Despite the intertwining of the history of philosophy and theology in the West, few scholars are adept in both fields. Ingolf Dalferth is a notable exception. Though trained under Eberhard Jüngel and nourished on Reformed theology, he has also become known in Europe for his expertise in phenomenology and philosophical hermeneutics. He has a particular ability to constructively retrieve ideas from both historical philosophy and theology. Malum is a work where Dalferth’s complex methodological approach and varied influences are on display.

Malum exists in that liminal space between theology and philosophy of religion. However, unlike most theological and philosophical works on the topic, the author does not attempt to provide a theodicy. Instead, he is concerned with how the “experience of ills” can affect one’s “conception of God” (p. 12). It is important to note, however, that Dalferth does not want experience to define the concept of God, since that should be done christologically and soteriologically. In this, he has affinities with the perspectives of Luther, Barth, and Jüngel. Instead, the experience of evil appears to act as a limitation of how one could conceive of God’s character and activities.

Dalferth discusses the topic of evil under the Latin term malum, since the German words (i.e., Übel and Böses) have connotations he does not desire (p. 8, n. 6), and he wants to distill a concept of evil from discussions of concrete instances. His goal is to orient an individual considering evil, since he is concerned with the way Christians could actually possess an attitude that would allow them to conceive of suffering in such way as to endure it with hope. Central to this project is the author’s attempt to correct theological and philosophical misunderstandings of evil, particularly in light of the biblical depiction of evil as something that is opposed by God. For Dalferth, drawing upon the centrality of eschatology that was reintroduced to Reformed theology by Barth, the divine overcoming of malum in Christ helps one to both understand evil and God.

Malum begins with theoretical considerations concerning methodology and Dalferth’s philosophy of orientation. In his view, Christianity’s focus, when one is affected by evil, is not so much on a change of circumstances (whether it be suffering or being the victim of immoral actions) but on a change in the way one approaches such circumstances (p. 115). He thus criticizes traditional discussions of what evil is and how it originates before presenting his preferred view. His first criticism is of the privatio boni view (pp. 105–79), the tradition significant in influence since Augustine, which sees evil as the lack of good. Though he regards this idea as containing many important insights, Dalferth questions whether it is based on a view that sees God more as an organizer of the world than the creator of it (p. 177). He also thinks that while it can explain the possibility of evil, it cannot explain its actuality (p. 178).

Since God as creator could not be blamed for evil and evil itself is not necessary, the tradition has often dealt with malum by claiming that it must be the result of human free choice. Thus, Dalferth moves on to discuss the historical view that evil is primarily malefactum, i.e., the doing of evil (pp. 181–243). Thus, the cause of all malum is reduced to the moral actions of persons. The author believes that this, too, is an insufficient view since it also has difficulty dealing with the actuality of evil. Moreover, the focus on the experience of ills means that one cannot simply focus on the perpetrator, as he contends the malefactum tradition does, but must also pay attention to the victim.

The final perspective, which provides the basis for Dalferth’s constructive work is that evil is to be defined in terms of unfaith (pp. 245–86). Scripture, in his view, knows only two states which orient human beings: unbelief, which causes them to ignore or oppose God, and faith, which causes them to trust that he will overcome inexplicable evil. From the latter perspective, one can only define good in relation to God’s values and pursuits. Thus, even if one does not and cannot know the reason for evil, one can recognize that God’s independence from human conceptions of goodness and justice will force her to trust him in the way that he demonstrates justice and love—the central demonstration of this being the cross (pp. 382–402).

There are some drawbacks to Malum, however, especially from an evangelical perspective. The first two are not so much criticisms as caveats. The book requires a considerable knowledge base to be able to fully understand its import. Dalferth assumes readers have some working grasp of Catholic and Reformed theology, the Church Fathers and modern theologians, analytic and continental philosophy, and classical sources in both disciplines. The second caveat relates to his complex phenomenological methodology. When dealing with the concept of God, beginning with experience pushes against the evangelical ethos, especially the reformed doctrine of sola Scriptura. Dalferth has reasons for his approach, some of which are justified if one understands how he conceives of the relationship of epistemology (philosophy of knowledge) to the philosophy of language. Yet, since his methodology is only briefly explicated, his demonstration of it is challenging to follow.

Dalferth’s disagreements with evangelicalism on certain key issues may also attenuate the usefulness of the book. His assumption of historical criticism, for instance, leads to an openness to see Scripture as sometimes mistaken and therefore not as the ultimate authority in matters of theology (p. 241, n. 14). Consequently, he is dismissive of biblical texts that would argue against his position, as is evidenced in his description of Adam and angels as “myths” (pp. 195, 197). Evangelicals would likewise find much to dispute in his interpretation of texts surrounding Adam, Noah, and Job (pp. 341–62). There are also areas of tension, including his assumption of an evolutionary view of human origins, his belief in religious inclusivism (p. 176), his apparent employment of certain ideas from Lutheran nominalism, his view of some evils as “senseless” and “irrational” (p. 406), and his idiosyncratic understanding of ethics and value theory.

At the same time, there is much to praise in Malum. It is the work of a singularly unique and noteworthy philosopher-theologian. Just observing how Dalferth constructs, clarifies, and criticizes difficult ideas is worth the arduous read. Furthermore, the author demonstrates a conversancy with a breadth of both disciplines and eras that can serve as an indictment of the ever-specializing tendencies of contemporary scholars. Lastly, Dalferth provides some significant correctives to previous theological and philosophical work on the issue of evil. He does not completely dismiss the privatio boni and malefactum traditions, even when he disagrees with them. Instead, he incorporates them into a larger framework that emphasizes faith in God and hope in his victory. His understanding of evil as that which God opposes and overcomes is a welcome supplement to traditional positions (p. 99). Moreover, his conceptualization of evil resists the recurring problem of malum being abstracted and so not recognized in the concrete suffering of human life. Finally, Dalferth lets a difficult topic remain difficult; he does not oversimplify it for the sake of apologetic usefulness. He struggles with the experience of evil, the scriptural material that interprets it, and the theological views that attempt to articulate it. It is for this reason that if one were looking to do a more in-depth study of the problem of evil, Dalferth’s work is a central, if not indispensable, contemporary work.