In this monograph, Kenneth Oakes, currently research fellow at Eberhard Karls University, Tübingen, addresses Karl Barth's account of the relationship between theology and philosophy. Oakes explains, “The existence of . . . two opposing lines of interpretation regarding Barth on philosophy and theology should suggest that something more complex, nuanced, or confused is happening in Barth's works than his critics often assume” (p. 6). More specifically, he makes three interrelated claims: (1) Barth's account is both influenced by and distinct from Wilhelm Herrmann and the liberal Protestant tradition. (2) Barth's account is not stable or cogent, and this despite its constant emphasis on theology's independence. (3) Barth's “various accounts of theology and philosophy . . . are heavily informed by the Christian doctrines under consideration” (p. 17).

Chapter 1, “The Earlier Barth,” is concerned with Barth's liberal/pre-dialectical years (1909-1914), taking up the conversation of convergence/congruence (i.e., between philosophy and theology). Oakes discusses Herrman's influence as well as Barth's years at Marburg and Geneva before explaining the impact of the First World War and his “uncanny break with liberalism” (p. 51). Regarding the latter, Oakes argues that it was “complicated and messy” (p. 51), having more to do with the early Barth's “theopolitical commitments” than his “epistemological nuances” (p. 58). Oakes goes so far as to say that “it might prove more useful to abandon this 'break with liberalism' historiography altogether and see Barth's theology as another mutation within nineteenth-century liberal theology” (p. 58n160; cf. 251ff.).

Chapter 2 continues the conversation of convergence/congruence via an examination and comparison of Barth's Romans I and Romans II, paying particular attention to Barth's favorable treatment of Socrates, Plato, and Immanuel Kant. Chapter 3 examines Barth's three theological prolegomena, or “non-prolegomenon,” which were intended “to decelerate . . . the typical impulse driving the production of prolegomena” (p. 89). The picture Oakes paints from the time between Romans and the dogmatics is one of increasing caution with regard to Barth's account of the relationship between philosophy and theology. More specifically, “The definition of the human person as a hearer of the Word begins to crowd out and take priority over pilgrim man” (p. 119). It is, after all, theology's relationship to the Word of God that separates it from philosophy. Rudolf Bultmann, of course, criticized Barth's supposed freeing of theology, arguing that Barth had simply substituted one philosophy for another (p. 123).

Chapter 4 addresses the period during which “Barth wrestled with the relationship between theology and philosophy with an intensity and frequency that will not be encountered again” (p. 125). More specifically, Oakes considers two selections from Barth's published works and a lecture as well as a series of lectures: four “experiments in theology and philosophy” (p. 125). These experiments reinforce theology's independence but speak against its isolation. That said, Oakes concludes, in concordance with the second of his three interrelated claims (noted in this review's first paragraph), “Barth leaves unclear how one might reconcile these four different experiments” (p. 160).

Chapter 5, “Barth's Third Prolegomenon,” examines the two-part Church Dogmatics I. Chapter 6 takes up Church Dogmatics III before chapter 7's consideration of “Barth's later thoughts” which were “remarkably similar to his earlier ones” (p. 244). Oakes concludes, “It should now be clear that Barth never settled on an exact and well-defined account of theology and philosophy . . . . one cannot look at any single text from any one period of Barth's oeuvre and assert that his understanding of philosophy and theology has been presented” (p. 243). And it is here that Oakes's monograph makes its contribution: gathering together and systematically examining scattered texts, and presenting them as a story of change in which Barth is characterized as “a recovering Hermannian” (pp. 245-46). Stated implications, or perhaps questions, include how strict a distinction between theology and philosophy might be had, as well as the extent to which Barth actually achieved a non-apologetic theology (p. 252-53). Oakes observes, “It is this reckless dream of an entirely non-apologetic theology that explains why Barth's project seems more like a dare than a well-defined programme” (p. 253; cf. 264).

Several specifics: Oakes's discussion of Barth's concept of parable in Romans II (pp. 75ff.) is especially helpful, both with regard to Barth studies as well as the more general conversations of analogy and perhaps even natural theology. On a related note, Oakes mentions, “Certainly on Barth's terms there is such a thing as anthropological 'natural theology,' for the humanity of Jesus Christ definitively establishes and reveals humanity tout court” (p. 223). Perhaps this idea could have been explored further, something Oakes mentions a bit further on (p. 254). Additionally, more engagement with Von Balthasar's notion of the stretto would have been helpful. Oakes's three-page treatment seems a bit too brief (pp. 220-22). Hans Boersma's Nouvelle Théologie (Oxford University Press, 2009; ch. 4 in particular) might have been useful here, though pursuing the conversation might have taken things too far afield. That said, this volume achieves its task and is recommended for Barth scholars and would-be Barth scholars, as well as those interested in twentieth-century conversations of prolegomena.