Whoever defines the terms tends to win the debate. That explains many of the language games in our culture in the past century, but it goes back even further in history. Radical paradigms have blurred the meaning of words previously assumed to be solid. One clear example of this phenomenon is skeptics redefining terms regarding Christianity’s relationship with science. Those redefinitions recast the historical narrative into one of perpetual, inevitable conflict.
In Some New World: Myths of Supernatural Belief in a Secular Age, Peter Harrison—emeritus professor of the history of science at the University of Queensland, Australia—explores how Enlightenment thinkers and skeptics reshaped language to rewrite history. He argues that when David Hume (1711–1776), Thomas Huxley (1825–1895), and others reframed the relationship of science and religion as a conflict between naturalism and supernaturalism the debate was, for all intents and purposes, over. How they managed to dominate the culture, and how Christians enabled it, is this book’s theme.
Some New World: Myths of Supernatural Belief in a Secular Age
Peter Harrison
Some New World: Myths of Supernatural Belief in a Secular Age
Peter Harrison
In the Middle Ages, people saw the hand of God at work everywhere. Indeed, many suppose that “belief in the supernatural” is likewise fundamental nowadays to religious commitment. But dichotomizing between “naturalism” and “supernaturalism” is actually a relatively recent phenomenon, just as the notion of “belief” emerged historically late. In this masterful contribution to intellectual history, the author overturns crucial misconceptions—“myths”—about secular modernity, challenging common misunderstandings of the past even as he reinvigorates religious thinking in the present.
Defining Modernity
Many categories we commonly use to discuss religion and science are modern inventions. For example, Harrison writes, “The concepts of ‘belief’ and ‘supernatural’ as we presently understand them were not prominent in pre-modern Christianity nor, indeed, in other cultures” (3). Thinkers in this period redefined “religion” as a neutral, sociological category, detached from its historically integrated role in society. In a time of rapid social and religious change, major shifts in language and meaning were much easier to make.
The Reformation introduced an epistemological shift that allowed Enlightenment skeptics to exploit the resulting existential crisis. At the Diet of Worms, Luther declared that his “conscience was bound by the Word of God,” and unless he was convinced by “Scripture and clear reason,” then he couldn’t recant. According to Harrison, reformation Christianity came with “the insistence that we take personal responsibility for what we affirm and do so in possession of all the evidential grounds upon which we affirm it” (52). Both individual conscience and responsibility became vital.
The Reformation introduced an epistemological shift that allowed Enlightenment skeptics to exploit the resulting existential crisis.
But how was an individual supposed to adjudicate between competing truth claims, especially when the conflicting parties both claim sola scriptura? According to Harrison, this shift toward individual responsibility and the elevation of personal conscience over ecclesiastical authority laid the groundwork for later secular critiques of Christianity.
Protestant Arguments, Secular Claims
The reformers believed that the Bible provides all the epistemological warrant an individual needs. However, subsequent Protestant scholars, such as liberal German theologian David Strauss (1808–1874), employed an antisupernaturalist approach to biblical criticism that undercut biblical authority. In addition, Enlightenment thinkers like Hume and Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) appropriated Protestant skepticism toward Roman Catholic claims of extrabiblical miracles to discredit religious belief altogether.
For example, Hume used Reformation arguments against continuing Roman Catholic miracles to reject belief in miracles in general, including the events of the Bible. According to Harrison, “The logic of Hume’s preference for a naturalistic outlook, in the face of a long standing and cross-cultural consensus, rested upon assumptions of Western exceptionalism and historical progress” (353). The 17th-century Protestant apologists were the first to describe the medieval period as the “Dark Ages” and as a time of superstition, ignorance, and gullibility. Enlightenment skeptics happily affirmed that characterization.
Skeptics accepted these critiques, which contributed to the cultural narrative that the Enlightenment exalted human reason by rejecting the Bible’s supernatural claims. Yet Harrison argues naturalism owes its stability to the very theistic concepts it sought to supersede. The rationality of the universe, the belief in human capacity to understand it, and the idea of progress—all these concepts are borrowed from Christian theology, revealing an inherent dependence on its metaphysical foundations. Yet you’d never know that from common versions of Western intellectual history.
More than Epistemology
Some New World is not only a historical analysis of the faith/science debate but also a significant philosophical challenge to prevailing views on secularism and faith. Harrison’s dialogue partners are Brad Gregory (The Unintended Reformation), Charles Taylor (A Secular Age), and, to a lesser extent, John Milbank. He agrees with them that the Reformation created the epistemological dilemma that made our present secular age possible—an age in which unbelief is not only possible but the default position. Whether it’s amnesia or hubris, secular culture fails to realize what a historical anomaly it is or appreciate how dependent it is on biblical theism for its epistemology.
Naturalism owes its stability to the very theistic concepts it sought to supersede.
Harrison’s arguments are thorough, but they don’t cover other factors that gave rise to the Enlightenment skepticism. For example, in The Theological Origins of Modernity, Michael Gillespie recounts the horrors of the religious wars of the post-Reformation and early modern period—horrors that include the slaughter of everyone in entire towns and villages, including women and children. Also, in They Flew: A History of the Impossible, Carlos Eire details how during the same period there developed a mania against witches, in which 100,000 to 200,000 were executed—again resulting in nearly entire villages being wiped out, including children. The Enlightenment didn’t result merely from intellectual concerns; moral revulsion also played a role.
Reassessing Secularism
Some New World isn’t simply a history of how things went wrong. After a lifetime of study on the issue, Harrison calls for a reassessment of the prevailing secular narrative in what is, perhaps, his magnum opus. He suggests exploring the concept of “salience”—the notion that our view of the world is to a large degree shaped by our expectations. We need to revisit the role our preexisting theoretical commitments play in understanding reality. We need to challenge the terms and concepts used—particularly “natural” and “supernatural.”
He shows a new paradigm is in order. At present, the secular outlook dominates the social imaginary. Harrison suggests that understanding the historical reliance of secular thought on theological concepts could pave the way for a more nuanced dialogue between science and religion.
Most helpfully, Harrison reminds us that contemporary views on science and religion are constructed from historical narratives. These narratives are themselves fraught with revisions, reinterpretations, and conflicts. To those engaged in the faith/science debate, Harrison issues a call to recast the very grammar of the dialogue. Some New World is essential reading for those interested in the deep-rooted connections between Christianity and the secular ideologies of modernity.