The British Society for the Philosophy of Religion was founded in 1993/1934 and has held a biennial conference since 1995. Each conference focuses on a particular theme, and in 2009 the theme was God and Morality. This volume promises to be the first in a series of volumes gathering together some of the papers presented at each BSPR conference. The papers collected here cover five broad issues. (1) Practicing philosophy of religion: what is the use of philosophy of religion? (2) The Euthyphro dilemma. (3) Evolution and the grounds of morality. (4) Evil and the goodness of God. (5) God and moral responsibility. What follows highlights some of the essays that seem noteworthy.

JacoGericke's “Beyond Divine Command Theory: Moral Realism in the Hebrew Bible” challenges contemporary divine command theory (DCT). It is often assumed that DCT is taught in the Hebrew Bible, but Gericke argues that this simply is not the case. Instead, the Hebrew Bible often talks of God as if he were under some external standard of morality. The Hebrew Bible does not seem to equate God with goodness as is the case with DCT. The arguments in this paper should be considered by those who are currently working on DCT and Christian theology since Gericke shows a deep understanding of biblical studies and philosophy of religion. It would also be interesting to see if the NT fits better with DCT than the Hebrew Bible.

The doctrine of divine simplicity (DDS) is a controversial doctrine these days. Its proponents often say that DDS can help us solve the Euthyphro Dilemma by way of developing a robust version of DCT. However, contemporary thinkers like Alvin Plantinga have offered arguments that DDS is incoherent. Anders Kraal seeks to defend the coherence of DDS in “Does Divine Simplicity Solve the Euthyphro Dilemma?” Plantinga's argument, in brief, is as follows. On DDS all of God's properties are identical to each other, so there is only one property. This property is identical to God, so God is a property. A property is not a person (nor three persons) and cannot cause things to exist. So DDS is incompatible with any Christian doctrine of God. Kraal points out that Plantinga's argument uses first-order logic. If the argument cannot be stated in first-order logic, the argument fails to refute DDS. Kraal argues that Plantinga's objection cannot be stated in first-order logic. This is because first-order logic does not allow us to predicate things of an object without introducing complexity into the object. As such, the argument fails. What Kraal does not seem to notice here is that this is a hollow victory for DDS. Plantinga's objection fails because DDS cannot be stated in first-order logic. Elsewhere Kraal attempts to develop possible systems of logic that can handle DDS, but concludes that the prospects for developing such a system do not look good (Kraal, “Logic and Divine Simplicity,” Philosophy Compass 6 [2011]). The inability of DDS to be stated logically is a reason for thinking that DDS is false. Something that cannot be stated logically cannot help us solve the Euthyphro dilemma, nor anything for that matter.

Robin Attfield's “Evolution and Agapeistic Ethics” argues that contemporary evolutionary accounts of altruism fail. Some evolutionary accounts fail because they preclude altruistic behavior from the start. We cannot presume altruistic behavior to be impossible because we know from experience that it does in fact occur. Other accounts fail because they rely on meme theory that treats genes and memes as wholly deterministic. This removes all rational agency, and only rational agents can engage in science. So we must reject meme theory in order to do science. However, our genes do have a causal role to play in our lives, but they are not determinants. Our “genes may incline without necessitating” our behavior (p. 128). Attfield then goes on to suggest some ways one might go about developing a proper evolutionary account of altruistic behavior.

Nicholas Wolterstorff's “What Makes Generosity Sometimes Unjust?” starts with two parables from the Gospels that seem to conflict with some of our moral intuitions about justice. The first parable is the Prodigal Son (Luke 15) and the other is the Laborers in the Vineyard (Matt 20). The parable of the Vineyard involves a vineyard owner hiring people to work the land. Some agreed to work the land early on in the day, while others began to work with only an hour left in the day. Yet, the owner gives all of the laborers the same pay. Naturally, the workers who have been there all day complain, but the owner contends that his actions are just. Jesus also seems to affirm that the owner's acts are just. What are we to make of this? What does this teach us about God and morality? Wolterstorff offers a fascinating analysis of this issue that looks at the true nature of justice, generosity, and mercy. He also offers a critique of other accounts. An unfortunate number of theologians and biblical commentators hold that God's generosity does in fact violate justice, but God transcends justice so this is somehow not a problem. Wolterstorff disagrees. “[P]ace Nygren and Brunner, God's generosity does not transcend justice by violating justice; it transcends justice by doing what justice requires and more. We are to do likewise.” (191)

Ioanna-Maria Patsalidou's “God's Love and the Problem of Hell” argues against Eleonore Stump's doctrine of hell. In Stump's hell, it is a good thing for God to preserve the damned. Whatever exists, or has being, is good. It is better to have being than not to have being. Through a series of free immoral actions, the damned have acquired a second nature that is not suited for heaven. God can be good to the damned by preserving them in being, and allowing them to act out the second nature that they have freely acquired. Yet God does not allow evil to continue. Here is one of the problems that Patsalidou brings up. It seems that God cannot preserve the damned and allow them to continue to act out their second nature without allowing further evil to occur. Say that one of the damned has developed a wrathful nature. If the damned has no object of wrath, how can she continue to act out her nature? It would seem that God is not being fully good toward her in the way Stump's hell demands. If the damned does have an object of wrath (i.e., another person), it would seem that she is continuing to perpetrate evil acts. How could it be the case, then, that God is not allowing evil to continue? Patsalidou's argument is more nuanced than I can do justice here, and it deserves attention from those who are currently working on the doctrine of hell.

All in all, this volume offers us some interesting papers that are of value to those working on the relationship between God and morality. It also allows us to see that Britain's got talent in the realm of philosophy of religion.

---