keep his commandments and his statutes and his judgments, that thou mayest live and multiply: and the LORD thy God shall bless thee in the land whither thou goest to possess it. 17 But if thine heart turn away, so that thou wilt not hear, but shalt be drawn away, and worship other gods, and serve them; 18 I denounce unto you this day, that ye shall surely perish, and that ye shall not prolong your days upon the land, whither thou passest over Jordan to go to possess it. 19 I call heaven and earth to record this day against you, that I have set before you life and death, blessing and cursing: therefore choose life, that both thou and thy seed may live: 20 That thou mayest love the LORD thy God, and that thou mayest obey his voice, and that thou mayest cleave unto him: for he is thy life, and the length of thy days: that thou mayest dwell in the land which the LORD sware unto thy fathers, to Abraham, to Isaac, and to Jacob, to give them.

Jeremiah 21:8, 9 “8 Furthermore, tell the people, ‘This is what the Lord says: See, I am setting before you the way of life and the way of death. 9 Whoever stays in this city will die by the sword, famine or plague. But whoever goes out and surrenders to the Babylonians who are besieging you will live; he will escape with his life.

regards,
#John

A red herring. The question is whether, given a standard definition of libertarianism, such as they supply, an Arminian can demonstrate that there is no possible world in which free agents freely choose Jesus. For if there is even one possible world in which everyone is saved, yet God chooses to instantiate a different world in which some individuals are damned, then in what sense is Arminianism more loving than Calvinism?

This is a question of logical implications, given a libertarian premise. What does that premise logically allow or disallow?

Given his commitment to libertarian freedom, can the Arminian (or Molinist) rule out a possible world in which everyone is saved?

“Libertarian free will is not defined by the number of possible futures, but by the manner in which a human makes a choice. In particular by the constraints on that choice or lack thereof.”

That’s a false dichotomy. Libertarian freewill is defined by the agent having at least two viable alternatives at his disposal: in the same situatio, he can either choose A or refrain from choosing A.

If his choice is constrained in the sense that only one path is open to him, then he lacks libertarian freedom.

“However, in the true history of the universe the person in question will only choose one thing. There are not two (or more) true / actual histories of the world. There are many logically possible histories, but only one actual one.”

“John” is apparently saying that in the actual world, an agent only has one path open to him. I agree with that. But, then, I’m a Calvinist. When “John” makes statements like that, he is repudiating libertarianism. In that event, what is his objection to Calvinism?

“In both simple foreknowledge and Molinism, God is limited in what worlds he can create by the actual choices of the people that inhabit those worlds.”

People don’t make actual choices in possible worlds. For merely possible worlds have not been actualized.

It would be more accurate to say that so-and-so does one thing in one possible world, and another thing in another possible world.

And the fact that, according to Molinism or Arminianism, God’s choice of what world to create is constrained by what human agents will do or would do does nothing to show that there can be no possible world in which free agents freely choose Christ.

If there are no possible worlds in which Judas either betrays Christ or remains faithful to Christ, then it’s not possible for Judas to do otherwise. In that event, you deny libertarian freedom. And, since I’m a Calvinist, that’s fine with me. However, that denial does nothing to help “John” make his case against Calvinism.

“For example, there is an intrinsically possible world in which Peter freely affirms Christ in precisely the same circumstances in which he in fact denied him; but given the counterfactual truth that if Peter were in precisely those circumstances he would freely deny Christ, then the possible world in which Peter freely affirms Christ in those circumstances is not feasible for God. God could force Peter to affirm Christ in those circumstances, but then his confession would not be free.”

Both possible worlds are feasible since, in both possible worlds, Peter acts freely. He acts just as freely in the possible world where he’s faithful to Christ as in the possible world where he’s faithless to Christ.

Therefore, God would not be “forcing” Peter to affirm Christ by instantiating a possible world in which Peter freely affirms Christ. Peter could freely opt for either alternative under precisely the same circumstances.

So, whichever outcome God instantiates is consistent with Peter’s libertarian freedom.

“The important point is that God cannot create a world in which a person chooses to do other than what God knows she will do in those exact same circumstances. Though it is logically possible for someone to do A or B or C, etc. in those circumstances God knows that the person will do A.”

There is no one thing a libertarian agent will do in different possible worlds. Even Craig, in the every passage which “John” cited, is explicit on that point: “He knows, for example, that in some possible world Peter freely denies Christ three times and that in another possible world Peter freely affirms Christ under identical circumstances, for both are possible.”

According to Craig, it could go either way. Indeed, there are possible worlds which encapsulate each of these alternate outcome.

“So, it may be that there is a world in which everyone freely comes to Christ, but the only such world is one in which God must lie, or the world must end in 3 A.D., or some other factual circustance that God, in His wisdom, does not want to actualize. We cannot know God’s reasons for choosing to create a world in which everyone does not come to saving faith, but we do have confidence that God has good reasons for doing so or that such a world was not possible. Neither way is libertarian free will defeated.”

Notice that “John” is now backpedaling from his previous denials. He now admits the possibility of a world in which everyone is saved. Yet God didn’t create such a world. Instead, he made a world in which everyone is not saved. So how is Arminianism (or Molinism) more loving than Calvinism?

“Furthermore, the Calvinist is no better off than the Libertarian; indeed her position is worse. The Calvinist position is worse because God determines the future by decree, and so could simply decree that every person be saved. Moreover, under Calvinism saving faith is irrestible since God first regenerates the heart of the person that is saved. Under Calvinism God is not limited by the true conditionals of freedom (i.e., by what a person will do under specified circumstances).”

i) “Not better off” is a far cry from “John’s” original allegations. “John” is retreating from his prior position.

ii) Moreover, “John” hasn’t shown that Calvinism is worse off. He says that under Calvinism, God could “simply decree that every person be saved.”

Yet he’s also quoted Craig saying there’s a possible world in which free agents like Peter can do otherwise under identical circumstances. So, for “John” to show that Calvinism is worse off than libertarianism, he must show that there is no possible world in which the damned in the actual world freely chose Christ in a possible world.

“So, in heaven we will be delighted with God that He has used some of our loved ones (children, parents, grandparents, best friends, etc.) as a means of displaying His wrath forever and ever. We’ll be pleased that God didn’t save them even though He could have.”

“Even though he could have saved them.” But, to draw an invidious contrast between Calvinism and libertarianism on that score, “John” needs to demonstrate that it was impossible for God to do so on libertarian grounds.

“Even if there is a feasible world in which everyone has libertarian free will and comes to saving faith, the fact that we do not have such a world means either that it is not feasibly possible or that this world, one in which everyone has freee will but not everyone is saved, is better for some reason that God only knows.”

False dichotomy. It means that “John” should go back and question his a priori commitment to libertarian action theory.

Under Calvinism, however, a world in which everyone is saved is feasible, but for the fact that God wants some people to burn hell so that he can display His wrath.

Even if there is a feasible world in which everyone has libertarian free will and comes to saving faith, the fact that we do not have such a world means either that it is not feasibly possible or that this world, one in which everyone has freee will but not everyone is saved, is better for some reason that God only knows.

regards,
#John

None of the three philosophers cited by Hays (Flint, Hasker, Kane)states that proposition, which Hays does not appreciate.

Libertarian free will is not defined by the number of possible futures, but by the manner in which a human makes a choice. In particular by the constraints on that choice or lack thereof.

“By “libertarian freedom” is meant freedom such that the agent who makes a choice is really able, under exactly the same circumstances, to choose something different than the thing that is in fact choses. The choices in question, then, are not causally determined to occur as they do; libertarian freedom is inherently indeterministic. This means that there is nothing whatever that predetermines which choice will be made, until the creature actually is placed in the situation and makes the decision.” (W. Hasker, “Providence, Evil, and the Openness of God”, pp. 125-6).

However, in the true history of the universe the person in question will only choose one thing. There are not two (or more) true / actual histories of the world. There are many logically possible histories, but only one actual one. In both simple foreknowledge and Molinism, God is limited in what worlds he can create by the actual choices of the people that inhabit those worlds. God cannot create every world that is logically possible, but only those that are actually possible. Actually possible worlds are feasible worlds.

W.L. Craig writes that “What Molinism holds is that God knows logically prior to His decree to create a world what any person would freely do in any fully specified, freedom-permitting set of circumstances in which God might place him.” (from his website) What a person will freely do is a definite fact for God.

On the difference between merely possible worlds and feasible worlds W.L. Craig writes, “The distinction between possible worlds and feasible worlds is one that lies at the heart of the doctrine of middle knowledge and may have very important theological implications, such as the one that you note. The terminological distinction was first drawn by the philosopher Thomas Flint, but the conceptual distinction is inherent in Luis Molina’s theory of middle knowledge formulated in the sixteenth century. . . . According to Molina, logically prior to the divine decree to create a world, God possesses not only knowledge of everything that could happen (His natural knowledge) but also everything that would happen contingently in any appropriately specified set of circumstances (His middle knowledge). God’s natural knowledge is His knowledge of all necessary truths. By means of it God knows what is the full range of possible worlds, or as you put it, worlds that are intrinsically possible. He knows, for example, that in some possible world Peter freely denies Christ three times and that in another possible world Peter freely affirms Christ under identical circumstances, for both are possible.”

This brings us to Hays point that there exists a possible world in which everyone comes to saving faith. It is therefore important to pay attention to what Craig writes next. “God’s middle knowledge is His knowledge of all contingently true conditional propositions in the subjunctive mood, including propositions about creaturely free actions. For example, logically prior to His creative decree, God knew that if Peter were in circumstances C, he would freely deny Christ three times. Such subjunctive conditionals are often called counterfactuals. These counterfactuals serve to delimit the range of possible worlds to worlds which are feasible for God to actualize. For example, there is an intrinsically possible world in which Peter freely affirms Christ in precisely the same circumstances in which he in fact denied him; but given the counterfactual truth that if Peter were in precisely those circumstances he would freely deny Christ, then the possible world in which Peter freely affirms Christ in those circumstances is not feasible for God. God could force Peter to affirm Christ in those circumstances, but then his confession would not be free. By means of His middle knowledge, God knows what is the proper subset of possible worlds which are feasible for Him, given the counterfactuals that are true.”

The important point is that God cannot create a world in which a person chooses to do other than what God knows she will do in those exact same circumstances. Though it is logically possible for someone to do A or B or C, etc. in those circumstances God knows that the person will do A.

So, it may be that there is a world in which everyone freely comes to Christ, but the only such world is one in which God must lie, or the world must end in 3 A.D., or some other factual circustance that God, in His wisdom, does not want to actualize. We cannot know God’s reasons for choosing to create a world in which everyone does not come to saving faith, but we do have confidence that God has good reasons for doing so or that such a world was not possible. Neither way is libertarian free will defeated.

The disagreement between Hays and me appears to lie in what types of worlds we were referring to. When I wrote that libertarian freedom does not imply that there is at least one world in which everyone chooses God, I was referring to feasible worlds. When Hays was referring to the fact that there exists a world in which someone eats an apple (for example), and an exact same world in which someone does not eat an apple, he was referring to logically possible worlds. In that sense he is true and I agree with him.

Furthermore, the Calvinist is no better off than the Libertarian; indeed her position is worse. The Calvinist position is worse because God determines the future by decree, and so could simply decree that every person be saved. Moreover, under Calvinism saving faith is irrestible since God first regenerates the heart of the person that is saved. Under Calvinism God is not limited by the true conditionals of freedom (i.e., by what a person will do under specified circumstances).

At this point we return to why Sproul did not adequate answer the question: it is not possible to answer it in any morally sensible manner.

Back to John Calvin, (Institutes, 3:21:5) “By predestination we mean the eternal decree of God, by which he determined with himself whatever he wished to happen with regard to every man. All are not created on equal terms, but some are preordained to eternal life, others to eternal damnation; and, accordingly, as each has been created for one or other of these ends, we say that he has been predestinated to life or to death.”

Scripture proclaims that all mortals were bound over to eternal death in the person of one man [Adam] (cf. Rom. 5:12 ff.). Since this cannot be ascribed to nature, it is perfectly clear that it has come forth from the wonderful plan of God…. Again I ask: whence does it happen that Adam’s fall irremediably involved so many peoples, together with their infant offspring, in eternal death unless because it so pleased God?… The decree is horrible indeed, I confess. Yet no one can deny that God foreknew what end man was to have before he created him, and consequently foreknew because he so ordained by his decree…. And it ought not to seem absurd for me to say that God not only foresaw the fall of the first man, and in him the ruin of his descendants, but also meted it out in accordance with his own decision. For it pertains to his wisdom to foreknow everything that is to happen, so it pertains to his might to rule and control everything by his hand.
(Institutes 3:23.7)

Yippee! As Calvin states, “this miserable condition wherein men are now bound [in sin, on the way to hell], all of Adam’s children have fallen by God’s will” is just God’s “wonderful plan” that He makes come to pass because it is “His might to rule and control everything by His hand”.

So, in heaven we will be delighted with God that He has used some of our loved ones (children, parents, grandparents, best friends, etc.) as a means of displaying His wrath forever and ever. We’ll be pleased that God didn’t save them even though He could have.

Oh how wonderful to be used by God to show the glory of His wrath and to burn in hellfire forever so that His glorious wrath can be displayed for billions of years without end.

regards,
#John

Wrong! Kane is using Jane to articulate the concept of libertarian freedom. This represents Kane’s position, as a libertarian action theorist.

“That is not God’s perspective under either simple foreknowledge or Molinism.”

For some reason, “John” keeps trying to recast the issue. The starting point is not middle knowledge or simple foreknowledge. The starting point is libertarian freedom. If you take libertarian freedom as your operating premise, then the next question is what does that imply?

Remember the question headlining Justin’s thread? Does God really want to save everyone?

Arminian commenters immediately began to pounce on Calvinism. I, however, pointed out that if you subscribe to libertarian freedom, then there’s at least one possible world in which everyone freely believes in Jesus. Yet God doesn’t make that world. Instead, he makes another possible world containing a large number of hellbound sinners. In that event, is the Arminian God more loving than the Calvinist God. That’s the question.

You can pose the same question for any form of freewill theism. The same question is applicable to Molinism. Indeed, William Lane Craig admits the existence of possible worlds in which everyone is saved. He justifies the creation of a world in which everyone is not saved on the grounds that more people are saved overall, even if that comes at the expense of the damned.

“Under those two theories, God knows which path Jane will take.”

Once again, “John” is unable to distinguish the descriptive question from the evaluative question. The question at issue is not merely what those two theories stipulate to be the case, but whether one or both are internally coherent with all their operating assumptions.

“But she can only choose in one way, and there is no other universe in which she chooses the other way.”

Which is a point blank denial of libertarian freedom. If “John” wants to deny libertarian freedom, that’s fine with me. However, he’s been attacking Calvinism right and left. Yet it’s very difficult for him to attack Reformed combatibilism if he’s going to repudiate libertarian incompatibilism as well. At that point, what is his standard of comparison?

“Under simple foreknowledge and Molinism there is no other universe with the exact same prior history and constitution in which Jane makes the choice differently.”

That statement directly contradicts Flint’s definition of libertarian freewill, and Flint is a leading Molinist. It also contradicts Hasker’s definition.

“So Kane does not contradict me, at least not in that passage.”

Kane isn’t stating the position of either middle knowledge or simple foreknowledge. That’s not his starting point. His starting point is libertarian freewill. The next question is what libertarian freewill allows or disallows.

I’ve now cited three libertarian action theorists (Flint, Hasker, Kane) whose definition of libertarian freedom directly contradicts the position of “John.” Yet “John” is attacking Reformed compatibilism. If, however, “John” rejects libertarianism and compatibilism alike, then what is his fallback position?

“It is, of course, possible to imagine other theories in which the above description is not the case, but those theories would not be simple foreknowledge or Molinism (which is what Hays began his attack on).”

“John” is rewriting the history of the thread. I didn’t begin by attacking middle knowledge or simple foreknowledge. Go back to where I entered the discussion. I began by discussing the universalistic potential of freewill theism:

http://thegospelcoalition.org/blogs/justintaylor/2009/11/18/does-god-really-want-all-people-to-be-saved/#comment-53998

“Hays gives the example of the multiverse, which is fine, but that is not what was underdiscussion and the failings of the multiverse are not the failings of Molinism or simple foreknowledge.”

i) Once again, “John” is rewriting the history of the thread. I’m not the one who brought up the multiverse. He did. I was responding to his introduction of that issue into the exchange.

ii) Moreover, he did that by confusing the concept of forking paths with the concept of the multiverse. While the multiverse is one way to underwrite the garden of forking paths, the two concepts are hardly synonymous. Kane is using the garden of forking paths to illustrate libertarian action theory, not physics.

iii) Furthermore, the “failings” of Molinism or the multiverse were not the point at issue. The issue was the way in which libertarian freedom implicates the possibility of a world in which everyone freely believes the gospel.

iv) Finally, “John” said the multiverse was inconsistent with Christian theism. I simply pointed out that you have professing Christians like Don Page who think otherwise.

So let’s recap the real issue: according to freewill theism, does God want everyone to be saved? If libertarian freewill creates the possibility of a world in which everyone freely accepts the Gospel, yet God chooses not to make such a world, but instead, makes a world in which many sinners will spend eternity in hell, then in what sense does God want to save them? It lay within his power to do so without stepping on their libertarian toes. And, in that case, how is freewill theism more loving than Reformed theism?

First correction: Hays quotes Kane, ““Open alternatives lie before us…This means we could have chosen or acted otherwise…If Jane believes her choice is a free choice (made ‘of her own free will’), she must believe both options are ‘open’ to her while she is deliberating. She could have chosen either one…But that means she believe there is more than one possible path into the future available to her and it is ‘up to her’ which of these paths will be taken.”

Note that Kane is writing from Jane’s perspective; to her all of the paths are open to her while she is deliberating. That is not God’s perspective under either simple foreknowledge or Molinism. Under those two theories, God knows which path Jane will take. However, God does not determine her choice (and neither does the natural universe); the choice is entirely hers. But she can only choose in one way, and there is no other universe in which she chooses the other way. Molinism has been attacked for not properly grounding God’s knowledge (though W.L. Craig does not think the attack successful). [I repeat myself again] Under simple foreknowledge and Molinism there is no other universe with the exact same prior history and constitution in which Jane makes the choice differently. So Kane does not contradict me, at least not in that passage.

It is, of course, possible to imagine other theories in which the above description is not the case, but those theories would not be simple foreknowledge or Molinism (which is what Hays began his attack on). Hays gives the example of the multiverse, which is fine, but that is not what was underdiscussion and the failings of the multiverse are not the failings of Molinism or simple foreknowledge.

regards,
#John

The present concept of “ordination” has acquired elements that are post-biblical. I have no problem with a woman being “ordained” as a hospital chaplain, and I believe that some SBC positions against woman’s ordination are sheer foolishness and quasi-Catholic.

I have some hesitancy to an absolute affirmation to rally for absolutely open women’s pastoring based on factors that admittedly are not absolutely clearly “biblical” qualifications but more based in the practicality of real life.

I am more concerned about what I believe is the unbiblical automatic restriction of allowing a woman to teach what the Lord has given her by the Spirit’s revelation and/or study of the Scripture. Women both taught and led men in the Scriptures but in full respect to their respective husbands.

I believe some gender complementarians are inconsistent in their application. Gender complementarians should not allow women to teach men ANYTHING. . . AT ANY TIME. . . IN ANY PLACE, if this position is truly based in a so-called creation gender ordinance (this includes wives of seminary presidents at ETS meetings and former vice-president candidates).

I’ve slept since I’ve read the Danvers statement so I don’t remember specifics but I probably would have some things to pick at in it.

Just curious, I haven’t noticed you at Denny’s lately. Is that because of his request at revealing one’s identity?

Blessings,

David (not Adrian’s son) Rogers

I’ve see Hays post elsewhere. I’m not always successful in writing dispassionately, but I’ve found it useful to write in the third person. We’ll see how this one goes.

cheers,
#John

The old age thing was my first extensive foray into blogging, which I only really started this year. Some of my posts are somewhat embarrassing. I’ve tried to tone down a bit since then so that reason tops emotion.

salut,
#John

Two final questions and then no more.

(1) Do you believe women should be ordained to the office of pastor or elder in a church?

(2) Do you affirm the Danvers Statement? If not, which parts do you disagree with?

Thanks.

Robert,

Can you provide a link to this blog thread so that I read the entire comment discussion?

Thanks.

Also, fwiw, I’ll be addressing some of your commentary about Steve Hays in a later comment when I have more time.

i) To the contrary, I specifically countered “John’s” explanation.

ii) Likewise, I’ve explained in some detail how the conclusion follows. “John’s” bare denial hardly amounts to a disproof.

“In regard to no. 2, the fact that no one else argues as steve does is good evidence for the conclusion that steve, being the odd one out, is wrong.”

i) A headcount is not an argument. Indeed, it’s a tacit admission that someone can’t defend his position by reasoned argument.

ii) Also keep in mind that this is just another assertion. “John” has offered no statistical evidence to back up his statistical claim.

“Neither Molinists nor simple foreknowledge-ists believe that the future is open ended. They believe that the choices of humans are contingent facts, but they both believe that the future is, and has been, fully determined by God (because of the content and nature of His knowledge).”

i) Arminians emphatically deny that divine foreknowledge implies divine determinism of the future.

ii) ”John” continues to equivocate over the future. He still doesn’t grasp the issue. The question at issue is not whether the actual future is open-ended. Rather, in libertarianism, there are alternate possible outcomes. The actual world actualizes one possible outcome. But this is by no means to obviate the open-ended character of the future at the level of possible worlds. And that is how the freedom to do otherwise cashes out. Does “John” even understand the principle of alternate possibilities?

iii) Apropos (ii), this, in turn, raises the question of whether God can know in advance which possible future is the actual future.

iv) Even if “John’s description of Molinism were accurate, that’s beside the point since the question at issue is not merely the descriptive question of what Molinism claims to be the case, but the evaluative question of whether Molinism is coherent. Can Molinism consistently make good on its claims?

Remember that Molinism is a compromise position which tries to finesse libertarian freedom and divine sovereignty. Whether it’s successful in that endeavor is a standing bone of contention.

“Even open theists would agree that the ultimate end is determined, and that many of the events along the way to that end are determined.”

That’s vague and equivocal. The point at issue is not whether natural events like earthquakes are determined, but whether God predetermines human actions. This is something open theism denies. Indeed, it goes further and denies that God even knows what human agents will do.

“Steve hays seems to use ‘open ended’ to mean ‘contingent’, but they are not the same concepts.”

That’s not how I’ve defined my terms.

“Further, as I have indicated, neither Molinists (e.g., W.L. Craig) nor those who hold to simple forknowledge (e.g., D. Hunt-the one with the PhD) believe that the future is open ended in the sense that steve hays sets out, i.e., unknown outcome.”

i) Once again, “John” fails to distinguish between the description of a claim and the evaluation of the claim.

ii) He is also trying to shift the focus of the discussion. The question of whether or not God can foreknow the counterfactuals of freedom is ancillary to my original argument. The question at issue is whether there is at least one possible world in which libertarian agents freely believe in Christ. And, therefore, whether the Arminian God is more loving than the Calvinist God when the Arminian God could save everyone without infringing on their libertarian freedom, but chooses, instead, to making a world containing hellbound sinners.

“Steve hays does not appear to understand the principle of bivalence nor how possible world theory works, but this is not the place for a mini lesson in those concepts (unless it is desired by readers).”

Because “John” doesn’t have a real argument, he resorts to promissory arguments. The check is in the mail.

“In short, however, if a person makes a choice at a certain time, e.g. biting an apple, and that choice represents the true history of the world, then there is no possible world with the exact same history up to that point in which the person does not bite the apple.”

To the contrary, that’s exactly how libertarianism asserts. Remember Flint’s definition, which I quoted above. According to Flint, libertarian freedom is definable by the fact that the preconditions don’t determine the outcome. Under the very same preconditions, you could have a different outcome.

Consider another standard definition of libertarian freedom by a leading libertarian philosopher (William Hasker):

“By ‘libertarian freedom’ is meant freedom such that the agent who makes a choice is really able, under exactly the same circumstances, to choose something different from the thing that is in fact chosen…libertarian freedom is inherently indeterministic. This means that there is nothing whatever that predetermines which choice will be made, until the creature is actually placed in the situation and makes the decision,” Contemporary Debates in Philosophy, 219.

It follows from Flint’s definition and Hasker’s alike that the history of the world could be identical up to the point at which the free agent makes his next choice, yet different futures remain in play. Although the actual world instantiates just one possibility to the exclusion of the others, the future could go either way at the level of possible outcomes, which inhere in different possible worlds (or world-segments). And that is how libertarian philosophers unpack the freedom to do otherwise.

“Some nonChristians have speculated that the universe is continually forking off and every logically possible world thus exists (either always and at the same time, or as progressive branching), but such arguments are not relevant for discussions of future knowledge involving the Christian God (i.e., one who possesses maximal compossible attributes). [note that I said ‘logically possible’, not ‘alethically possible’].”

That objection is muddled in two respects:

i) A Christian can subscribe to the multiverse. Don Page is a Christian physicist who has written in support of the multiverse.

ii) More to the point, the question at issue is not the physical existence of forking paths, but forking paths as possible worlds (i.e. abstract objects). As (Christian) libertarian philosopher Robert Kane explicates the concept:

“Open alternatives lie before us…This means we could have chosen or acted otherwise…If Jane believes her choice is a free choice (made ‘of her own free will’), she must believe both options are ‘open’ to her while she is deliberating. She could have chosen either one…But that means she believe there is more than one possible path into the future available to her and it is ‘up to her’ which of these paths will be taken. Such a picture of an open future with forking paths–a garden of working paths, we might call it–is essential to our understanding of free will,” Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics, 285-86.

Kane’s explanation directly contradicts “John’s” contrary assertion about the relation between past and future in libertarian action theory.

“John” seems to lack even a nodding acquaintance with the standard libertarian literature–although that’s the position he claims to be both representing and defending. Either that or he doesn’t grasp what the writers are saying.

“It appears to me that steve hays is unfamiliar with the concepts and literature necessary to engage usefully on this issue and out of his depth.”

Notice that I’m the one who’s actually documenting my claims from the relevant literature. “John” is simply pounding his fist.