F. LeRon Shults might not be the best known name on this side of the Atlantic, but in Reforming Theological Anthropology he has provided a wide-ranging, interdisciplinary discussion of two key theological questions: ‘What are we as human beings in relation to God?’, and ‘How do we know what we are?’

The study is prompted by the shift in philosophy from a predominantly individualistic matrix to ‘relationality’: seeing humans as relational beings. This shift resonates through psychology and other sciences and opens the way for a ‘reconstructing of the doctrines of human nature, sin and the image of God in the light of the challenges of late modernity’. Underpinning this reconstruction is the recognition, passé Calvin, that the knowledge we have of ourselves is reciprocal to our knowledge of God, the one shaping the other. Shults also recognises that philosophy and the sciences are in part returning to a relational understanding of humanity that has always existed in the church, even if it might have been clouded in the past by prevailing philosophies and cultures.

The first chapter surveys the use of the category of ‘relation’ in philosophy from the ancient Greeks to the present day. It is not intended to be exhaustive, but nonetheless it provides a useful overview of an important subject. I can easily recommend the book on the strength of this chapter alone.

Three major parts follow this survey. In Part I, Shults broadens the topic to discuss the shift to relationality in developmental psychology, pedagogical practice (learning and teaching) and ‘spiritual transformation’. The study is fascinating and touches on areas which will be familiar to readers of Themelios, such as the role of fear and repression in seminary education (!), and the notion of a ‘fiduciary’ framework (one involving faith) for developing our understanding of God and ourselves.

Part II traces the line of relational thought-forms through theological anthropology to the doctrines of the Trinity and the person and work of Christ. The latter, in chapter 7, looks usefully at the doctrine of anhypostasic/enhypostasic union. In Part III Shults gathers these strands into the task of ‘Transforming Theological Anthropolgy’, bringing his widely-informed idea of relationality to the doctrines of human nature, sin and imago dei. In each of these three chapters the outlines classical statements of the doctrine and then exposes these to the insights gained in Parts I and II.

I have only two critical comments. The first concerns vocabulary, which is often unnecessarily difficult. For instance, ‘propaedeutic’ could just as easily have been ‘preparatory’. The second criticism concerns what isn’t in the book. Such a wide-ranging study of the fiduciary framework would have benefited from engagement with Michael Polanyi. Anselm should have been at the table (he gets mentioned once in the by-going), as should John Zisioulas (see his Being as Communion: Studies in Personhood and the Church). Alan Torrance’s Persons in Communion: Trinitarian Description and Human Participation would have usefully informed the discussion of ‘Anthropology and Trinity: Constitutive Relationality in Barth and Pannenburg’.

Nonetheless, Shults’ book is highly stimulating; it constructively ranges over territory not often visited and is scattered with gems, such as this footnote on page 217: ‘human being is not a static substance, but a becoming—a dynamic, historically configured movement in search of a secure reality. Like human knowing and acting, human ‘being’ is also experienced as both gift and call’. Anyone concerned to connect the knowledge of ourselves and of God with recent developments in other disciplines will find that it repays careful reading.